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Abstract  
The target of non-profit organisation (NPO) accountability is efficacy in achieving the mission, 
the efficiency with resource use, risk-minimising and guarding against corruption (Mook, 2012). 
However, for a long time, the focus has been on efficient use of money and policing maleficence. 
The emphasis on functional accountability has created a narrow view off accountability as 
answering to donors at the expense of being accountable to the people they serve (Gent, Crescenzi, 
Menning & Reid, 2013; Mook, 2010: Murtaza, 2012). There has however been a shift inspired by 
normative ideas about the NPOs’ responsibility to their clients beyond “a moral responsibility to 
provide services that reflect their true needs” (Guo, 2007, p. 459). Despite this shift and the 
arguments for greater accountability to NPO clients, we still know very little about the role of 
client-communities as principals of NPOs. These principals have even received limited treatment 
in the theoretical economics literature (Jegers, 2015). This study, therefore, provides an economic 
investigation of the NPOs’ accountability to client-communities using South Africa as a case 
study. Its first applies spatial econometric techniques to test the hypothesis that if NPOs are 
responsive to the needs of the people, a correlation between NPO density and need should be 
evident. The study then draws from principal-agent theory and the rights-based approach to 
formulate a framework and construct propositions that can guide research on NPO accountability 
to client-communities. This research test three of the propositions: two related to the leadership 
characteristics correlated with greater accountability to these stakeholders and the other to the 
implications of greater NPO accountability for community satisfaction with the NPO’s operations. 
The findings showed that NPOs are geographically concentrated due to agglomeration benefits 
from knowledge and skills, as well as the availability of private philanthropic resources, but have 
broad geographic reach in terms of meeting the needs of communities. The organisations are also 
accountable to communities, which translated to favourable evaluations by community members. 
However, the findings showed that NPOs are more likely to be responsive if altruistic leaders with 
more education and experience control the organisations. Furthermore, revenue, location and 
organisational type are significant conditions for community accountability and the mediators of 
its relationship with community satisfaction. Overall, the findings lead to the conclusion that NPOs 
in South Africa, especially small community-based organisations are accountable to client-
communities. Nonetheless, we identified several limitations which could be addressed by future 
research. 
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Abstract (Dutch) 
Het uiteindelijke doel van non-profit ‘accountability’ is het realiseren van de doelstellingen van de 
betrokken organisatie, met een efficiënt gebruikt van middelen, beperking van risico, en het 
vermijden van corruptie (Mook, 2012). In de praktijk heeft de nadruk echter vooral gelegen in een 
efficiënt gebruik van fondsen en het vermijden van wangedrag, waardoor een beperkte visie is 
ontstaan op ‘accountability’: de focus lag eerder op de donors dan op de begunstigden van de 
organisaties (Gent, Crescenzi, Menning & Reid), 2013, Mook, 2010; Murtaza, 2012). Recentelijk 
is er echter een verschuiving waar te nemen, geïnspireerd door normatieve ideeën over de 
verantwoordelijkheid van non-profit organisaties ten opzichte van hun begunstigden die verder 
gaat dan ‘a moral responsibiility to provide services that relfect their true needs’ (Guo, 2017; p. 
459). Dit neemt niet weg dat nog steeds weinig geweten is over de rol van begunstigden (of 
begunstigde gemeenschappen) als prinicipalen van non-profit organisaties, ook niet in de 
theoretische literatuur (Jegers, 2015). Het voorliggend proefschrift beoogt daarom een 
economische studie van de ‘accountability’ van non-profit organisaties t.o.v. hun begunstigden, 
uitgevoerd met Zuid-Afrikaanse data. Het werk begint met een econometrische analyse die de 
volgende hypothese test: non-profit organisaties die sneller inspelen op de behoeften van hun 
begunstigden zullen zich eerder vestigen daar waar deze behoeften het grootst zijn. Vervolgens 
wordt, op basis van een principaal-agent benadering gecombineerd met een rechtengebaseerde 
benadering een theoretisch kader met bijhorende stellingen tot stand gebracht om een beter inzicht 
te verschaffen in ‘accountability’ t.o.v. begunstigden of begunstigde gemeenschappen. Twee 
proposities worden empirisch getest: de relatie van leiderschapskenmerken en ‘accountability’ 
t.o.v. begunstigden, en de relatie tussen ‘accountability’ en tevredenheid van de bereikte 
gemeenschappen met de activiteiten van de non-profit organisatie. Uit de analyses blijkt dat non-
profit organisaties geografisch geconcentreerd zijn ten gevolge van agglomeratievoordelen op het 
vlak van kennis en vaardigheden, maar ook van de beschikbaarheid van filantropische middelen, 
weliswaar met een ruim bereik in termen van het vervullen van de behoeften van de 
gemeenschappen. De organisaties legden ook voldoende verantwoording af t.o.v. de betrokken 
gemeenschappen, met een hoge tevredenhed tot gevolg. Daartegenover staat dat de organisaties 
sneller geneigd zijn tot reële ‘accountability’ als hun altruïstische leiders hoger opgeleid zijn en 
meer ervaring hebben. Daarenboven mediëren inkomen, locatie, en organisatietype de relatie 
tussen ‘accountability’ en tevredenheid van de begunstigde gemeenschappen. Samengevat kunnen 
we tot het besluit komen dat non-profit organisaties in Zuid-Afrika, en meer in het bijzonder de 
kleinere die ingebed zijn in de gemeenschappen, ruimschoots verantwoording afleggen aan hun 
begunstigden. Dit neemt niet weg dat er nog verschilende beperkingen en moeilijkheden zijn. Deze 
kunnen het voorwerp uitmaken van verder onderzoek  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“To alienate humans from their decision-making is to change them into objects.” (Paulo 
Freire, 1968) 
In economics, non-profit organisations occupy a position between the market and public sector to 
provide collective, private and public goods that are left un-catered for due to government and 
market failures (Hansmann, 1980; Steinberg, 2006). Hence, the field of non-profit economics has 
examined the economic roles of NPOs and their goals reflected in their behaviour (Brooks, 2005; 
Steinberg, 1986). In the field the types of individuals who self-select into the sector and their 
motivations have also been investigated (Badelt, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Other topics have 
covered the governance structures of the NPOs and their impact on organisational performance 
(Wellens & Jegers, 2014; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & Jegers, 2012). Overall, the non-profit 
economics has given much attention to how the organisations are structured to create social and 
economic value for society at large and the people dependent on their services.  
Despite the operations of NPOs being about the people they serve. the roles of actual and potential 
end users as NPO principals has received less attention, even in the theoretical economics literature 
(Jegers, 2015). The neglect is in contrasts with the importance and concomitant treatment of 
‘consumer sovereignty’ in market equilibrium or the influence of voters in public choice theories. 
In the field of NPO governance, neglect of client-communities is pronounced. The focus has 
mostly been on the principal role of the board of directors because they are supposed to act as the 
fiduciary of all other organisational stakeholders (Du Bois, Caers, Jegers, Schepers, De Gieter & 
Pepermans, 2004)  
Consequently, we have a limited economic understanding of the role of actual or potential clients 
as principals and the NPOs’ responsibility towards them. Questions remain about how 
communities influence NPOs’ behaviours and decisions; under what conditions they could have 
the opportunity to get involved and shape NPO decision-making or whether communities can 
derive private or social benefits from such participation. This research aims to address some of 
these questions by conducting an economic examination of the NPOs accountability to client-
communities.  
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1.1 Background 
Confidence in the non-profit form and perceptions that they are mission maximisers driven by 
altruistic motives gave them a competitive advantage in the provision of public goods and 
trustworthiness (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). The non-profit organisational form is governed by the 
non-distribution constraint, which restricts the distribution of residual profits (Hansmann, 1980). 
The purpose of the constraint was to give NPO principals the reassurance that they will not be 
exploited when they are ignorant about the organisations’ products in cases of information 
asymmetry and that they can be trusted (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001; Jegers, 2015; Rose -Ackerman, 
1996). The perceptions created included that social-entrepreneurs initiate the organisations as a 
response to need and mission drives their actions (Hansmann, 1980; Letts, Ryan & Grossman, 
1999).  
However, because the trustworthiness of the NPOs depends on the credibility of the non-
distribution constraint and the integrity of their governance structures (Young, 2000). The 
weaknesses of both in curbing opportunistic behaviour and the violation of public trust by some 
organisations resulted in calls for greater oversight and accountability for their actions and impact. 
On the African continent, the public and government view them with distrust and their 
effectiveness in facilitating development has been called into question (Nega & Scheider, 2014, p. 
497).  
Additionally, Since the 80s the size of the sector has dramatically increased together with the 
influence and resources it commands, in what was termed the ‘global associational revolution’ 
(Morton, 2013; Salamon, 1994; Salamon, 2010). Bottom-up growth in social action and the 
instrumentalisation of the organisations by the government and private sector resulted in an 
increase in their numbers across the globe (Casey 2016). There are no estimates of the exact figures 
of NPOs operating globally, but in South Africa, the number of registered organisations has more 
than doubled to 200 000 from the 85 248 registered in 2012 (Department of Social Development 
(DSD), 2018). Globally the organisations command about 1 trillion USD in resources (Salamon, 
2010). The results of the growth in the size and influence of NPOs, as well as the number of public 
monies entrusted to them, there has been increased pressure for accountability. This pressure has 
also thus been driven by the growing awareness that NPOs are also fallible and the need for them 
to illustrate their efficiency and effectiveness (Ebrahim, 2005)  
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Proponents of accountability and performance measurement argue that if organisations are 
accountable and show evidence of their impact and outcomes, they and society can gain efficiency, 
as well as private and social benefits (Murtaza, 2012). The argument is that accountability 
enhances incentives for improved performance, the understanding of community priorities, and 
shared learning (Wenar, 2006). By being accountable, organisations can also provide reassurance 
to resource providers that they will use funds provided as intended, thereby securing support, and 
increasing their credibility and ability to be change agents (Murtaza, 2012). Greater accountability 
can also help NPOs to avoid intrusive oversight mechanisms from external stakeholders and to 
protect themselves from political interference (Wenar, 2006; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006). 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Until recently, the sector neglected accountability to communities even though they are often 
directly and indirectly affected by the organisations’ actions. Non-profit organisations and society 
can gain from practising greater accountability, which is why its purpose in the sector has been on 
the effectiveness of the organisations in achieving their mission, their efficiency with resource use, 
risk-minimising and guarding against corruption (Mook, 2012). However, the focus has been on 
financial management creating a narrow view off accountability as reporting to donors about the 
proper use of resources (Gent, Crescenzi, Menning & Reid, 2013; Mook, 2010: Murtaza, 2012). 
The result of this is that NPO accountability has often been the weakest towards the people they 
serve (Murtaza, 2012).  
There has however been a gradual shift towards the recognition of the importance of the people 
being served. In international development accountability frameworks such as the AccountAbility 
1000 (AA 1000AP) and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) standards have been 
introduced to address the deficit in accountability to stakeholders impacted or affected by the 
organisations’ practices (AccountAbility, 2018; HAP, 2010). The AA 1000 framework includes 
principles such as inclusivity, materiality and responsiveness. Similarly, the HAP framework 
recognises that the essence of accountability is to respect the people in need and to be answerable 
to them about the organisations’ actions and decisions. The HAP framework also espouses to 
values such as respecting international law with regards to rights, reaffirming the responsibility of 
governments to target communities, acknowledging the duty of care shared by development actors 
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towards them and recognising the role of external constraints in formulated responses (HAP, 
2010).  
The shift has thus been inspired by the acceptance of normative ideas about the NPOs’ 
responsibility to the people they serve beyond “a moral responsibility to provide services that 
reflect their true needs” (Guo, 2007, p. 459). Non-profit organisations have an ethical obligation 
to foster a meaningful relationship with the people from which they claim to derive part of their 
mandate (Slim, 2002). Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2009) thus note that client 
community accountability is not legally defined in contracts nor enforceable but underpinned by a 
moral responsibility to stakeholders. The emerging rights-based approach to development with its 
emphasis on voice and agency is in line with these normative arguments. O’Dwyer and Unerman 
(2010) state that the approach politicises aspects of development such as community participation 
to improve accountability to recipients of development work from policymakers and other 
development agents. The approach also draws attention to the power imbalances, which often 
characterise development aid.  
Additional to moral, performance and efficiency arguments also support the case for greater 
accountability to client-communities. The relationship between the NPOs and their constituent 
communities is acknowledged as essential for their effectiveness because it eases trust and co-
operation. Accountability can also improve the impact of the organisations because people are 
more likely to use NPOs’ services if they have an active role in them (Mlodovosky, 2014). Good 
governance needs engagement with communities and their systematic involvement in evaluating 
organisational performance (Ebrahim, 2003, p. 819). 
Despite this shift, accountability to client-communities “as a practise of bottom-up development 
is rarely questioned” and recognised as important, yet, “little implemented” (Brennan (2010, p. 1). 
This study tries to provide knowledge that can bridge this gap between the appreciation of 
accountability to communities and organisational practice. It investigates the accountability 
relationships between NPOs and their client-communities and the factors that impact on these 
relationships using South Africa as a case-study. South Africa’s socio-economic and historical 
context, which has justified an important role for the NPOs and shaped the characteristics of the 
sector make the country an ideal location to study non-profit accountability. 
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1.3 South African NPO Sector 
South Africa is an upper middle-income country, one of the stable democracies and the largest 
economies in Africa. However, it has faced many challenges that have required the non-profit 
sector to step in and play a significant role. In 2017 the country’s GDP stood at 300 billion USD 
(World Bank, 2018), while the Gini coefficient estimates showed income inequality at 0.57. Fifty-
five and twenty-five percent of the population are income and multidimensionally poor, 
respectively (David et al., 2018). The country also suffers from challenges in service delivery, 
which are evidenced by increases in service delivery protests (Gordon, Roberts & Struwig, 2015). 
The population has also lost confidence in the government, which has resulted in the level of trust 
in government from 43% in 2011 to 35% in 2015 (Chingwete, 2016). 
Due to these challenges NPOs “have taken on expanded roles as the government seeks to provide 
social and other services in more flexible, and cost-effective ways” and they are central to 
community engagement and building social capital (Stats SA, 2015, p. vi). Government’s 
proclamation to be a ‘developmental state’ has also helped to define this role. Consequently, the 
functions of NPOs in the country mirror the development needs of the people and are linked to the 
government’s priorities. Due to the expanded role of NPOs in South Africa, the sector has 
experiences exponential growth over the years, and the number of registered organisations stood 
at 200, 000 in 2018 (DSD, 2018). 
Though the number of NPOs has increased, the NPO register data shows their uneven distribution 
across South Africa. Gauteng (32%) and Kwa -Zulu-Natal (20%) house over 50% of the NPO 
sector, with the rest shared among the remaining seven provinces (DSD, 2018). A brief review of 
the literature also shows geographical clustering in the sector. For example, in the NPO study 
conducted in 1999, it was reported that organisations who received more government funding, and 
who are more formal tended to locate in urban working and middle class than deprived areas 
(Swilling & Russel). In 2008, the National Development Agency (NDA) audit of NPOs showed 
that over 80% of the sampled organisations were in the Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu-Natal, and the Western 
and Eastern Cape provinces. Of the 80%, 31% were in Gauteng and 22% in the Western Cape, 
provinces with higher incomes and levels of development. A small percentage of NPOs chose poor 
provinces like Limpopo (3%), Mpumalanga (3%) and Northern Cape (2%) as the place of their 
headquarters (NDA, 2008).  
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The uneven geographical distribution of NPOs could be the result of the country’s history, which 
has created the unequal distribution of economic development and deprivation. For example, 
according to the 1996 and 2011 census data Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu-Natal, and the Western Cape 
provinces contributed about 65% to the South African economy (Stat SA, 2011). Similarly, 
metropolitan municipalities within these provinces, namely Johannesburg, eThekwini, and Cape 
Town contributed about 35% to the South African economy in 2011 (David et al., 2018). The 
population has also tended to follow these patterns, with the Western Cape and Gauteng provinces 
making up about 35% of the country’s total population (David et al., 2018).  
Even though the available studies suggest the unequal spatial distribution of NPOs and 
development in the country we have limited understanding of the spatial interaction between the 
geographical spread of NPOs and various development indicators. There is, to our knowledge, no 
work in the country that has investigated this relationship, except for (Burger, Jegers, Seabe, 
Owens & Vanroose, 2017), who showed that poorer provinces have a lower NPO density. The 
study, however, was aggregated at the provincial level and only examined the effects of poverty 
and revenue. More studies are therefore needed to examine whether the spatial inequalities evident 
in economic activity and deprivation persist in the NPO sector. 
More importantly, understanding the spatial relationship between NPO density, resources and 
needs is important for accountability. One of the key tenets of accountability is responsiveness, 
where the organisations act to meet the substantive expectations of the organisations by fulfilling 
the needs of their client-communities (Koppell, 2005). The NPO’s “active response to the poor” 
will also have positive outcomes for the organisations leverage and legitimacy (Grønbjerg, 1990; 
p. 209). Responsiveness is unlikely if the distribution of the organisations has little correlation 
with the needs of the people they aim to serve. South Africa with its unequal spatial distribution 
of NPO density, needs and resources provides the ideal context to investigate how NPOs manage 
the trade-off between the practical need for resources and addressing the needs of the stakeholders. 
Furthermore, despite the expanded developmental role of NPOs in South Africa there is little 
scientific research on community-facing accountability. The widespread reliance of government 
on NPO partnerships to deliver services to communities provides the opportunity to test how NPOs 
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practice accountability to these stakeholders, the factors that influence their accountability 
decisions, and in turn, how greater accountability may affect the organisation’s performance.  
Additionally, NPO register data shows that over 90 % of the organisations in the country are small 
community-based organisations (CBOs) (DSD, 2015). They help to meet community needs left 
unattended by the government (Ranchod, 2007). Leaders play a significant role in the daily 
operations and the strategic directions of these types of organisations. Their large number in the 
South African NPO sector provides the opportunity to test whether there are any leadership 
differences, which may affect the adoption and implementation of community-facing NPO 
responsibility.  
1.4 Dissertation Overview  
The aim of the dissertation is to understand how NPOs enact accountability and the factors that 
impact on their responsibility towards client-communities. The literature identifies several factors 
that may impact on this form of accountability including resource dependence, the attitudes of 
NPO staff including NPO leaders, and lack of clarity and evidence on the outcomes of community-
facing accountability (Dubnick, 2005; Kilby, 2006; Schmitz and Mitchell, 2009). This dissertation 
investigates some these factors further.  
In Chapter 2, the dissertation begins with the examination of the geography of NPOs. It tries to 
understand what demand and supply factors go into explaining the locations of the organisations. 
It does this by applying spatial econometric techniques to South African data guided by Krugman’s 
agglomeration theory and Wilson’s NPO spatial theory. The chapter tries to show that if NPOs are 
responsive, they should be found in places with the greatest need as a response to the demand for 
their services. However, resources may also explain the geographical distribution of NPOs because 
they require them to function. This chapter thus investigates how the organisations navigate the 
trade-off between being responsive to their needs for resources and sustainability and the needs of 
communities who require their services when they make their strategic decisions about locations.  
Chapter 3 lays the conceptual and theoretical foundation. Drawing from principal-agent theory and 
the rights-based framework the chapter discusses the meaning and purpose of NPOs accountability 
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to client-communities as principals of the organisations and develops a framework which can be 
used to understand how NPOs’ make decisions to be accountable to these constituents. 
 The chapter concludes with a set of propositions, which can be used to director further research 
on the topic in economics. Three of the propositions guide the research in Chapters 5 and 6. In 
Chapter 4 the South African data and sample used to address the research problems in the 
subsequent chapters are discussed.  
Chapter 5 responds to Wellens and Jegers (2014b, p. 228) call for more research that examines the 
relationship between characteristics of managers (demographic, education, and organisational 
funding) and the implementation of client-centred decision-making approaches. The chapter 
investigates how individual-level differences among leaders may correlate with variations in 
attitudes and the acceptance of participatory values in NPOs. The research focuses on the leaders’ 
individual-level differences based on the argument that they are the ones who wield the most 
influence in organisations. They are positioned to be able to guide strategic decisions in NPOs 
including those about accountability to client-communities. The chapter uses Logit regression 
analysis applied to the South African NPO survey dataset described in Chapter 4 to answer the 
research questions.  
In the accountability literature arguments have been made that when NPOs show greater 
responsibility to their client-communities they can improve efficiency and community wellbeing 
(Ebrahim, 2003; Mlodovosky, 2014; Morrison & Salipante, 2007). However, concerns have been 
raised that such claims about the benefits of client accountability, especially participation, have 
been made with limited substantive evidence to back them (Burger, Dasgupta & Owens, 2016; 
Wellens & Jegers, 2014a). Chapter 6 responds to these concerns, and answers the question of how 
greater accountability to client-communities relates to community satisfaction as reported by 
community members? The chapter also draws from the South African data but uses both the survey 
and focus group responses to estimate structural equation models. 
The chapters of this dissertation, therefore, contribute to the understanding of the broader topic of 
NPO accountability to client-communities. Mainly, are NPOs responsive to the needs of 
communities when they make their strategic decisions about locations? What it also contributes is 
a framework that can be applied to understand the different components and factors that shape 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
 
NPOs decisions about accountability to community stakeholders. Additionally,  the understanding 
of which leaders are likely to be more responsive to community inputs and of the relationship 
between greater client-community accountability and community satisfaction. These contributions 
are discussed in Chapter 7 after we review the main findings. The chapter also includes the 
limitations of the research and proposals for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2: SPATIAL AUTOCORRELATION IN NPO-DENSITY: THE 
ROLE OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY  
Abstract 
The belief that NPOs are flexible, resourceful and responsive to the needs of communities has 
pushed them to the forefront of development implementation. Where these organisations are 
established is thus important: proximity to the people they serve allows them to assess, adapt and 
respond to community needs accordingly. However, where NPOs cluster may not necessarily 
match the places of greatest need. Due to the importance of NPOs’ responsiveness for their 
accountability to communities, this research examines whether NPOs agglomerate in places with 
the greatest need as a response to the demand for their services, but it also examines how the supply 
of resources impacts on NPO agglomeration because resources are required to initiate and sustain 
their initiatives. 
Applying spatial econometric techniques to geo-coded South African data, the chapter investigates 
the demand and supply factors responsible for agglomeration in the South African NPO sector. 
Additionally, it examines whether there are cross-border effects from the changes in NPO density, 
and demand and supply indicators of neighbouring regions. Our estimates show that property 
ownership and education have a statistically significant and robust direct relationship with NPO 
density. Additionally, NPOs respond to demand in both their direct locations and in neighbouring 
regions. These results should prompt further investigation into the cross-border interactions 
between NPO density and its correlates, an area which has received limited attention in the 
literature thus far.  
Keywords: agglomeration, cross-subsidisation, NPO density, spatial autocorrelation 
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2.1  Introduction  
The belief that NPOs are flexible and responsive have pushed them to the forefront of development 
implementation. Society perceives them as unique private entities that are serving a public purpose, 
and who are endowed with special characteristics such as agility, closeness to people and an ability 
to harness private support for a public purpose (Salamon, Sokolowski & List, 2003). Where the 
organisations locate is thus significant, because proximity allows them to assess, as well as adapt 
and respond to community needs accordingly. When optimally located in places with the greatest 
need, which government is unable to reach, NPOs can assist with addressing “the most urgent 
services to the poor, reduce fiscal stress, and avoid further costs associated with high-poverty 
concentration” (Joassart-Marcelli & Wolch, 2003, p. 92). Understanding the locations of NPOs is 
thus important for development policy implementation, the equal distribution of services, and 
NPOs’ accountability to client communities (Da Costa, 2016; Fruttero & Gauri, 2005). 
However, where NPOs locate may not necessarily match the places of greatest need. Places with 
an already large number of NPOs are likely to attract more of these organisations, which are 
enticed by the possibility of economies of scale, in other words, the achievement of organisational 
goals at a lower cost due to resource, technology and information spillovers (Bielefeld & Murdoch, 
2004; Koch, 2007; Pinch, Henry, Jenkins, & Tallman, 2003). As a result, instead of ensuring the 
fair distribution of services, NPOs may entrench the existing geographical disparities in service 
provision and differences in opportunities for voluntary and civic participation (Clifford, 2012; 
Mercer, 2003).  
Clifford (2011) saw the uneven distribution of NPOs as something to theoretically expect: the 
demand for public goods is distributed unequally, and the supply of resources and social 
‘entrepreneurs’ also varies with geography. Demand and supply theories have therefore tried to 
provide explanations for the unequal spatial configurations in the NPO sector (Barr & Fafchamps, 
2006; Bielefeld, 2000; Dreyer. Mölders & Nunnenkamp, 2007; Grønbjerg & Paarlberg, 2001). 
Different theories of NPO demand propose that they form to satisfy the preferences of diverse 
groups, which is why more are found in localities with higher levels of deprivation and greater 
income, ethnic, and social diversity (Salamon, 1987; Salamon, Sokolowski & Anheier, 2000; 
Young, 2000). Supply theories, on the other hand, explain that the organisations are more likely to 
concentrate in areas where they have greater access to economic and social capital, which facilitate 
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the formation as well as the running of the organisations (Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, 1992; 
Bielefeld & Murdoch, 2004; Corbin, 1999; Fruttero & Gauri, 2005; Lecy, 2010; Saxton & Benson, 
2005). These demand and supply explanations are enlightening in terms of explaining where NPOs 
are more likely to be found. However, they suffer from several limitations. With this research, we 
contribute to the field of NPO governance and geography by addressing some of these issues.  
Firstly, the studies seldom consider the link between NPO locations and accountability. This 
research links accountability and geography by testing the proposition that if NPOs are responsive 
to the people they serve, a correlation between NPO density and need should be evident. 
Accountability to clients does not begin once the organisations are formed and delivering services, 
but should begin at the inception of an NPO, especially when founded on a mission centred on 
service to others. One of the raisons d’être of NPOs is their responsiveness to need, which is one 
of the cornerstones of non-profit accountability (Balser & McClusky, 2005; Barret, 2001; Koppel, 
2005; Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, p. 297). If NPOs are indeed responsive, they should be 
found in places of most need. 
However, research shows that NPOs sometimes fail to target poor areas (Joassart-Marcelli & 
Wolch, 2003). For example, ordinary-least-squares regression analyses showed that poverty-
stricken areas in California had low NPO density and were served by organisations with fewer 
resources (Joassart-Marcelli & Wolch, 2003). In international organisations, poverty plays a 
subordinate role in the organisations’ location decision. Koch, Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 
(2009) reported that despite poverty playing a role in the location decisions of international NPOs, 
they are more likely to be found in less challenging environments where other NPOs are present, 
and in places where they have shared commonalities such as religion. These organisations are also 
more likely to mimic the funding decisions of institutional donors because of their dependence on 
donor funding (Fruttero & Gauri, 2005; Koch et al., 2009).  
Notwithstanding that NPOs require resources to operate, are they not more likely to be accountable 
to the people they serve when they prioritise need in their location choices? However, needs may 
be a prerequisite but not enough for non-profits to concentrate in specific areas. For this reason, 
the research also accounts for the impact of resources based on the findings of previous research 
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that NPO density correlates positively to financial contributions and skilled entrepreneurs (Ben-
Ner & Van Hoomissen, 1992; Bielefeld & Murdoch, 2004; Corbin, 1999). 
Additionally, most studies on this topic focus on developed countries, especially the United States 
of America. A few have appeared from developing countries in Asia and South America (Da Costa, 
2016; Fruttero & Gauri, 2005), while in Africa, Barr and Fafchamps (2006) studied Ugandan NPOs 
and Brass (2012) studied Kenyan NPOs. Koch and Ruben (2008) also investigated NPOs in the 
Central African Republic and Tanzania. In South Africa, Moshabela, Gitomer and Schneider., 
(2013) studied the formation of health and social services NPOs in Bushbuckridge, a municipality 
in Mpumalanga, using a longitudinal qualitative design.  
In these studies, only a few explicitly modelled spatial interdependence, mainly Bielefeld and 
Murdoch (2004), Yan, Guo and Paarlberg (2014) and Da Costa (2016). Joassart-Marcelli and 
Wolch (2003) only tested for spatial autocorrelation by mapping the ordinary least-squares (OLS) 
residuals, and computing Moran’s I. They proceeded with OLS because they found no evidence 
of spatial dependence in their estimated model.  
Although these studies reported conflicting results with regards to the impact of geography, they 
share an appreciation for the need to consider the effects of spatial interdependence (Bielefeld & 
Murdoch, 2004; Da Costa, 2016; Yan, et al., 2014). Bielefeld and Murdoch (2004) warned that 
not considering spatial interdependence risks model misspecification through omitted variables, 
which increases the risk that estimates will be biased and inferences misleading (Anselin & 
Arribas-Bel, 2013).  
Over and above this, spatial models offer a more parsimonious way of accounting for spatial 
dependence than using regional fixed effects to account for the spatial autocorrelation (Le Sage & 
Pace, 2004). Models using region fixed effects “assume homogeneity and no interconnection 
between regions, whereas a spatial model allows the degree of similarity to be estimated” (Ward 
& Gleditsch, 2008, p. 64). Estimating similarities seems more intuitive in the geographical context, 
where “everything is related to everything else, but near things more related than distant things” 
(Tobler, 1970, p. 236).  
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Furthermore, of the studies that have examined the effect of spatial association, none to our 
knowledge have considered how the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the chosen covariates 
may influence NPO density. Poverty, income, inequality and other variables used to explain the 
locations of NPOs are more likely to exhibit similar quantities in nearby locations. For example, 
David et al. (2018) reported positive and significant spatial dependence in the South African 
development indicators, poverty and inequality. Additionally, given the country’s history, cross-
subsidisation of NPO services is likely between wealthier regions with the means to start and 
operate an NPO and poorer regions with need but without the means. 
Regional cross-subsidisation of non-profit services may not only be peculiar in unequal societies 
like South Africa. More resourced and institutionally dense areas such as cities and metropolitans 
with the infrastructure to accommodate higher concentrations of NPOs may also cater to the needs 
of close-by suburban or rural areas (Bielefeld &Murdoch, 2004). The possibility of cross-border 
spill-overs from changes in explanatory factors provides the rationale for understanding the impact 
of spatial dependence in the independent variables on NPO density. By estimating spatial 
econometrics models with the spatially dependent outcome and explanatory variables, the research 
also contributes the application of spatial econometrics techniques to the study of NPO locations. 
Applying spatial analysis could assist in understanding agglomeration in the NPO sector (Bielefeld 
& Murdoch, 2004).  
The research also tested for the impact of human capital on the supply of non-profits, which has 
only been examined by limited studies. Where studies account of the impact of education, it serves 
as a proxy for socioeconomic status (Joassart-Marcelli & Wolch, 2003). Van Puyvelde and Brown 
(2016), however, noted the importance of education in the supply of NPOs by demand-side 
stakeholders.1 
The goals of the research were therefore as follows: To examine the presence of agglomeration 
economies, measured as NPO density and positive spatial interdependence in the outcome 
variable. To test whether spillovers from the demand and supply predictors is another source of 
the spatial interdependence in NPO density. To achieve the aims, propositions informed by an 
                                                          
1 Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (1991, p.521) described demand side stakeholders as “coalitions of individuals who 
associate to provide themselves and others with goods or services that are not adequately supplied by either for-
profit or government organisations”. 
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integrated NPO spatial theory, which incorporated Krugman’s (1992) agglomeration and 
Wilson’s (1989) NPOs spatial theory were formulated. The propositions were tested by applying 
spatial econometric techniques to the South African data.  
In the next section, the spatial model of NPO density is presented. The discussion of the model is 
followed by a description of the data and sample in Section 2.3 and the empirical approach in 
Section 2.4. A description of the model variables is included in Section 2.5, followed by a 
discussion of the results in Section 2.6 and the conclusion in Section 2.7.  
2.2 Spatial Model of NPO Density  
The framework presented draws from Krugman’s (1991; 1992; 1999) and Wilson’s (1989) 
theories, which explain why some regions may attract greater NPO activity and help us to identify 
the factors that may drive this pattern. Agglomeration theory, nested in New Economic Geography 
theory, elucidates why it is the case that certain regions will be centres of economic activity 
(Krugman, 1999). The theory predicts the spatial configuration of firm locations driven by the 
tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces, which cause the agglomeration or dispersion of 
economic activity (Krugman, 1992). Wilson’s (1989) theory also predicts geographical variation 
in non-profit firm locations and identifies needs, resources and entrepreneurship as the possible 
forces responsible. The theory, like agglomeration theory, presents demand and supply 
explanations of NPO density, but differs in that it is specific to the non-profit sector. Consequently, 
together the theories provide a good foundation from which to understand the spatial configuration 
of NPO density across regions.  
 Spatial agglomeration in the NPO sector  
NPOs studies have identified geographical concentration in the NPO sector (Bielefeld, Murdoch 
& Waddel, 1997; Bielefeld & Murdoch, 2004; Da Costa, 2016; Koch et al., 2008). Non-profit 
organisations tend to agglomerate, resulting in a duplication of services and the enforcement of 
existing inequalities in service delivery (Bebbington, 2004; Fruterro & Guari, 2005; Fyfe & 
Milligan, 2003; Koch & Ruben, 2008).  
Krugman (1999) predicted economic agglomeration because there are benefits present from the 
concentration of firms and people due to a circular relationship that exists between the markets 
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and firms (Glaeser, 2010). Agglomeration can occur as localisation economies, which is when 
similar firms or firms located within related industries cluster in the same area (Malmberg & 
Maskell, 2002). Accordingly, studies have used measures defining clusters, which are the 
geographic concentrations of industries and sectors, such as quantities of firms or production plants 
in a specific area (Delgado, Porter & Stern, 2015; Glaeser, 2010). For this paper, we, therefore, 
used NPO density to measure agglomeration. 
However, agglomeration can also display as spatial interdependence in NPO density across 
municipalities (Bielefeld & Murdoch, 2004; Da Costa, 2016). Cross-border spillovers are likely 
because municipalities are political boundaries that may have no correspondence with the reality 
on the ground. Neighbouring regions may have similar levels of NPO density, resulting in their 
clustering over larger geographical areas.  Therefore: 
Proposition I: The higher the NPO density in neighbouring municipalities, the higher the NPO 
density in a municipality. 
 Causes of NPO agglomeration  
If NPOs concentrate in specific regions, it is important to ask why they do so. According to 
agglomeration theory, centripetal forces, which pull economic activity together, drive the 
concentration of firms. Locations with good access to demand and supply markets will attract 
greater economic activity, which in turn further improves markets (Krugman, 1992). Firms can 
locate in areas with established organisations to benefit from labour pooling, knowledge spillovers 
and the reduction of transport costs related to goods, people and ideas (Baum & Havenman, 1997; 
Ellison, Glaeser & Kerr, 2010; Gottlieb, 1995). However, NPOs are different from for-profit firms 
in terms of the factors driving their spatial configuration (Bielefeld & Murdoch, 2004). 
Wilson (1989) noted that it is the social, economic and political parameters of each location that 
will explain the geography of NPOs, given that their nature involves mission and welfare as 
opposed to profit maximisation. The agglomeration pathways identified in the NPO sector are 
increased productivity and reduced costs because of proximity to target markets, access to 
resources, shared infrastructure, large labour markets, knowledge sharing, the presence of 
networks and supportive institutions (Bielefeld & Murdoch, 2004, p. 224; Delgado, Porter & Stern, 
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2015; Koch & Ruben, 2008). In this study, we focused on three of these demand and supply factors, 
which Wilson (1989) grouped under needs, resources and entrepreneurs. 
2.2.2.1 Needs as demand for NPOs  
Since the role of NPOs is to improve welfare, needs are the conditions that elicit a response from 
NPOs that will result in a geographically uneven distribution of demand for the organisations 
because they are variable distributed (Wilson, 1989). They include the economic, cultural and 
welfare requirements that arise from space-specific factors such as economic development, history, 
discrimination, lack of access to alternative services and cultural needs (Wilson, 1989).  
Before we proceed, it is important to note that the extent that NPOs go to fulfil these needs will 
depend on the division of the market for the goods and services that they produce, between them 
and the for-profit and public sectors. NPOs are more likely to address needs for which they have 
a comparative advantage. Due to a non-distribution constraint, they are more likely to address 
needs in the instance of public and trust goods characterised by various degrees of non-
excludability, non-rivalry and information asymmetry (Van Puyvelde & Brown, 2016). The non-
distribution constraint inspires perceptions of NPOs as being more trustworthy (Young, 2000).  
That said, the needs for NPO services may arise from the plurality of preferences that are a function 
of economic and social diversity. NPOs will locate in more heterogenous locales because diverse 
needs require a diverse set of organisations (Clifford, 2011; Nemenoff, 2008). The most diverse 
neighbourhoods are therefore more likely to be ‘institutionally-rich’ than racially and 
economically homogeneous neighbourhoods (Rutherford, 2004). Furthermore, people living in 
destitution are more likely to require the assistance of others, leading to an increase in the demand 
for NPO services (Rutherford, 2004; Peck, 2008; Kim, 2015). Therefore:  
Proposition II: The greater the needs, the greater the NPO density is in a municipality. 
We also expect the needs of the population to have spillover effects, such that NPO density is 
correlated with need in close-by municipalities. People may cross political boundaries to find 
organisations that cater to their unmet needs. Additionally, due to South Africa’s history of 
segregation, which is mirrored in the country’s geography, poor areas exist alongside wealthy 
areas, which makes it possible that a need in poor region i is met in the wealthy region j, leading 
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to a situation where deprivation in the poor municipality increases NPO density in adjacent 
wealthier municipalities. As a result:  
Proposition IIb: The greater the level of need in neighbouring municipalities, the higher the NPO 
density.  
2.2.2.2 Supply of financial resources  
Both agglomeration and Wilson’s (1989) theory predict that the locations with higher NPO density 
will be those with an enabling environment that includes better excess to private and public 
financial resources (Bielefeld & Murdoch, 2004; Nemenoff, 2008; Yan et al., 2014). Communities 
with higher levels of philanthropic propensity are therefore more likely to have higher NPO 
density, as part of the budgets of NPOs are derived from private donations and user fees (Lecy, 
2010). Level of wealth is an important indicator of philanthropic propensity and can be measured 
by the level of income or other indicators, (such as property ownership). 
Proposition IIIa: Municipalities showing high levels of philanthropic propensity will also exhibit 
higher NPO density. 
Here we also expect spatial spillover from the philanthropic propensity in neighbouring 
municipalities. High philanthropic propensity in adjacent municipalities could signal the 
availability of funds, which attract more organisations, resulting in an increase in NPO density in 
those regions and a decrease in the municipality.  
Proposition IIIb: The higher the philanthropic propensity is in neighbouring municipalities, the 
lower the NPO density. 
Resources also include the level of government expenditure on the provision of public goods and 
the budget available for government grants to NPOs. Heterogeneity theory sees government 
expenditure as negatively related to philanthropic participation; when government fails, private 
citizens will step up to fill the void through NPOs, in other words. “to the extent that the 
government is providing such collective goods, the need for non-profit provision would decline” 
(Salamon, et al., 2000, p. 12). Whereas demand heterogeneity theory assumes rivalry between 
NPOs and government, inter-dependency theory postulates a more collaborative coexistence 
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between the two sectors, especially with organisations providing welfare service (Kim, 2015; 
Young 2000) where NPOs contribute the expertise and government the revenue to provide services 
(Salamon et al., 2000).  
There are numerous reasons why governments could choose to work with NPOs, for example 
when there is resistance to direct state action but a demand for public goods, or where support for 
NPOs legitimises the role and strengthens the power of the government, such as in the case of 
Kenyan NPOs (Salamon et al., 2000; Brass, 2012). In line with inter-dependence theory, Wilson 
(1989) saw at least three reasons why the government would support NPOs. The government sees 
them as efficient producers of services, a means to avoid controversy, and as a neutral ground for 
multi-sector activity (Wilson, 1989). The public sector may thus recognise the comparative 
advantage of NPOs in the provision of public goods and provide financial support to stimulate 
provision (Matsunaga, Yamauchi & Yokuyama, 2010).  
Inter-dependency theory has received more support than government failure theory in the literature 
(Lecy, 2010). Salamon et al. (2000) reported a significant positive relationship between 
government social spending and the size of the non-profit sector. Kim and Kim (2018), meanwhile, 
found evidence to support the inter-dependence theory’s significance, in that there is a positive 
relationship between government expenditure for social protection and non-profit growth. A high 
density of organisations receiving government grants that were involved in economic development 
was found in poorer communities in the UK (Clifford, 2011). Thus Lecy and Van Slyke (2012) 
concluded that NPO density is greater and more significant when a government collaborates with 
them.  
Proposition IV: Municipalities with greater public spending and spending on NPO grants will 
have a larger density of NPOs. 
When examining the effects of government expenditure and grants to NPOs, it is important to be 
conscious of the possibility of endogeneity arising from omitted variable bias or simultaneity. 
There may be omitted variables, such as an enabling policy environment, correlated with both 
NPO density and government expenditure whose effect is captured by the government expenditure 
variable. The inclusion of the lagged outcome variable may correct some of this bias. Besides, the 
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coefficients are interpreted as correlations rather than causal effects of explanatory variables on the outcome 
variables.   
2.2.2.3  Supply of entrepreneurs  
Centripetal forces could also include the level of entrepreneurship in a region. In this study, we 
used the percentage of the adult population with tertiary education to proxy for entrepreneurship. 
Education is one of the individual characteristics that explain entrepreneurship, alongside age, 
gender and immigration. Although we could not find spatial studies of NPO entrepreneurship, in 
the for-profit sector spatial variation in entrepreneurs is noted as large and persistent over time, 
driven by factors such as entrepreneurial culture, peer effects (networks and social multipliers) and 
spatial selection, where latent regional characteristics attract people with entrepreneurial abilities 
(Anderson & Larsson, 2014). We can expect similar patterns in NPO entrepreneurship because 
both roles require high levels of skill, innovation and motivation. The spatial variation of 
entrepreneurs is thus likely to lead to variation in NPO density across municipalities (Wilson, 
1989, p. 21). Places with greater availability of NPO entrepreneurs are therefore likely to have 
higher NPO densities.  
Proposition Va: NPOs density will be positively related to the density of NPO entrepreneurs in the 
municipality.  
Spatial spillovers from changes in the levels of entrepreneurship in adjacent municipalities are also 
expected. NPO density may have an inverse relationship with levels of entrepreneurs in adjacent 
municipalities if they cannot find the resources required to start an organisation in their 
municipality. Therefore:  
Proposition Vb: The higher entrepreneurship is in neighbouring municipalities, the higher NPO 
density will be in a municipality. 
2.2.2.4 Population  
Agglomeration theory also states that improved market access due to reduced search costs for 
demand and supply markets is one of the main reasons why economic activity may cluster in 
certain geographical areas, especially urban areas (Krugman, 1999). Although our focus is not on 
the effects of population, this study controlled for the population because it may indicate the 
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potential demand and labour markets faced by NPOs, as well as the available resources (Saxton & 
Benson, 2005; Van Puyvelde & Brown, 2016). The size population could proxy for Marshallian 
urbanisation economies where firms or sectors benefit from the externalities generated by 
urbanisation (Henderson, 2003). Therefore: 
Proposition VI: The greater the population, the higher the NPO density in a municipality.  
2.3 Model Covariates  
The covariates of NPO density are presented in Table 2.1 with the expected sign of coefficients 
and a brief description of the variables. The population variable is included as a proxy for market 
size and the potential resource pool. We also included the proportions for people living in poverty. 
Poverty is a measure often used to study the effect of need on NPO density (Lecy & Van Slyke, 
2012; Peck, 2008). Property ownership was included as an indicator of private philanthropic 
propensity, and we expected it to have a positive sign. Municipal government expenditure and 
municipal grants to NPOs were also included as indicators of potential and actual income to NPOs 
from the public sector. As a proxy for entrepreneurship, we included the proportion of the 
population with a tertiary education qualification. Jiménez et al. (2015) reported a positive 
relationship between tertiary education and formal entrepreneurship; we expected the coefficient 
on education to have a positive sign. 
Table 2.1: Covariates of NPO Density Description (with expected sign in parentheses) 
Variable and expected sign Description 
Market size 
Population (+) Population size per municipality  
Needs (demand) variables 
Poor (+) The proportion of poor people in each municipality  
Resources variables 
Property ownership (+) The proportion of people who own property in a municipality, including 
paid up and not paid up properties  
Municipal expenditure (+/-) Total municipal expenditure (R 000) per annum  
Grants (+) Municipal grants (dummy=1 if municipalities give grants to NPOs) 
Entrepreneurship 
Higher education (+) The proportion of the population over 21 who have a higher education  
2.4  Data and Sample  
To test the above propositions, we used a merged data set comprised of the NPO register, as well 
as demographic and municipal finance data. The NPO register includes data of all the NPOs in 
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South Africa that were registered with the Department of Social Development’s (DSD) NPO 
Directorate before or in the year 2014. Non-profit organisations in South Africa have the choice 
to register for NPO status with the NPO registrar at the DSD. Registration is voluntary and free. 
However, organisations must be registered to benefit from government funding. In 2014, 123 891 
organisations were on the NPO database and marked as registered. Our data included these 
organisations, aggregated at the municipality level, as the unit of analysis for this study. The study 
sample, therefore, consisted of the 234 municipalities in South Africa.  
The information on the independent variables is drawn from data from various departments at 
Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). For the need (proportion of poor people), some of the resources 
(proportion of the population who own property), and entrepreneurship (proxied by the proportion 
of the population with higher education) variables we used the 2011 census data. Information about 
government expenditure and municipality grants to NPOs was drawn from Statistics South 
Africa’s municipal finance data. Although most government funding to NPOs is distributed by the 
provincial DSD and through other national and provincial departments by way of service 
agreements, some municipalities distribute funding to NPOs to help them achieve their 
development mandate. 
2.5 Approach: Spatial Econometrics Analysis  
Spatial econometric analysis was used to achieve the goals of this research due to the geographical 
nature of the model propositions and data. At its core, spatial econometrics entails non-linear 
model specifications and estimations to account for spatial autocorrelation (Griffith, 2000). Spatial 
autocorrelations may arise as the result of past and current behaviours of agents, influencing the 
decisions and transactions of other economic agents (LeSage & Pace, 2004). Not controlling for 
these effects may lead to estimated results being biased and therefore unreliable, and no longer 
meeting the least squares criterion (Anselin, 1988; Arbia, 2014; Corrado & Fingleton, 2012; Lecy 
& Van Slyke, 2012).  
 Spatial weights  
The analysis commenced with the creation of a spatial weight matrix, which is an essential part of 
the spatial analysis (Arbia, 2014; Lambert, Brown & Florax., 2010). Spatial weights matrices, 
which are exogenous to the model, provide information about the nature of the relationship 
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between the units of observation (Anselin, 1988; Arbia, 2014). The connectivity matrix W is a 
fixed non-stochastic and positive definite Ν × 𝑁𝑁 matrix with elements wij, which equal 1 if units 
are connected and 0 if not. The elements thus provide information about one observational unit’s 
connectivity to another, for example, between observation 𝒾𝒾 and observation 𝑗𝑗 (Anselin, 2001; 
Arbia, 2014).  
The weights can identify connectivity using adjacency (e.g. contiguity matrix) or distance (e.g. 
inverse distance matrix) where weights are non-zero when two locations share a common boundary 
or are within a given distance of each other, respectively (Anselin, 2001). This study uses a queen 
contiguity W matrix, which is more encompassing than the rook matrix because it includes 
neighbours sharing a common border or vertex (Drukker, Peng, Raciborski & Prucha, 2013).  
 Detecting spatial autocorrelation  
Exploratory spatial data analysis followed the choice of the weight matrix. The analysis started 
with the creation of descriptive maps with the spatial weights as a first step in detecting spatial 
auto-correlation. The mapping involved investigating patterns of spatial dependence in the 
outcome variable NPO density and then its relationship with some of the independent variables. 
The study then estimated Moran’s I coefficients of global and local spatial association (Anselin, 
1995).  
Both the dependent and independent variables were tested for global spatial association. The 
Global Moran’s I statistic indicates whether spatial interdependence exists among the chosen 
variables (Anselin, 1988; Cliff & Ord, 1981; Moran, 1950). The study then decomposed the Global 
into Local Moran’s Is, which estimate the contribution of each observation to the global indicators 
(Anselin, 1995).  
 Estimation: spatial autoregressive models  
Spatial models describe a process where the dependent variable is specified to depend on spatial 
interaction between observational units plus a disturbance term. The interaction is modelled as a 
weighted average of neighbouring observations and is an endogenous variable referred to as the 
spatial lag (Lambert et al., 2010). The equation for the spatial lagged dependent variable Υ𝑊𝑊 is 
∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 (Drukker et al., 2013).  
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The equation in 1.1 and 1.2 describe the family of linear spatial dependence models used in spatial 
autoregressive regressions for cross-sectional data (Anselin, 1988; Florax & Folmer, 1992), from 
which the estimated models for this research were chosen.  
𝛶𝛶 = 𝜌𝜌𝛶𝛶𝑊𝑊 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀                 (1.1) 
𝜀𝜀 = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝜀𝜀 + µ                µ ~N (0, σ2εIn)              (1.2) 
Υ is a Ν × 1 stochastic variate, 𝜌𝜌 is the autoregressive parameter, the coefficient for the spatially 
lagged dependent variable, and λ is its counterpart in the spatial autoregressive structure for the 
disturbances (Anselin, 1988). The 𝑊𝑊s are the N X N non-stochastic pre-specified weights matrices 
that stipulate the relationship between the spatial units (LeSage & Pace, 2004). In 1.1, 𝑋𝑋 is the 
vector of exogenous, non-stochastic covariates including the constant, 𝑋𝑋 is the vector of the 
parameters associated with 𝑋𝑋, and µ the vectors of independently distributed error terms (Lambert 
et al., 2010). When 𝜌𝜌 is equal to zero and 𝜆𝜆 ≠ 0 the spatial lag has no influence resulting in a spatial 
error model, and when λ is equal to zero and ρ ≠ 0 it results in a spatial lag model. Other model 
possibilities are a spatial error and lag model where both 𝜌𝜌 and λ are non-zero, spatial models with 
spatially lagged explanatory variables and models where the dependent, independent and error 
variables are included with spatial lags (LeSage & Pace, 2004).  
In this paper, models belonging to this spatial econometric model family were estimated. All the 
models used a generalised spatial two stages least squares estimator to deal with the endogeneity 
bias due to the presence of the spatially lagged dependent variables (LeSage & Pace, 2009). The 
three models were spatial autoregressive models with spatial autoregressive explanatory covariates 
selected from the needs (proportion of the poor households), resources (property ownership), and 
entrepreneurship (education) categories, otherwise known as Spatial Durbin Models (SDM).  
We estimated the Durbin models to control for the biases produced by omitting spatially dependent 
variables, which are possible in the analysis of models with geographical observations (LeSage & 
Pace, 2009). Additionally, as discussed in Section 2.2, given the arbitrary nature of political 
boundaries, spatial spillovers from changes in the predictors in one municipality have the potential 
to affect the outcome in other municipalities. For this reason, the SDM assisted with modelling the 
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effects of these changes through the introduction of Wx and Wy (Lesage & Pace, 2009). The 
models are represented in the equations below.  
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1000 =  𝑋𝑋1 +  𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1000 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 + 𝑋𝑋3𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟 + 𝑋𝑋4𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁   +  𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊 + µ 
            (2) 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1000 =  𝑋𝑋1 + 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1000 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 + 𝑋𝑋3𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟 + 𝑋𝑋4𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁+  ∂𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊 + µ 
            (3) 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1000 =  𝑋𝑋1 + 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1000 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 + 𝑋𝑋3𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟 + 𝑋𝑋4𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁 +  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑊𝑊+ µ 
            (4) 
2.6 Variable Distributions Characteristics 
To measure NPO prevalence we used the absolute number of NPOs combined with the population 
size to create an NPO density variable: NPOs per 1000 population. In this regard, our measure is 
like that of Liu (2017), Van Puyvelde and Brown (2016), Kim (2015) and Grønbjerg and Paarlberg 
(2009) in previous studies of NPO prevalence. 
Table 2.2: Distribution characteristics of dependent and independent variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max skewness kurtosis 
Dependent variable   
NPO density per 1000  234 2.04 1.03 0.01 10.16 2.92 19.70 
Independent variables   
Population  234 221,241.7 521,289.4 7003 4,434,827 6.02 41.27 
Needs   
Poor  234 57.04 10.08 32.31 75.01 -0.55 2.23 
Resources   
Property ownership 234 57.01 0.11 0.25 0.87 -0.17 2.95 
Municipal Exp (R000)  234 941,013.12 3,593,645 26,724 34,800,000 6.86 53.35 
Grants (dummy) 234 0.05 0.95 0 1 4.07 17.55 
Municipal grants to 
NPOs (R000) 
12 33,075.253 48,523.02 105 142,307 8.96 86.40 
Entrepreneurship    
Higher education   234 4.67 2.55 1 17 1.42 5.59 
Note: The are 234 observations, the number of South African municipalities (8 Metropolitan and 226 Local 
municipalities) based on the 2011 boundary demarcations.  
                                                          
2 About $ 6 689 891, 50 
3 About $ 2 348 578.93 
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In Table 2.2, the variables’ distribution characteristics and measures of normality are presented. 
The table shows that average NPO density across municipalities is two organisations per 1000 
inhabitants. The table also provides evidence of the non-normality of included variables, which 
motivates for their log-transformation. Pairwise correlation statistics are included in Appendix A2 
and illustrate significant and sometimes moderate to high correlations among the independent 
variables. Due to the high correlations between the explanatory variables, the research does not 
imply causality but reports the results of the regressions as correlations and not causal paths 
between the dependent and independent variables.  
2.7 Results 
 Visualisation and detection of spatial-autocorrelation in NPO sectors  
Visualisation of the dependent variable in Figure 2.1 shows high and moderately high NPO density 
municipalities (red and orange shading), suggesting a concentration of NPOs in these areas. The 
map also shows that there is sorting of South African municipalities based on the density of 
registered NPOs.  
 
Figure 2.1: NPO Density by the municipality in South Africa 
In Figure 2.2, multivariate maps relate NPO density to poverty, property ownership, municipal 
expenditure and proportion of people with higher education. The maps suggest the presence of 
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spatial dependence among the independent variables and that they have a heterogeneous 
relationship with NPO density. For example, the map in the top left-hand corner shows the cluster 
of municipalities with high poverty and above average NPO density, but at the same time one with 
low poverty levels and high NPO density. Similarly, in the top right-hand corner of Figure 2, the 
map shows that municipalities with higher property ownership tend to cluster together and to have 
an above average NPO density. However, some municipalities with lower proportions of property 
owners also have above average NPO density. A similar pattern is also evident in the relationship 
between density and municipal expenditure and higher education. 
 
Figure 2.2: Multivariate maps of NPO density and selected covariates 
(Note: The navy triangles on the map show the mean NPO density, with clear triangles illustrating NPO density below 
the mean and solid triangles indicating NPO density above the mean. The larger the triangle is, the greater the 
divergence from the sample mean.)  
Moran’s I estimations in Table 2.3 confirm the presence of spatial autocorrelation in both the 
dependent and independent variables. All the estimated statistics, except for the NPO Grant’s 
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estimate, are significant, providing proof of global spatial autocorrelation in the dependent and 
independent variables. 
Table 2.3: Moran’s I statistics of global spatial autocorrelation for dependent and independent 
variables 
Variables Moran’s I E(I) sd(I) z p-value 
NPOs per 1000 population 0.06 -0.00 0.04 1.53 0.06 
Needs 
Poor 0.49 -0.00 0.04 12.21 0.00 
Resources 
Property ownership 0.14 -0.00 0.04 3.66 0.00 
Municipal expenditure  0.20 -0.00 0.04 5.50 0.00 
NPO Grants -0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.25 0.40 
Entrepreneurship 
Higher education 0.29 -0.00 0.04 7.30 0.00 
Note: The global Moran’s estimates are based on a queen contiguity spatial weights matrix, which also considers 
areas sharing a border or a vertex. 
We also examined the presence of local spatial autocorrelation in the outcome variable. The 
scatterplot of the estimates is presented in Figure 3; on the x-axis are the values of NPO density 
while on the y-axis is the spatial lag of the same variable. The bottom left-hand corner shows that 
low-low municipalities are located mostly in the eastern part of the country, suggesting an under-
serving of municipalities and their neighbours by NPOs. Most of the eastern parts of South Africa 
form part of the former homelands, which suffer from low economic development and deprivation. 
Consequently, although the need may be there, resources for adequate NPO provision are lacking. 
The upper right-hand corner in Figure 2.3 shows high-high municipalities in the northern regions 
of South Africa. Municipalities with high NPO density bordered by neighbours with high NPO 
density appear to be those that are strategically placed as metropolitans or local commercial and 
tourism centres in the regions. On the other hand, high-low values (where “isolated” high-density 
municipalities are surrounded by low-density municipalities) are most evident for municipalities 
in the east coast and two municipalities in the north-western parts of the country close to the 
Botswana border. The high-low and low-high values, therefore, suggest cross-subsidisation 
between high and low NPO density municipalities. 
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Figure 2.3: Local Moran's indicators of spatial autocorrelation in NPO Density scatterplot and 
cluster map 
(Note: On the x-axis of the Local Moran scatter plot are the values of NPO density(z), while on the y-axis is the spatial 
lag of NPO density (Wz)). 
The accompanying local Moran’s I cluster map in Figure 2.3, which shows spatial clusters and 
outliers, corresponds with the result of the local Moran scatter plot. Overall, the map provides 
weak evidence of spatial autocorrelation in the supply of NPOs. The hot areas on the map, 
however, confirm the agglomeration theory’s prediction of multiple equilibria, where more than 
one geographical area emerges as the node of activity.  
Similar maps on the independent variables, poor, property ownership and higher education, are 
included in the appendices. Comparing the distribution of poor clusters with that of NPO density 
confirms the heterogeneous relationship in the spatial interaction of the two variables. The property 
ownership map, when compared to the NPO density map, suggest that property rights matter, as 
evidenced by the property ownership and NPO density hot clusters in Gauteng and Limpopo. The 
map on higher education is in some sense the mirror image of poverty. In Gauteng there are clusters 
of municipalities with high levels of tertiary educated individuals, emphasising that this region has 
a high supply of skills with low needs, but these combine to produce high NPO density. The 
Western Cape has a similar clustering of education and poverty but does not produce the NPO 
clustering we observe in Gauteng because there are no regions with high need in proximity.  
We, therefore, have some evidence that Gauteng is a springboard for NPO activity that results 
from supply-side factors that serve regions in need that are “somewhat” nearby. Western Cape is 
too isolated from regions in need to play the same role, even though it has the right supply side 
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factors for filling this role. Overall, these results suggest that the spillover could occur over much 
larger regions, but only if the metro has enough agglomeration and is sufficiently close to an area 
in need.4 However, this pattern is isolated to a small number of localities and is not universal. The 
evidence from the maps suggests that different combinations of demand and supply factors relate 
to the spatial dependence of NPO density in municipalities in different regions.  
For further detection of spatial autocorrelation, we estimated two ordinary least squares regressions 
(in OLS population was included to control for urbanisation economies) and applied diagnostic 
tests for spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variables and errors. The results are presented in 
Table 2.4 and provide no significant evidence of spatial autocorrelation. The spatial 
autocorrelation present in the dependent variable is effectively modelled by the independent 
variables, which exhibit similar patterns of geographic interdependence. The OLS results thus 
suggest that shocks to one region do not influence adjacent areas. In other words, the entries and 
exits of NPOs in one region do not influence organisations in neighbouring areas to either 
complement or provide substitutes to these movements.  
Table 2.4: Ordinary least squares regressions and diagnostics test for spatial dependence in OLS 
errors and NPO density 
          *0.05 *00.01 ***0.001 INS: Insignificant 
                                                          
4 Considering these observations, we examined the effects of education employing a distance weight with a wider 
cut-off. The effects of education remained the same, however both the spatial lags of education and NPO density 
became insignificant.  
 OLS I OLS II (population) 
Dep var: NPO per 1000 population Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Population    -0.03 0.06 
Poor 0.83** 0.30 0.87** 0.32 
Property ownership 0.35* 0.19 0.35* 0.19 
Municipal expenditure -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.08 
NPO Grants 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.20 
Higher education  0.74*** 0.13 0.73*** 0.13 
Diagnostic tests for spatial dependence      
Spatial error:     
Moran's I  INS  INS 
Lagrange multiplier  INS  INS 
Robust Lagrange multiplier  INS  INS 
Spatial lag:     
Lagrange multiplier  INS  INS 
Robust Lagrange multiplier  INS  INS 
N  234.00  234 
R-squared  0.19  0.17 
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It is, of course, possible that this spatial interaction does occur within municipalities. This analysis, 
however, shows that few cross-municipal spillovers exist when the number of NPOs changes. 
Nonetheless, we proceeded with SDM regressions because of the spatial autocorrelation in the 
independent variables illustrated in both the global and local indicators of spatial association. We 
also continued with the SDM models to control for other latent traits that were not accounted for 
by the observed covariates.  
 Spatial autocorrelation in the NPO sector  
The results of the GS2SLS-SDM models including variants where we controlled for population 
size are presented in columns I to VI in Table 2.5. The coefficients represent the elasticity of NPO 
density in relation to the chosen needs, resources, and entrepreneurship variables. The dependent 
and independent variables with non-zero and continuous values were logged to deal with the non-
normality in the model variables. 
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Table 2.5: Generalised spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) Spatial Durbin Model (DSM) Regressions of NPO density 
 GS2SLS-DSM (Lagged poor)  GS2SLS-DSM (Lagged property ownership)  GS2SLS-DSM (Higher education)  
Dep var: NPO per 1000 
population 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
Population   -0.04 0.07  -0.02 0.06  -0.02 0.06 
Poor -0.07 0.49 0.02 0.48 0.56* 0.34 0.61* 0.35 0.20 0.42 0.29 0.43 
Property ownership 0.48** 0.20 0.47** 0.20 0.44** 0.20 0.44** 0.20 0.47** 0.20 0.46** 0.20 
Municipal expenditure -0.09* 0.05 -0.05 0.08 -0.08 0.05 -0.05 0.08 -0.08 0.05 -0.06 0.08 
NPO Grants 2013 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 
Higher education  0.58*** 0.15 0.57*** 0.15 0.69*** 0.13 0.68*** 0.14 0.66*** 0.14 0.66*** 0.14 
Spatially Lagged Vars 
NPO per 1000 0.85** 0.33 0.81*** 0.33 0.49 0.30 0.45 0.29 0.82** 0.37 0.74** 0.36 
Poor 0.71** 0.36 0.70** 0.36        
Property ownership     -0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.06    
Higher education          -0.08** 0.05 -0.07 0.04 
Direct Impacts 
 dy/dx Std.Err.  dy/dx Std.Err.  dy/dx Std.Err.  dy/dx Std.Err.  dy/dx Std.Err.  dy/dx Std.Err  
Population   -0.05 0.08  -0.02 0.07  -0.02 0.07 
Poor 0.11 0.41 0.20 0.42 0.58* 0.34 0.64* 0.35 0.24 0.46 0.33 0.45 
Property ownership 0.59 0.36 0.57* 0.32 0.46** 0.21 0.45** 0.21 0.57* 0.34 0.53** 0.28 
Municipal expenditure -0.12 0.09 -0.07 0.10 -0.08 0.06 -0.06 0.08 -0.10 0.08 -0.07 0.10 
NPO Grants_2013 0.27 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.29 0.25 0.26 
Higher education  0.72*** 0.24 0.68*** 0.20 0.72*** 0.14 0.71*** 0.14 0.79** 0.26 0.75*** 0.19 
indirect impacts 
Population   -0.13 0.35  -0.02 0.05  -0.05 0.16 
Poor 3.25 6.72 2.89 4.96 0.43 0.46 0.42 0.44 0.68 1.22 0.65 0.90 
Property ownership 2.02 5.25 1.55 3.39 0.27 0.36 0.24 0.31 1.59 3.99 1.03 2.00 
Municipal expenditure -0.40 1.08 -0.18 0.49 -0.06 0.09 -0.04 0.07 -0.27 0.71 -0.13 0.32 
NPO Grants 2013 0.91 2.59 0.71 1.73 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.22 0.77 2.12 0.49 1.09 
Higher education  2.47 5.84 1.86 3.62 0.54 0.60 0.47 0.52 2.23 5.15 1.46 2.55 
Total impacts 
Population   -0.17 0.41  -0.04 0.11  -0.07 0.23 
Poor 3.36 6.69 3.09 4.92 1.02 0.63 1.05* 0.63 0.92 1.47 0.98 1.13 
Property ownership 2.61 5.56 2.12 3.65 0.73 0.53 0.69 0.48 2.16 4.27 1.56 2.21 
Municipal expenditure -0.51 1.15 -0.25 0.57 -0.14 0.14 -0.09 0.15 -0.37 0.77 -0.19 0.40 
NPO Grants 2013 1.18 2.83 0.97 1.95 0.33 0.45 0.31 0.41 1.04 2.35 0.74 1.30 
Higher education  3.20 6.03 2.55 3.75 1.26** 0.65 1.18** 0.57 3.02 5.36 2.21 2.68 
N   234  234  234  234  234  234 
Pseudo R2   0.075  0.0848  0.1457  0.1457  0.0811  0.1032 
*0.05 *0.01 ***0.001
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The results show that the spatial term is both positive and significant, except for when we control 
for the spatially lagged property ownership variable (in III and IV), which provides partial support 
for Proposition I and agglomeration theory. A one percentage point increase in NPO density in 
adjacent municipalities increases NPO density in a municipality by 0.85% points and 0.81% points 
in Models I and II, and 0.82 and 0.74 percentage points respectively in Models V and VI. The 
findings are like those reported by Da Costa (2016), who found spatial effects in the NPO sector 
in Brazil.  
In terms of the other covariates, the results varied. Proposition IIa was partially supported; need 
(logged proportion of people living in poverty) only had a direct and significant impact in the 
property ownership models III and IV, where a percentage point increase in poverty increases NPO 
density by 0.58 and 0.64 % points, respectively. The positive sign of the variable in all the models 
is, however, as expected, and supports the findings of other studies that showed that poverty plays 
a role in the location decisions of NPOs (Koch et al., 2008; Peck, 2008; Yan et al., 2014). The 
results partially contradict Peck’s (2008) conclusion that needs are the most significant predictor 
of locations. 
On the other hand, the coefficient for the spatially lagged counterpart of poverty is both positive 
and significant, with moderate effects even when we controlled for population. The results thus 
support Proposition IIb, that is, an increase in the number of poor people in neighbouring 
municipalities corresponds with an increase in NPO density. This result can be explained by people 
demanding NPO services outside of their municipalities. It could also be that NPOs have a wider 
reach into adjacent municipalities.  
Among the resource variables, philanthropic propensity (property ownership) appears to explain 
NPO density better than government expenditure. Property ownership consistently shows positive 
and significant direct impacts on NPO density, providing support for Proposition IIIa. A 
percentage increase in the variable correlates with a 0.44 to 0.48 %-point increase in the NPO 
density.  
Proposition IIIb is, however, not supported. The lagged property ownership variable is positive 
and remains within a similar range. However, it is insignificant, suggesting no spatial dependence 
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between property ownership and NPO density. The wealth of adjacent regions, therefore, does not 
spill over into poor municipalities.  
The findings provide no evidence to support Proposition V that municipalities with greater public 
spending or grants to NPOs have a higher NPO density. The result remains unchanged even when 
we substitute per capita expenditure in the specifications. Instead, the sign of the municipal 
government expenditure variable is negative and only significant when we control for population 
and the spatially lagged poor variable. The negative sign is in line with Lui’s (2016) results but 
differs from Saxton and Benson’s (2005) findings. It is, however, important to note that Saxton 
and Benson’s (2005) coefficient was close to zero. The results suggest that government 
expenditure is crowding out voluntary initiatives, which happens because the municipality is 
already catering to the needs of its residents. The grants variable is consistently positive, which is 
in line with Lui’s (2016) findings but not significant. The insignificance may be due to the small 
size of the sub-sample of municipalities making provisions for NPO grants, in other words, only 
12 of the 234 municipalities. 
The results on the proportion of the population with a tertiary education, which was included as a 
proxy for entrepreneurship, proved to be a significantly important correlate of NPO density. The 
findings thus support proposition V: the proportion of the population with higher education has a 
significant and large effect on NPO density. Nevertheless, the adjacent location effect is negative. 
This result suggests that agglomeration benefits exist from having a large skilled and 
knowledgeable population. These benefits reinforce concentration because NPOs are attracted to 
places with higher skills and knowledge away from those with lower education levels.  
Liu (2016) also reported a strong relationship between educational attainment and the size of the 
NPO sector, which is like our results although we used different measures for education; Liu used 
the median years of educational attainment, while we used the proportion of post-school educated 
individuals. These results are supported by Van Puyvelde and Brown’s (2016) argument that a 
higher proportion of people with higher education support a larger NPO sector because better-
educated individuals are potential entrepreneurs. The results should, however, be interpreted with 
caution, as the variable may capture the broader agglomeration benefits of labour and knowledge 
spillovers rather than pure entrepreneurship. 
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We found no evidence to support Proposition VI: the greater the population, the higher the NPO 
density in a municipality. The population variable has a negative, but negligible and insignificant 
impact on NPO density. We, therefore, do not necessarily find that there are scale effects in NPO 
locations. However, the insignificant results could also be because the effects of population are 
captured by the municipality government expenditure variable, which is highly and significantly 
correlated with population. That said, these results are in line with those of Saxton and Benson 
(2005) but contradict Brass’ (2012) report of a positive correlation between NPO size, population 
size and density. They are also different to Harrison and Thornton’s (2014) report of a positive 
relationship between population and NPO activity.  
2.8 Conclusion  
Considering the needs of communities in NPO decision making is important not only for 
improving their efficiency but more significantly their responsiveness to the needs of the people 
they serve. This research, therefore, made the argument that if NPOs are indeed responsive to 
needs, there should be a positive and significant correlation between needs and where they are 
most likely to be found as they respond to a demand for their services in those areas. However, we 
conceded that need alone may not be enough and that a combination of needs, resources and 
entrepreneurship in each location will affect NPO activity. Financial and human resources are 
required to initiate an NPO and ensure its sustainability.  
Consequently, this research aimed to examine which South African municipalities are likely to 
experience high concentrations of NPOs, and the role played by demand and supply factors, as 
well as the NPO activity in neighbouring areas in explaining that distribution. To achieve these 
aims we formulated propositions based on Krugman’s (1998) agglomeration and Wilson’s (1989) 
NPO spatial theories and tested them by applying spatial econometric analyses on South African 
data. 
The research provides evidence to support Krugman (1991) and Wilson’s (1989) theories, i.e. it 
confirms that NPOs in the country are accountable in terms of being responsive to needs in making 
location decisions. As predicted by Krugman (1991) and Wilson’s (1989) theories, the results show 
that some municipalities attract more NPOs, leading to a concentration in those areas. Furthermore, 
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the positive significant lagged NPO density results suggest that the agglomeration of NPOs is 
diffused over larger areas.  
Additionally, in line with Wilson’s (1989) spatial theory, the results provide evidence that needs, 
resources and entrepreneurship all contribute to the spatial distribution of NPOs. The support of 
Proposition IIa in both the OLS models and in the GS2SLS-DSM III and IV, where we controlled 
for the spatial dependence in property ownership, suggest that need has a direct effect on the level 
of NPO activity within a municipality. Furthermore, support for Proposition IIb, i.e. the greater 
the level of need in neighbouring municipalities the higher the NPO density, suggests cross-
subsidisation. In societies where there is less integration, and rich areas exist alongside poor areas.  
The needs of the poor may be met by organisations in wealthier regions, leading to a situation of 
cross-border spillovers in the correlation of need with NPO density. As previously mentioned, this 
cross-subsidisation is not limited to unequal societies like South Africa. In other places, it could 
manifest between more urbanised resource-rich and rural resource-poor municipalities.  
Thirdly, resources and entrepreneurship are the main centripetal forces driving the agglomeration 
of NPOs in South Africa. The consistently positive and significant direct effects of property 
ownership (philanthropic propensity) signals the availability of the crucial financial resources 
required to start and run NPOs. Additionally, higher proportions of individuals with tertiary 
education (entrepreneurship) show that more individuals can identify opportunities and take the 
risk of starting an NPO.  
Based on the results, we can conclude that NPOs in South Africa are accountable in terms of 
responding to places in need when it comes to their location decisions. The diffusion of their 
services across municipal borders also suggests that they may be accountable to higher values of 
equality and social justice. The results, however, also show the importance of resources and 
entrepreneurship, supporting previous arguments that NPOs are both charitable and pragmatic in 
choosing their locations (Bielefeld & Murdoch, 2004).  
This study is not without limitations, which are mainly related to the nature of South African data 
and the included covariates, in other words, there is a high correlation between needs, resources 
and entrepreneurship indicators. To avoid this in future research, research can use other proxies to 
account for these factors. For example, measures of self-employment can be used as proxies for 
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social entrepreneurship in the absence of NPO entrepreneurship data. Additionally, the aggregated 
nature of the data did not allow for an adequate examination of the nature of the heterogeneity in 
the relationship between NPO density and the selected independent variables that were illustrated 
in the multivariate maps. Future research can thus use point data or data at a more local level to 
investigate NPO locations and the different demand and supply combinations that explain their 
distribution in different provinces or regions.  
Despite these limitations, the study makes an important contribution to the study of NPO locations 
by examining the effects of spatial dependence on both the dependent and independent variables. 
Accounting for spatial autocorrelation in the independent variables, to our knowledge, has not yet 
been examined in studies investigating NPO density and locations. We are the first to study 
spillovers in supply-side factors, noting that neighbouring areas can compensate for a lack of 
resources in one area. Demand spillovers are the reverse of this coin, i.e. demand in one area can 
be met by NPOs located elsewhere.  
As a result, a larger geographic reach of organisations can equalise cross-border inequalities. The 
result is that NPOs can be highly concentrated in small regions but extend their reach beyond their 
locations. Furthermore, in line with previous research, the results illustrate that modelling spatial 
association in the independent variables could shed further light on the spatial factors of NPO 
density (Bielefeld & Murdoch, 2004).  
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Appendices  
A1: Pairwise correlations of dependent and independent variables  
 
NPO per 
1000 
Population Poor Property 
ownership 
Municipal 
expenditure 
NPO Grants 
2013 
Higher 
education  
NPO per 
1000 
1 
      
Population 0.14** 1 
     
Poor -0.14** -0.31*** 1 
    
Property 
ownership 
0.10 0.03 0.29*** 1 
   
Municipal 
Exp 2013 
0.14* 0.97*** -0.36*** -0.03 1 
  
NPO Grants 
2013 
0.13* 0.70*** -0.30*** 0.05 0.71*** 1 
 
Higher 
education  
0.28*** 0.51*** -0.78*** -0.15** 0.55*** 0.46*** 1 
*0.05 *0.01 ***0.001 
 
A2: Local Moran cluster map of poverty across South African municipalities  
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A3: Local Moran cluster map of property ownership across South African municipalities 
 
 
A4: Local Moran cluster map of tertiary education across South African municipalities 
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CHAPTER 3: COMMUNITIES AS PRINCIPALS: A FRAMEWORK TO 
UNDERSTAND NON-PROFIT ACCOUNTABILITY TO CLIENT-
COMMUNITIES  
Abstract 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the concepts and theories that form the theoretical building 
blocks for the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. The aim is to develop a theoretical 
framework to guide this and future research in the study of the factors that impact on the 
accountability of non-profits to communities. After a discussion of the meaning of NPO 
accountability to communities, the chapter discusses the purpose of accountability to these 
stakeholders based on agency theory and the rights-based development paradigm arguments. The 
chapter then develops a model and propositions that could guide this and future research on the 
topic.  
Keywords: principal-agent, rights-based approach, client-communities, accountability  
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3.1 Introduction  
Despite the positive rhetoric for greater accountability to constituent communities and the 
recognition of their importance. The role of community-facing accountability in NPOs is treated 
as subsidiary to that of donors and governments. One of the obstacles is the absence of a clear 
theoretical framework that articulates why, how and for what NPOs need to account to 
communities. There is an absence of academic literature, which focuses on the economics of the 
principal-agent relationships between client-communities and NPOs, except for the works of 
Burger (2009); Burger and Owens (2010) Burger, Dasgupta and Owens (2015) as well as Wellens 
and Jegers (2011 & 2014). These studies have however investigated the participation of client-
communities in NPO operations at various levels due to the difficulty of measuring and finding 
the correct proxies for this form of accountability.  
In this chapter, a theoretical framework is formulated using insights from the accountability 
literature, as well as, principal-agent theory complemented by the ‘rights-based approach’. The 
framework focuses exclusively on the accountability of NPOs to communities due to the limited 
focus given to this area of research in economics. The framework explains what is meant by 
accountability to client-communities and why NPOs should be accountable to this constituent. It 
also includes a model and propositions that could guide this and future research on the factors that 
may influence NPOs’ decisions and practices related to accountability to communities. The 
framework formalises the role of the client-communities as principals of NPOs and as claim-
holders with a right to active participation in decisions that affect them. Furthermore, it also 
provides a basic model, which can be used to understand the trade-offs considered by organisations 
in their accountability choices.  
In the following section, the chapter presents a discussion of the meaning and purpose of NPO 
accountability to client-communities. The section starts by defining accountability broadly and 
client-community accountability. It then discusses the role of participation and power imbalances 
in NPO stakeholder relations and their consequences for effective accountability practices to 
communities. An overview of principal-agent theory and its application to NPOs as well as the 
‘rights-based approach’ to development then follows. The chapter then discusses the role of client-
communities as principals, why it is complicated but legitimate, why the communities role is 
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important for development outcomes and for their empowerment to claim a place in decisions that 
affect their lives. It then develops a client-community accountability model  and concludes with a 
set of propositions. The model and propositions can inform future economic research in the area. 
Chapter 5 and 6 address two of the propositions.  
3.2 The Meaning of Accountability 
Many definitions have been put forward to describe what accountability is, the one by Edwards 
and Hulme (1996, 8) who describe accountability broadly as “a means through which individuals 
and organisations are held responsible for their actions”, is the one often used. Accountability is a 
process through which an NPO openly acknowledges its responsibility for what it believes and its 
behaviour in a manner that illustrates participatory values and learning (Slim, 2002). Ebrahim 
(2003a) notes that it is the way “organisations and individuals take internal responsibility for 
shaping their organisational mission, values, for opening themselves to public scrutiny and for 
assessing performance in relation to goals” (Ebrahim, 2003a, 815). Accountability can thus be an 
expression of duty that is inspired by “‘felt responsibility’ reified through individual action and 
organisational mission” (Ebrahim, 2003a, 814). An external stakeholder can also coerce 
responsibility through contracts and regulations.  
Grant and Keohane (2005, p. 29) argue that “accountability implies that the actors being held 
accountable have obligations to act in ways that are consistent with accepted standards of 
behaviour and that they will be sanctioned for failures to do so”. Consequently, the concept 
assumes a relationship between those with power and the parties owed accountability where there 
is an agreement with regards to the standards for accountability and the authority of the parties to 
the relationship. Accountability, therefore, encompasses shared expectations, giving a common 
currency for justification, putting agreements into context, and providing a sense of obligation or 
a right to be called to account (Kilby, 2006). Besides, for real accountability to take place 
rectification or change should be a real possibility. Which is why Kilby (2006, 954), quoting 
Mulgan (2003), points out that it is the degree of rectification or changes that can be claimed that 
measures the strength of accountability.  
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 Accountability process 
Consequently, accountability refers to a process with several components. They include the 
formulation of shared expectations and an agreement on commitments in terms of what will be 
done, for whom and what the measures of success will be. Secondly, it involves the generation and 
reporting of information on relationships, intent, aims, methods and impact (Slim, 2002). 
However, reporting need not and should not be one-sided: both the NPO and respective 
stakeholders can generate and report information. For example, field office visits by donors 
generate information of importance to relate back to the NPO, which helps it achieve its 
organisational goals. Similarly, clients generate relevant information through their use of NPO 
goods and/ or services. The feedback they give is also a form of reporting.  
Thirdly, the NPOs should respond to information provided; and rectify or apply reforms where 
necessary considering the available human and financial resources as well as the implications for 
their relationship with other stakeholders. Fourthly, credible recourse in the form of rewards or 
sanctions depending on the actions taken by the NPO should be articulated and lastly, opportunities 
for mutual learning by all parties in the accountability relationship should be available.  
Now that we have presented the broad principles of accountability, it is important to discuss who 
we refer to by client-community and what it means for organisations to be accountable to these 
constituents. This is important because NPOs have multiple accountabilities to their different 
stakeholders who have different ideas of what the NPO should be held responsible for.  
 Client-community accountability  
In the literature, client-community accountability is termed ‘downward’ accountability and is often 
juxtaposed to ‘upward’ accountability to stakeholders such as trustees, donors, and governments 
(Edwards & Hulme, 1996, p. 8), because communities occupy the lowest position in the power 
hierarchies manifest in NPO stakeholder relations (Murtaza, 2012). This research adopts the term 
‘client-community’ from Barr and Fafchamps (2005) who used it to refer to the communities 
served by NPOs. In this study, the term refers broadly to direct clients and the broader community, 
which includes the people around the location of the organisation. But, for brevity, I will 
sometimes use ‘client’ and ‘community’ to refer to these stakeholders. That said, client-community 
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accountability in this research is defined as accountability to the stakeholders who make use of the 
goods and services delivered by NPOs or who are affected by the externalities generated by their 
operations.  
Bawole and Langnel (2016, p. 922) present this accountability as “the relationship between NPOs 
and their clients” but go further to note that it is “where NPOs interact and learn mutually with 
clients”. Najam (1996) and Ebrahim (2003a) identify NPO clients as individuals or groups to 
whom NPOs provide goods or services. These groups also include those people who are in the 
“catchment of an NPO’s activities, indirect clients such as the community at large” (Najam, 1996, 
p. 345).  
 Participation and accountability  
Having the platforms in place to ease interactions, and the mechanisms to gather stakeholder inputs 
are important for the execution of the responsibilities towards communities: meaningful 
participation is thus a prerequisite. However, the benefits of participation only can be realised if 
client-communities truly have the space to influence organisations (Agyemang et al., 2009, p. 28). 
According to Cronin and O’Regan (2002), participation may influence the achievement of 
accountability through growing the information base and easing channels of communication. 
When implemented correctly, participation can also empower communities and improve 
inequalities and social cohesion. Niyizonkiza and Yamamoto (2013) thus argue that resentment 
and hostility follow when empowered and active participation is absent in development initiatives. 
Participation is empowering if stakeholders are involved in all stages of the project cycle 
(Helvetas,2015). When all stakeholders are properly included the organisation is able to 
accommodate different views and foster ownership, and commitment. Consequently, for 
participation to have an impact on accountability, it needs to be meaningful. The ideal form of 
participation would then be when communities identify their problems, make all key decisions on 
what their needs are, and how to address them with the available resources (Cronin & O`Regan, 
2002, p. 14). This interaction between communities and NPOs would involve communities 
actively taking part in the planning, implementation and evaluation of development projects 
(Niyizonkiza & Yamamoto, 2013).  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
55 
 
Ebrahim (2003a) labels this form of engagement, ‘level four’ participation, where ‘citizens own 
initiatives’, but in most development initiatives ‘level, three’ is more likely the level of 
participation. Level three is when citizens can negotiate over decisions and have control over 
identifying their local needs and the resource allocations required to address them (Ebrahim, 
2003a, p. 819). Level two participation, on the other hand, is characterised by involvement in NPO 
activities and could include in-kind and financial contributions towards the running of NPO 
projects (Ebrahim, 2003a, p. 819).  
Level one participation is when communities are informed and give feedback about the decisions 
already taken by the organisation. At this level, participation can involve the use of public meetings 
or hearings, surveys, or a formal dialogue on project options. Ebrahim (2003a, p. 818) notes that 
at this level participation becomes a ‘sham ritual’ of consultation with community leaders and 
members, while decision-making power is still with the project planners. For example, in Ghana 
where clients were included in the decision-making process but had limited influence because the 
NPO came with pre-packed decisions (Bawole & Langnel, 2016). Najam (1996) raised concerns 
about this instrumentalisation of participation where communities are brought in to validate 
already made decisions because they are left with no platform to influence organisational decisions 
(Najam, 1996, p. 346). The ability of communities to effectively engage with organisations may 
also be frustrated  when the process is not inclusive, empowering, and creating an environment 
conducive to discussions (Walsh, 2016).  
3.3 Purpose of Client-community Accountability  
This section uses principal-agent theory and the ‘rights-based approach’ to explain the purpose of 
NPO accountability to communities.  
 Principal-agent theory relations 
In the field of economics, the principal-agent theory applies best to contractual relations in for-
profit firms. The NPO organisational form makes the application of theory more complicated. Just 
as a for-profit a non-profit firm is a ‘legal fiction’ which serves as a nexus where “conflicting 
objectives of entities are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations5 
                                                          
5 Steinberg (2010), argues that contracts need not be legal and formal.  
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“(Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 311). However, they differ in that no entity is entitled to the 
organisation’s financial surpluses except for the organisations themselves (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). The non-distribution constraint states that NPOs cannot distribute profits to their members 
or executives (Hansmann, 1980 &1987). As a result, NPOs have no residual claimants or residual 
risk bearers, with legal rights to the firm’s profits (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
The absence of legal residual claimants has sparked debate about the impact on organisational 
performance and the behaviour of agents. However, the assumption is that the NPO form buffers 
principals from the opportunistic behaviour of agents. Principals see them as the more trustworthy 
organisational form relative to their for-profit counterparts under the condition of information 
asymmetry and contract failure and in the delivery of goods which have some public and quasi-
public characteristics (Steinberg, 2006). The non-distribution constraint inspires the principals to 
see NPOs as a solution to the ‘contract failure’ that arises when output and quality of the good or 
service cannot be easily judged (Steinberg, 2006, p. 119).  
Additionally, NPO theory states that altruistic entrepreneurs self-select into the sector because they 
care less about pecuniary rewards and more about the quality and quantity of the goods provided 
and mission attainment (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Evidence has, however, shown the existence of 
for-profits in disguise who maximise their utility by extracting rents and acting opportunistically 
(Young, 2000). The presence of opportunisms may be amplified in developing countries 
characterised by a lack of opportunities, which causes this self-selection mechanism to fail. The 
non-distribution constraint may also have an insignificant effect in this context where regulating 
institutions are weak to guard against the erosion of the credibility of the constraint. This thus 
raises questions about the applicability of these theories in developing country contexts such as 
South Africa.  
That said, though the non-distribution constraint has engendered perceptions of trustworthiness in 
the sector it has not eliminated opportunistic behaviour by some actors. As a result, principal-agent 
relations in NPOs are not immune to agency problems, which result from the unobservable 
behaviour of NPOs as agents6. In the absence of performance-based contracts as a viable solution 
                                                          
6 Steinberg (2010), however, identifies nine types of agency problems that may arise in principal-NPO 
relationships. 
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due to the type II character of most non-profit goods which make them hard to measure (Steinberg, 
2010; Van Puyvelde et al., 2012). Type II goods have quality and quantity characteristics that are 
difficult to observe and as a result, they “cannot be enforceable written into contracts, cannot affect 
the firm’s reputation, and cannot trigger refunds when money-back guarantees are offered” 
(Steinberg, 2010, p. 96). 
Non-profit accountability acts to reassure principals that the organisation will not take advantage 
of the information asymmetry between them. It is the process through which the NPO satisfies its 
respective principals that it is acting in their best interest and is still committed to upholding their 
agreement. NPO accountability entails the principals’ “right to require an account” from the NPO 
as well as the right to recourse when the account is given, or the actions accounted for are 
unacceptable (Leat, 1988). It is when the NPO reports to the principal and is held responsible for 
his or her actions (Coule, 2015). 
Availability of information is therefore key in holding an NPO accountable, and so is the 
principal’s access to information about the agent’s behaviour. The intuition is, “when the principal 
has [full] information to verify agent behaviour, the agent is more likely to behave in the interest 
of the principal” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 60). Non-profit principals obtain this information through 
various monitoring mechanisms including participation, reports, evaluations, and site visits. 
Monitoring the agent’s actions informs the principal about the actions of the NPO, but when it is 
meaningful, it helps to manage the principal’s expectations with regards to what the NPO can 
achieve. Monitoring the NPOs behaviour helps the principal to distinguish whether the outcomes 
of NPO projects are the result of the organisation's actions or factors beyond its control (Levinthal, 
1988). Burger and Owens (2010, p. 1270) warn against over-reliance on NPOs’ self-reported 
information as it could be unreliable. Besides, transparency, which, mobilises the power of shame, 
does not affect the shameless (Fox, 2007). However, Holmström (1979, p. 75) argues that “any 
additional information, however imperfect, can be used to improve the welfare of both the principal 
and agent”.  
NPO principals can also formulate outcomes-based contracts, which transfer some of the risks to 
the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The treatment of grant payments by some donors is an example of 
this. Usually, donors pay the first tranche of the funds at the beginning of the project and provide 
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follow up payments at a point in the future subject to the NPO meeting certain requirements. On 
other occasions, donors fund the project and provide repeated funding after they are satisfied with 
the NPOs’ actions and outcomes of the project.  
3.3.1.1 Critique of application of principal-agent theory  
Some studies have critiqued the application of principal-agent models in the NPOs sector (Coule, 
2015; Ebrahim, 2003a). The concern is that the theory has the potential to inspire narrow 
interpretations of accountability, which may have a limited positive impact on the organisations or 
their accountability (Coule, 2015). Application of the theory has also been accused of encouraging 
prioritisation of accountability to donors and governments who have the means to enforce 
contracts; tools to extract information, however imperfect, and the incentives to reward or punish 
compliance or non-compliance. The models are thus noted to neglect accountability to other 
stakeholders, especially clients. This neglect may be the result of the use of narrow legal or 
management definitions, which see principals only as those stakeholders whose relationship is 
enforced in a legal contract or who exchange financial resources for NPO goods and services.  
Though the theory is mainly applied to relationships in for-profit firms in the field of economics, 
it has wide applicability (Ross, 1973). The focus of the theory is on general principal-agent 
relationships, like those between NPOs and their stakeholders and deciding the best contract and 
means to enforce it (Eisenhardt, 1989). The models, therefore, need not bias accountability to one 
group of stakeholders at the expense of another, as Jegers (2015) and Gailmard (2012) argue. 
Principal-agent models can be applied to a multitude of relationships including those between 
client-communities and NPOs. 
Ebrahim (2003b) also raised concerns about principal-agent models. He notes that the models 
ignore the challenges that arise from misaligned interests between the NPOs and their principals, 
which cannot be corrected by monitoring and incentives. Additionally, principal-agent models fail 
to adequately address the negative incentives that may arise from the implementation of such 
measures (Ebrahim, 2003b). Furthermore, the models also neglect that accountability can stem 
from internal rather than external motivations and they downplay the role of the principals’ 
influence on NPOs` behaviour. The models also do not adequately address the tensions that may 
arise from NPOs accountability to multiple principals (Ebrahim, 2003b).  
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Despite the limitations, the theory can still offer much insight in understanding the relationship 
between NPOs and their stakeholders. Du Bois, Caers, Jegers and De Gieter (2004) note that it can 
improve our understanding of the behaviour of non-profit firms. Peterson (2010) further notes that 
the usefulness of the theory rests in its ability to predict decisions and relationships. Agency theory 
shows the effect of contractual arrangements on performance (Steinberg, 2010). These contracts 
or internal "rules of the game" specify the rights of each agent in the organisation, performance 
criteria on which agents are evaluated, and the payoff functions they face.” (Fama & Jensen, 1983, 
p. 302). The theory is thus useful for understanding accountability problems as interaction issues 
between the NPO and its stakeholders, and to think about accountability as a solution with the end 
of creating mutual benefit for both the agent and principal.  
The short-coming of agency theory is that it “is not, by itself, normative” (Steinberg, 2010, p. 80). 
This complicates the theory’s ability to fully capture the role of client-communities as principals. 
The complication may stem from the models being mainly used to explain principal-agent relations 
in for-profit firms where the shareholders have a financial claim on the organisations’ profits: the 
expectations of shareholders are clear, and contracts protect their rights in law. The situation is 
different when it comes to the case of client-communities, they have no formal contract to govern 
their relationship with the NPO as in the case of donors and governments.  
The study introduces the ‘rights-based’ approach to deal with the normative dimension absent in 
agency theory. The approach complements principal-agent theory by formalising the role of client-
communities as principals and the responsibility of the organisations towards them. The rights-
based paradigm names the responsibilities the NPO as duty bearer has to client-communities as 
right holders. Though rights, as formulated in the approach, are not legally binding: they a 
normative value category.  
 Rights-based approach  
The development sector adopted the ‘rights-based approach’ in the 1990s to improve development 
outcomes by putting the recipients of development projects at the centre. The approach helps to 
identify who has rights, what they are and who is responsible for fulfilling them (O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2010, p. 452). It focuses on defining people’s rights as laid down in international 
conventions and then empowers them to claim those rights, which are justified based on normative, 
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pragmatic and ethical arguments. The focus on rights adds the value dimension and politicises 
development as it is grounded in human rights legislation, which moves development from the 
realm of charity to claims (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004).  
The approach, therefore, involves a paradigm shift from thinking of development as a need and 
development work as a gift to rights, entitlements and an emphasis on the accountability of all 
development actors whose actions impacts on the development process. The approach also focuses 
on minimising power differentials between the people who implement, and those affected by 
development programs. Community development approaches that focus on shifting of power back 
to communities by harnessing their capabilities to address development needs reinforce these ideas 
(Eisenberg, 1998; Kretzmann & McKnight, 1993; Mathie & Cunningham, 2003; Niyizonkiza, & 
Yamamoto, 2013). For example, the Asset-based Community Development (ABCD) approach and 
Community Philanthropy. The ABCD approach responds to the challenges of harnessing 
opportunities for sustainable development and claiming and retaining the rights and entitlements 
of state and global citizenship” (Mathie &Cunningham, 2003, p. 475). 
The ABCD approach is premised on communities taking the lead in their development process by 
creating local economic development through identifying and mobilising “social assets, the talents 
of individuals, as well as the social capital inherent in the relationships that fuel local associations 
and informal networks” (Mathie &Cunningham, 2003, p. 474). Community philanthropy is also 
about changing power asymmetries in favour of communities. The idea is that when communities 
co-invests in the betterment of their own lives, they are motivated to take ownership, to be 
concerned about the outcomes and to protect their collective interests (Hodgson & Pond, 2018). In 
turn, the power dynamics between the development implementers and the community change 
resulting in trust, transparency and better community-faced accountability (Hodgson & Pond, 
2018). Consequently, the rights-based accountability agenda emphasises that communities are the 
rightful and legitimate claimants and not passive recipients of development (Gaventa, 2002).  
Within the right-based paradigm accountability to communities involves the NPOs recognition of 
their rights and taking the required steps to fulfil them. It, therefore, entails “designing 
accountability mechanisms emphasising participatory partnerships aimed at enabling clients to 
have a meaningful role in development projects” (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2010, p. 452). The 
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responsibilities the organisations have towards their communities involve helping them demand 
their rights as claim-holders in relations to non-NPO duty bearers. Additionally, accountability 
implies that NPOs recognise community’s rights to “hold organisations accountable for the nature 
of their activities and acceptance of their duty-bearer role in relations to beneficiaries” (O’Dwyer 
& Unerman, 2010, p. 454). Consequently, NPOs need to assess how responsive they are to the 
needs of their clients (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). It also means the use of participatory 
approaches for evaluating NPO effectiveness, determining their priorities, assessing the outcomes 
of their activities and mutual learning (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2010).  
The adoption of the rights-based approach may have been at odds with the use of the term ‘client-
communities’. It is therefore important to clarify that the term is used as an identification of a 
group of people and not in the needs-based development paradigm sense, where the term ‘client’ 
may have a different connotation of passive recipients rather than active co-producers of 
development projects (Kretzmann and McKnight, 1993). Contrary to the needs-based view of 
clients, this research presents client-communities as active participants who have the right to be 
involved in NPO projects and to influence the decisions they make that affect their lives. Hence 
the adoption of agency theory and the rights-based paradigm to frame the research. Both 
approaches theorise an active role for client-communities in NPOs working to achieve the 
community’s wellbeing, whether as co-producers or as incentivising cooperation from the 
organisations.  
 Clients-communities as principals 
As principals and claim-holders, client-communities have an interest in NPOs conduct and 
business. But, communities are principals in an unorthodox and more abstract way, as they rely on 
NPOs to deliver services funded by a third party (Burger & Seabe, 2014; Gray, Bebbington & 
Collison, 2006). Though this may be the case, client-communities’ claims on NPOs result from 
them being potential or final users of NPOs’ goods and services and the ones with the most to lose 
if the organisations do not perform (Williamson, 1983). They also legitimise the NPO’s existence 
and operations. This legitimacy can be transformed into contributions from stakeholders who are 
concerned with the welfare of clients (Burger et al., 2015). Given these two reasons, their needs 
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should be at the centre of organisational decision making (Wellens & Jegers, 2014, p. 940). This 
is, however, not always the case. 
Therefore, the community’s dilemma is to align the interest of the NPO with their own. Social 
entrepreneurs found NPOs with the aim of maximising client welfare, which raises the expectation 
that their goals are the same as that of their potential users, but as previously mentioned, that is not 
always the case. Because of misaligned interest client-communities also face the agency problems 
which result from the difficulty or impossibility to observe the character of most NPOs goods 
(Steinberg, 2010). They also have no way of judging the NPOs’ actions when it comes to issues 
of financial probity and governance, which are hidden from external stakeholders and for which, 
like other principals, they rely on the information provided by the NPO, which may be different 
from reality.  
The contracts that can mitigate agency problems in the relationship between client-communities 
and NPOs are behaviour-based contracts, which involve the monitoring of NPO actions. When 
communities are actively involved as principals, it can reduce the cost of monitoring an NPO and 
its actions. Client-communities have an ‘information role’, which imperfectly resolves the 
principal-agent dilemmas that arise from un-observable behaviour. Their proximity to NPOs puts 
them in a better position to judge quality, output, and outcomes, albeit imperfectly. They are in an 
advantageous position relative to other stakeholders, who may find it difficult to assess the results 
of NPO initiatives and to determine the appropriateness of their actions. Communities are also in 
a better position to name and communicate their needs of which other stakeholders do not always 
have a realistic idea (Wellens & Jegers, 2014). 
What complicates the role of communities as principals is that there are no clear contracts that 
govern the relationship, formalising the responsibility that NPOs have towards their them: the 
“precise responsibilities to clients and procedures to hold organisations accountable [are] obscure” 
(Cornwall et al., 2000, p. 3). Gray et al., (2006, p. 333) note that in the case of service 
organisations, where those who control and fund the organisations are likely to be different from 
the people who receive services, there is “no direct means by which the clients can enforce 
accountability”. Clients do not manage a formal accountability process, and their participation is 
through the formal processes managed by other stakeholders and at the latter’s discretion (Murtaza, 
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2012). The lack of formal contracts does however not negate that NPOs are required to be 
accountable to the people they serve. The question is what the reasons are, which explain why 
some organisations may be reluctant to practice accountability to communities. In the section 
below the chapter presents an NPO client-community accountability model. The aim is to outline 
the factors that explain the likelihood of NPOs to be accountable to community stakeholders.  
3.4 A Model of NPO Accountability to Client-communities  
NPO accountability to client-communities is a key part of their relationship, and for fulfilling their 
obligations to communities as duty bearers, which includes caring about their wellbeing. The 
organisations will thus account to these groups to align their interests with those of the organisation 
and to demonstrate the NPOs commitment to maximising their welfare. As mission maximisers, 
NPOs care about the welfare of their clients and the quality of the goods which they produce 
(Bilodeau Slivinski, 1997; Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001). Because they are mission maximisers, they 
will engage in activities and processes which they see as having a positive benefit for furthering 
the aims of the organisation and thus their client’s welfare. These activities include administration, 
fundraising, projects, and accountability to external stakeholders (client-communities, donors and 
governments). 
In deciding to be accountable, the NPO will weigh the contribution of client-community 
accountability to achieving the organisational goals, consider the costs involved and the resources 
available for implementation, as well as its accountabilities to other stakeholders including donors 
and governments.  
 The gains of client-community accountability  
In the framework, achieving organisational goals can be impacted in two ways, through the 
fulfilment of the mission and legitimacy. The NPO will, therefore, consider the impact of 
accountability on mission attainment and thus the welfare of the community. Accountability can 
improve the organisation’s performance through access to important client-community 
information, which can facilitate the alignment of NPO activities with the real needs of the 
community (Brown, Moore & Honan, 2003). 
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Additionally, when an organisation illustrates responsibility towards communities, it can generate 
legitimacy, which results in trust, and commitment from external stakeholders because they know 
who the organisation represents (Lee, 2004). Wellens and Jegers (2014, p. 940) also argue that “a 
well-balanced stakeholder management policy” can have positive legitimacy and reputation 
outcomes that result in a competitive advantage relative to other non-profits. Organisations will, 
therefore, also consider the legitimacy gains.The gain can also be transformed into financial and 
in-kind support from concerned external stakeholders (communities, donors, governments, 
volunteers) who also care about the communities welfare.  
Increased financial resources could assist the organisation to fulfil its mission, however, they will 
also affect the NPO’s decision to be accountable to client-communities. Organisations need 
resources to cover bonding costs. We would, therefore, expect larger well resources organisations 
to be more accountable to client-communities (Steets, 2010). However, a large, well-resourced, 
and presumably more bureaucratic organisation could also lack the required flexibility to be 
responsive. The availability of resources could lead to a situation of more mechanic forms of 
accountability that include ticking the box instead of a genuine commitment to community 
stakeholders. That said, legitimacy is important for NPOs because it leads to social recognition 
and support for the NPO’s role and actions (Jepson, 2005).  
The empirical literature has presented inconclusive findings of the organisational and welfare 
benefits of community accountability. Wellens and Jegers (2017) found some weak positive 
associations between the use of client accountability mechanisms and impact on NPO policy-
making in Southern Africa. In Uganda, Burger et al., (2015) found no evidence to corroborate that 
involving the communities in organisations improves revenue or beneficiary welfare. Noor (2015), 
also found no positive association between the use of participation mechanisms and organisational 
effectiveness among organisations in Malaysia. But on further analysis, she showed that the results 
differ for distinct categories of NPOs (Noor, 2015). Furthermore, the results showed a positive and 
significant relationship between organisational effectiveness and overall client accountability. 
Organisational effectiveness was also positively related to two of the other variables that were used 
to construct the measure, information disclosures and complaints mechanisms (Noor, 2015).  
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 Costs of client-community accountability  
NPOs will also consider the costs generated by the accountability process. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) refer to these as bonding costs. For NPOs, bonding costs can be thought of as expenditures 
on accountability-related activities such as reporting, participation, information generation and 
dissemination as well as responding to community needs. These activities reveal the behaviour of 
NPOs to client-communities and help to align its interests with theirs. The assumption here is that 
these collective action related costs are a function of community characteristics: if the community 
is such that it makes accountability activities difficult or challenging, the NPO will have to spend 
more resources on those activities. This is supported by Guy’s (1991) observation that collective 
action costs are a function of the homogeneity of the community, the level of social cohesion, size 
of the population, transaction costs related to distance, frequency and continuity of transaction, the 
value of transactions costs for individuals and cultural requirements on the part of communities. It 
must be noted that deriving the costs would be difficult without prior knowledge of community 
characteristics such as their socio-economic status (Burger et al., 2015). Deriving the cost would 
also require apriori knowledge of the variables reflecting levels of social capital.  
It is unlikely that NPOs will prioritise accountability to client communities if they are not 
empowered enough to claim their rights as principals. The reluctance of communities to demand 
accountability is one of the factors named as barriers to client-community accountability. O’Dwyer 
and Unerman’s (2008, p. 813) showed that members of the advocacy organisation in their 
qualitative case-study displayed apathy, passiveness and placed blind trust in the organisation’s 
professional staff. Lack of assertiveness when dealing with NPOs is another problem (Burger, 
2005; Burger & Seabe, 2014). For example, in Beattie’s (2011) study, the community was reluctant 
to express issues directly because they did not want to cause problems between the community 
and the NPO.  
Communities may fear the negative consequences that result from voicing dissatisfaction, which 
may include the withdrawal of services (Ebrahim, 2003b; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). Ebrahim 
(2003b) argues that clients are in an asymmetric power relationship with NPOs, especially those 
in the services sector because of resource allocations. NPOs have more say in how projects are 
planned and implemented and can withdraw service if they are unhappy (Ebrahim, 2003b). On the 
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other hand, clients only have two options when they are dissatisfied, exit, which is unlikely when 
there is no alternative, and voice, which is also unlikely where there is fear of reprisals. In such 
relationships, it is doubtful that clients will be empowered enough to demand accountability from 
NPOs.  
Additionally, if client-communities are not sufficiently empowered, community initiatives become 
fertile ground for ‘elite capture’; which worsens the skewed power relations and impacts on the 
communities’ abilities to claim their entitlements and right to accountability from NPOs (Platteau 
& Gaspart, 2003). Elite capture occurs when participatory development is captured by the 
traditional, social, and political elite to acquire rents and benefits at the expense of marginalised 
communities (Platteau & Gaspart, 2003). Musgrave and Wong (2016, p. 92) define the 
phenomenon as the “capture of the distribution of resources, project implementation and decision 
making, which negatively impacts non-elites or the target population”. 
However, elite capture is different from elite control and elite reinforcement (Musgrave & Wong, 
2016). Elite control of resources does not have a detrimental impact on the lives of the people but 
may ease implementation by facilitating community-ownership, providing the needed capacity and 
reducing the burden of working in some remote and institutionally poor areas (Dusgupta & Beard, 
2007; Musgrave & Wong, 2016). On the other hand, elite reinforcement is when the elites gain 
more than the poor from development initiatives because of their existing position in the 
community, however, it does not have to be at the expense of the poor (Musgrave & Wong, 2016).  
Although not all-powerful elites are corrupt (Dusgupta & Beard, 2007). There is a greater 
likelihood of accountability to community members when they have more influence in decision 
making, which may not be likely when elites have greater control.  
Implementing accountability activities could also be a challenge in contexts plagued by 
partisanship, favouritism in the distribution of services, inter and intra-group conflicts and political 
interference. The presence of social capital- manifested as trust and cooperation, volunteerism, and 
reciprocity and density of associational life- can, therefore, ease different notions and practices of 
client-community accountability (Awaio et al., 2011) and reduce the costs involved. 
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 Multiple accountabilities to donors and governments  
NPOs have multiple accountabilities to various principals, who have differing interests. These 
stakeholders all have an idea of what the NPO should do and how it should act, which is a source 
of tension. Stakeholders will enjoy more importance as principal if they have found a way “to 
organise, express [ their] desires and enforce accountability” (Bogart, 1995 p. 159). Those with 
the most power and ability to express their interest will, therefore, enjoy more accountability 
because they have the will and means to enforce it. In this scenario, NPOs are less likely to be 
accountable to client-communities, whom they are seldom beholden to unless they are direct fee-
paying members or collectively the main donors of the organisation.  
Non-profits are more likely to be more accountable to patrons. Patrons (donors, governments, and 
others) can withdraw their support when the organisations fail to fulfil their mandate (Najam, 
1996). They “have both the inclination to hold NPOs accountable and the means to ‘punish’ them” 
(Najam, 1996, p. 344). Martinez and Cooper (2010), therefore, argue that accountability to these 
patrons often comes at the cost of accountability to client-communities.  
The accountability demands of donors can lead to a standardised situation, where “hierarchical 
accountability is formalised through financial and administrative mechanisms and socialised, 
informal, and narrative approaches to accountability become less possible” (Martinez & Cooper, 
2010, p. 37). O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007, p. 462) support this view: they observed that within 
the organisations they investigated there was an institutionalised fixation on functional 
accountability, which hampered moves towards client focused social accountability (O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2007, p. 462). 
Resource dependency can add more complexity in this trade-off, especially when an organisation 
does not have diversified sources of funding. Stuck with one donor and with the responsibility to 
keep the NPO active there will be greater pressure to prioritise donor demands. Chahim and 
Prakash (2014) report that in Nicaragua this is the case. Due to resource dependency and the need 
to survive, organisations have decreased their representational capacity and biased their 
accountabilities towards donors at the cost of clients and internal accountability (Chahim & 
Prakash, 2014). Chahim and Prakash (2014) based their conclusions on the findings of 60 in-depth-
interviews, observations and document analysis in the Nicaragua NPO sector. In Belgium, board 
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members and management also prioritise knowing and fulfilling funders’ desires due to the NPOs 
financial dependence on donor funding (Wellens & Jegers, 2014).  
The dependence on donor funding does not necessarily need to lead to accountability biased 
towards donors at the expense of other stakeholders. Some circumstances will mitigate the extent 
that this is the case. AbbouAssi and Trent (2016), after their investigation of accountability of three 
organisations funded by the same donor, reported that the accountability dynamics of respective 
NPOs varied based on the perceptions of the NPO’s management and staff about accountability, 
their donors, and assumptions about donor perceptions of the NPO’s role. These varying 
perceptions resulted in different strategies used to deal with changes in donor funding priorities. 
Consequently, AbbouAssi and Trent conclude that “perceptions and practices of accountability 
determine to whom an NPO should be primarily accountable, shape NPO behaviour, and alter 
dependence on donors” (2016, p. 288). 
Pallas and Guidero (2016) take a different view when they propose that the demand and supply of 
NPO goods and services indirectly affect NPO accountability to their clients. In their theory, NPOs 
can share some of their power with affected populations if they have it over their activities (Pallas 
& Guidero). The organisations would have enough power if they have enough autonomy from 
their donors, which occurs when demand for their activities exceeds supply (Pallas & Guidero, 
2016). When there is over-supply of NPOs, they compete for donor attention leading to a situation 
where donor-driven accountability dominates (Pallas & Guidero, 2016, p. 627).  
Pallas & Guidero (2016) raise the point that donors could also use their power to hold NPOs more 
accountable or delegate their power to affected stakeholders by creating a structural mechanism to 
facilitate accountability to those stakeholders (Pallas & Guidero, 2016, p. 630). For example, 
donors can provide financial support for NPOs to involve communities in the organisations' 
activities and decision making (Burger et al., 2015). But, Burger et al. (2015) find limited evidence 
to support the efficacy of such an approach. Donors could also use grants to harness local resources 
and promote community philanthropy, to cultivate power-sharing among development actors 
(donors, NPOs and the people), and follow participatory grant-making, where communities make 
the decisions about which projects or organisations should be funded (Hodgson & Pond, 2018). 
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 Organisational factors 
Brennan (2010) argues that the extent to which client accountability is integrated into 
organisational decisions relies on the institution within which it is to be embedded, i.e. 
accountability will be discharged differently in different organisations. For example, Gray et al., 
(2006) note that when an “NPO is not a membership-based organisation, there is a clear absence 
of direct groups to whom the body must express its accountability” (Gray et al., 2006, pg. 333). 
Wellens and Jegers (2017) also report variations in the use of accountability mechanisms both 
between and within industries. Furthermore, “in those industries where there are long-term or 
intense relationships with clients (such as health and education), more elaborate and resource-
consuming systems of accountability are implemented (Wellens and Jegers, 2017).   
Van Zyl, Claeyé, and Flambard (2016), also found a difference in the use of accountability 
mechanisms between local and non-local NPOs in South Africa: local organisations claimed to 
practice more and better client accountability, and non-local organisations appeared culturally 
closer to donors and thus were more likely to implement more and ‘better’ ‘upward’ accountability. 
Chahim and Prakash (2014, p. 502) also observed that "rather than providing a mechanism by 
which the citizens can articulate their interests, foreign-funded NPOs give the client what their 
technical experts ‘believe’ is needed”. This paternalism worsened in cases of social differences 
between NPO staff and its clients (Chahim & Prakash).  
According to Beattie (2015), staff attitudes are the most common barrier to implementation of 
accountability mechanisms. NPO staff in Beattie’s (2015) study interpreted applied accountability 
mechanisms as a reflection of a lack of trust in them and their abilities. How the leadership views 
accountability can also play a role in whether the organisations accounts to the communities 
(Ebrahim, 2003b). In most instances, accountability to clients is at the discretion of the leaders and 
is thus subject to the incentives they face (Kilby, 2007).  
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the concepts and theories related to NPO accountability to client-
communities and developed a framework and propositions to guide future research on the topic. 
The chapter used the ‘client-communities’ to identify NPO stakeholders who are directly and 
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indirectly impacted by the organisations’ actions and decisions. It then presented the principal-
agent theory and the rights-based approach to explaining the purpose of accountability to client-
communities.  
Based on the argument that client-communities are important principals with a legitimate claim to 
NPO accountability, the chapter formulated a model to guide future research on the factors that 
may affect NPOs’ decisions about accountability to these stakeholders. Firstly, the model showed 
that NPOs would consider what they can achieve from accountability to community stakeholders. 
NPO literature notes the efficiency and effectiveness benefits of accountability, but as we 
illustrated the empirical evidence on the impact of client-community accountability in inconclusive 
(Barr & Fafschamps, 2005; Burger et al., 2015; Noor, 2016, Wellens & Jegers, 2017). The field 
can, therefore, benefit from more studies investigating the benefits of client-community 
accountability. Here we theorised that the gains of NPO accountability to client-communities 
include improved NPO performance and client welfare (mission attainment), as well as legitimacy, 
which can be transformed into rents such as greater funding and labour contributions. Future 
research can, therefore, investigate the following propositions: 
Proposition Ia: NPO accountability to client-communities will be positively related to NPO 
effectiveness and beneficiary welfare. 
Proposition Ib: NPO accountability to client-communities will be positively related to NPO 
legitimacy, which in turn is positively related to contributions and recognition from donors and 
governments.  
Secondly, NPOs will be accountable to client-communities if certain conditions are satisfied. 
These are related to the costs of accountability, which are a function of client-community 
characteristics, multiple accountabilities and organisational factors. Like any other productive 
activity, engaging in accountability result in costs, bonding costs, as referred to by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). We theorised that an NPO would only engage in client-community 
accountability related activities up to the level where the marginal cost of those activities equals 
their marginal benefit. We also noted that the costs would be a function of community 
characteristics such as average socio-economic status, and level of social capital. We, therefore, 
theorise that: 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
71 
 
Proposition IIa: Client-community accountability will be a positive function of client-community 
socio-economics status.  
Proposition IIb: Client-community accountability will be a positive function of the level of social 
capital in the respective communities.  
Non-profit organisations differ in many respects including the activities they are engaged in, 
whether they are membership organisations, and the characteristics of the staff and the people 
leading them, not to mention their location. For example, organisations engaged in service delivery 
are more likely to be accountable to client-communities than advocacy organisations because they 
can identify who their target community is, making the exercise of accountability easier and thus 
reducing the costs involved. Similarly, membership organisations are more likely to be 
accountable to client-communities because there is a “direct group to whom the organisations must 
express its accountability” (Gray et al., 2006, p. 333).  
Human resource characteristics including those of the board, leaders (founders, and managers), 
staff and volunteers also play a role in the adoption and enactment of accountability to client-
communities. If the fulfilment of organisational objectives maximises these internal stakeholders’ 
utilities, and they have the skills and knowledge on how to be accountable NPOs are probably 
more likely to be accountable to their client-community principals. Therefore: 
Proposition IIIa: An NPO is more likely to be accountable to its client-community if it is a 
membership organisation.  
Proposition IIIb: An NPO is also more likely to be accountable to its client-community if the NPO’s 
human resources’ utilities are maximised by organisational mission fulfilment and client welfare.  
Proposition IIIc: When the human resources in an NPO have the skills and knowledge on how to 
be accountable to client-communities they will be more likely to be accountable to these 
stakeholders.  
One of the barriers to client-community accountability mentioned in the literature is the 
accountability expected by more powerful principals including donors and governments (Benson, 
2012; Schmitz & Mitchell, 2009). Due to reliance on donor funding, NPOs may neglect their 
responsibility towards communities to appease the donors (Benson, 2012). Accountability to 
donors and governments can also crowd out accountability to communities because of the time 
and other resources the NPO spends to satisfy their demands (Burger & Seabe, 2014). Therefore: 
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Proposition IV:  NPOs who face greater demands for accountability from governments and donors 
will be less likely to be accountable to client-communities. 
To conclude, the chapter set out to develop an economic theory of NPO accountability to client-
communities that would assist us to understand the factors that go into NPOs decision about 
accountability to communities. The contribution it makes is a framework and propositions that 
focus on the role of communities as principals and claim-holders based on a principal-agent theory 
and the rights-based paradigm. The framework explicitly and exclusively focuses on the role of 
communities as principals of NPOs. The addition of the right-based approach ameliorates the value 
base missing in principal-agent theory by establishing the normative basis for NPO accountability 
to client-communities. The focus of the approach on the communities’ rights to accountability and 
to self-determination adds the value base missing in principal-agent theory because it is ethical 
and legally justified.  
The framework and propositions could guide future research around community accountability in 
economics. Three of the propositions are investigated in chapters of this dissertation. In Chapter 5 
we test two of the propositions, Proposition IIIb: An NPO is also more likely to be accountable to 
its client-community if the NPO’s human resources’ utilities are maximised by organisational 
mission fulfilment and client welfare and Proposition IIIc: When the human resources in an NPO 
have the skills and knowledge on how to be accountable to client-communities they will be more 
likely to be accountable to these stakeholders. In Chapter 6 we examine Proposition Ia: NPO 
accountability to client-communities will be positively related to NPO effectiveness and 
beneficiary welfare.  
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CHAPTER 4: SAMPLE AND DATA 
4.1 Sample and data 
The empirical analysis for Chapters 5 and 6 draws from the survey and focus group data collected 
from communities in the Eastern and Western Cape provinces in South Africa. We were able to 
sample only two provinces due to resource constraints. The Eastern Cape and Western Cape were 
selected because they reflect the inequalities in South Africa and together are a good representation 
of the different communities present in the country. We, thus, opted for the two areas because of 
their demographic and socio-economic differences. For example, the Eastern Cape (6, 562 million) 
has a larger population compared to the Western Cape (5,823 million), and the Eastern Cape (23 
years) also has on average a younger population compared to the Western Cape (28 years) (Stats 
SA, 2011). The province also has a more rural community compared to the Western Cape, 53 % 
of the households live in rural areas, whereas in the Western Cape 93% of families live in urban 
areas (Stats SA, 2016).  
Households in the Eastern Cape (R 64 539.00) also enjoy less income than their counterparts in 
the Western Cape (R 156 243.00). Additionally, the Eastern Cape (14.3 %) has the highest and the 
Western Cape (3.6 %) the lowest percentage of the population living in multidimensional poverty 
in South Africa according to data on Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) (Stats SA, 2014). The 
provinces also differ based on excess to services: in 2011 only 0.9% of the Western Cape 
population had no access to piped water, a very small share of the 22% who share the same fate in 
the Eastern Cape and 93% of the population in the Western Cape have electricity, while only 74% 
in the Eastern Cape (Stats SA, 2011). Though we cannot name them all here, similar disparities in 
access to services, socio-economic status and infrastructure are present7 between the two 
provinces. The sampling followed a two-stage procedure, which included cluster and snowball 
sampling; the details of each are provided below.  
                                                          
7 See Stats SA’s (2016) report titles ‘The state of basic service delivery in South Africa: In-depth analysis of the 
Community Survey 2016 data for more information about these differences.  
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 Cluster sampling  
After choosing the provinces, the procedure followed in selecting communities involved a random 
sample of communities based on a typology derived from cluster analysis of the 2011 Census data. 
Cluster sampling was based on the socio-economic and access to services variables from Census 
2011 data.  
The clustering procedure included estimating the correlation of key indicators (population-density, 
formal-dwelling, informal-dwelling, traditional dwelling, household income, unemployment, 
electricity, water, no water, no rubbish collection, radio, TV, internet, and number of NPOs). The 
correlation results showed that if a household has electricity, it is more likely to be a formal 
dwelling and have access to water, radio, tv, internet; and that unemployment is likely to be 
correlated with a traditional dwelling and low levels of income. Conversely, higher income was 
positively correlated with access to services. The inclusion of both smaller and larger sets of 
variables was investigated and the results showed a high correlation between the clusters.  
The final cluster analysis included a smaller set of variables, namely, formal dwelling, 
unemployment, access to electricity, access to water, no rubbish collection, internet, and traditional 
dwelling. The variables were therefore used to create clusters based on the community’s level of 
socio-economic status and development. The result was a community topology with six categories 
(1=poor to 6=wealthy). 
 Random sampling was then used to select communities from each cluster with oversampling in 
cluster 1 reflecting the large proportion of poor communities present within the two provinces. 
This process resulted in the choice of 12 non-overlapping primary sampling units (PSU), six 
communities in each province (see Table 4.1).  
 Snowball sampling for the NPO survey 
After the sampling of the communities, a target sample of NPOs was derived based on the 
population size in each community. Before this, snowball sampling was used to gather information 
on NPOs operating in each selected community. Snowball sampling also referred to as chain 
referral sampling is a non-probabilistic sampling method used to obtain information about 
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members of a population that are difficult to find and was therefore very suitable for this study 
(Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981).  
The process included an initial identification of members of the population of interest and after 
that using these identified members to find other members of the population. The process was 
repeated until the desired sample size was obtained. In this study, the process entailed extracting a 
list of registered NPOs from the Department of Social Development NPO register. We then 
proceeded to verify the existence of the organisations on the list by telephone and via physical 
visits to their offices. When we contacted the NPOs, we asked them to list other organisations in 
the community working in the same subsector. Only registered NPOs were added to the list. When 
the last three visits to NPOs did not generate new leads, we took it as an indication of the saturation 
of the sample in that area. 
The snowballing process also involved identifying locators such as municipal community 
development officers, Integrated Development Planning (IDP) officers, local and ward 
councillors, as well as other government representatives (e.g. members of the police and healthcare 
facilities), who may have information about NPOs operating in each area. We also obtained NPO 
information from NPO umbrella organisations and other NPO networks, where it was available.  
Three criteria were used to select surveyed organisations. The first was that the organisation should 
be registered with the Department of Social Development, NPO Directorate. Secondly, they should 
work in the selected communities, not implying that they cannot have offices in another area. 
Lastly, they should be service delivery organisations whose activities fall under the pre-selected 
12 categories8.  The survey and structured focus group data collection then started in 2015 with 
the administering of the instruments to NPOs and community members in the Eastern and Western 
Cape provinces in South Africa. 
                                                          
8 The activities included entrepreneurial programmes, adult education and literacy, school learner support, HIV support group, HIV prevention, 
healthcare, skills development and training, unemployed support group and job placement, gender violence, child welfare services, early 
childhood and development (ECD) and child day care and services to handicapped and elderly.  
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Table 4.1: Survey and focus group sample list 
Community  Municipality  Cluster Population Target sample Actual sample 
Western Cape 
Dysselsdorp Oudtshroon local 1 12544 15 10 
Crossroads Cape Town 1 36043 25 30 
Kwanokuthula Bituo 1 14016 15 13 
Kraaifontein Kraafontein local 1 154,615 85 73 
Cloetesville Stellenbosch 1 15390 15 15 
Saldanha Saladanha Local 6 2294 20 14 
Eastern Cape 
Cala Sakhisizwe Local  2 145,20 15 15 
Lubhacweni B Umzimvubu locaL  3 7640 10 14 
Ngcoya Port St Johns 4 3124 10 0 
Tyeni Umzimvubu locaL  5 1024 10 0 
Ndayingana    Mbizana 2 1664 10 2 
Etenteni Buffalo City 1 2731 10 9 
Total     240 195 
Table 4.1 shows the list of the sample communities, the cluster category, population, as well as, 
the target and final NPO sample size for each community. The target sizes were based on the size 
of the population, driven by the assumption that areas with a higher population are likely to have 
larger numbers of NPOs. The final sample of surveyed NPOs consisted of 195 organisations.  
The sample is less than the target of 240 NPO envisioned at the start of the research. The difference 
is the result of there being no NPOs in two of the sampled communities, namely Ncgoya and Tyeni 
in the Eastern Cape. In other communities, the number of identified and sampled NPOs was less 
than the number estimated at the beginning. These communities included Dysselsdorp, 
Kwanokuthula, Kraaifontein, and Saldanha in the Western Cape. In the Eastern Cape, the 
communities with less than envisioned NPOs were Lubhacweni, Ententeni and Ndayingana. To 
compensate for this, we oversampled in the community where we identified more operating 
organisations than those in the list derived from the NPO database, for example, Crossroads. Thirty 
organisations were surveyed in Crossroads instead of the target 25.  
 Sampling for the structured group-interviews  
To sample for the focus groups purposive sampling was used. For larger communities such as 
Crossroads, Kraaifontein, Cala and Lubacweni sub-place further disaggregated the communities. 
Focus groups participants were recruited at the sub-place level where the NPO was located. This 
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strategy was based on the reasoning that  because of the small and local nature of most of the NPOs 
it would prejudice them if focus group participants were located further than the organisations 
local community. The participants were mobilised using community leaders and community 
development workers not associated with any of our surveyed NPOs. In each focus group, the aim 
was for community members to discuss their knowledge of and interaction with five organisations, 
who had claimed to work in the community. We used a structured focus group questionnaire to 
guide the sessions and we pre-selected the names of the NPOs that we discussed prior to the focus 
group sessions. We conducted 47 focus groups: 35 in the Western Cape and 12 in the Eastern 
Cape.  
4.2 Instruments  
The fieldwork team used two instruments for data collection, a survey and structured group-
interview instruments like those used in the study of NPOs in Uganda. The instruments were 
adapted for the South African context and updated based on insights from recent NPO literature. 
They were also translated into two of the local languages (Afrikaans and isiXhosa) and piloted to 
ensure the appropriateness and relevance of the questions.  
The survey instrument administered to NPOs included closed and open-ended questions. The 
questions in the survey covered basic information pertaining to the founding of the organisation 
and registration with various regulatory bodies such as when it was founded, by whom, if it was 
registered with the NPO Directorate and as a public benefit organisation, as well as whether it had 
a bank account and some movable and immovable assets. The survey also covered questions about 
the finances, leadership, management practices, compliance with various accountability 
mechanisms and staff compliment. Other questions covered, membership in networks and 
compliance with their code of conducts, relationships with the different tiers of government, as 
well as internal and external accountability and performance measurement practices.  
A structured groups-interview instrument was also administered to community members living in 
the same area as respective NPOs. The structured questionnaire included questions about 
community members’ perceptions and attitudes about NPOs’ operation in their areas. The 
questions covered topics such as the community’s knowledge and perceptions about NGO mission 
and activities, how they view their relationship with NGO staff, the quality and frequency of 
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participation in NGO activities and decision-making processes and their views and attitudes with 
regards to the value of the NPOs for their community. Both the survey and structured group-
interviews data are used in this dissertation: Chapter 5 uses the NPO survey data and Chapter 6 
the survey and structured group-interview data. 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
A preliminary analysis of the data showed that most of the organisations in our sample are small, 
informal community-based organisations with close ties in the community. As previously noted, 
195 surveys were conducted: 40 in the Eastern Cape and 155 in the Western Cape. The skewed 
sample, thus, confirms the findings of Chapter 3 which showed that NPOs are unequally 
distributed across South Africa and that the Eastern Cape is one of the provinces underserviced by 
NPOs. Nonetheless, 87% of the organisations were founded by an individual (40%) or a group 
(47%) of South Africans.  
 
Figure 4.1: Breakdown of the sample by NPOs’ main activities 
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100, 41% of the sampled NPOs had more than one main activity. 
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As Figure 4.1 shows most of the organisations are involved in early childhood development (ECD) 
(57%) followed by skills development (25%,) healthcare (18%), child welfare. (17%) and HIV 
prevention (17%). A large part of the  sample were also registered as a non-profit organisations, 
but only 43% of organisations confirmed that they had public benefit status and 70 % had external 
funding. Figure 4.2 also shows that a large segment of the organisations in the sample are relatively 
young, most have been registered for five or fewer years (28%), this is about 4% more than those 
registered for between six and 10 (24%) years and 13% more than those for more than 10 but less 
than 15  years. The rest of the sampled organisations are more mature, they have existed for 16 or 
more years. The descriptive results show that our sample consists of young organisations in the 
services sector and a large proportion have not been exposed to the funding market. These facts 
could have implications on the organisation’s accountability practices.   
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of NPOs by years in existence  
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CHAPTER 5: ALTRUISTIC IDEOLOGUES AND NON-PROFIT 
RESPONSIVENESS TO CLIENT- COMMUNITIES 
Abstract 
NPO leaders are essential for shaping and achieving organisational success. They influence 
decisions made in the NPOs, including those around accountability (Potlaka et al., 2017). 
However, they are not a homogenous group and differ in terms of their preferences, ability, effort, 
and viewpoints. They are thus very likely to have different priorities when it comes to the NPOs 
and their responsibilities towards their various stakeholders. This exploratory research investigates 
how the characteristics of non-profit leaders relate to NPO accountability to client-communities. 
Accountability is operationalised as NPO’s ‘responsiveness’: the extent to which community 
inputs and suggestions are incorporated in a meaningful way into the organisation’s decision-
making processes. 
The research uses a unique community-level data set of 195 NPOs in the Eastern and Western 
Cape provinces in South Africa to test the proposition that more altruistic and educated NPO 
leaders with more experience, embedded in the communities in which they work are more likely 
to reify participatory values and demonstrate sensitivity to their client-communities. The results 
from the analysis show connections between NPO’s responsiveness with the manager being the 
founder of the organisation and being employed at an NPO for a longer period. Tertiary education 
and having prior NPO experience also correlate positively with NPO responsiveness.  
Keywords: accountability, altruism, client-communities, embeddedness, leadership, 
responsiveness 
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5.1 Introduction  
If NPOs exist because “some people want to do good things” (Gassler, 1998, p. 174), the question 
is whether this desire to do good extends to other areas of NPOs’ operations including 
accountability to their less powerful stakeholders. This research examines the relationship between 
NPO leaders and client-community accountability. It tries to identify those traits of leaders most 
associated with the likelihood to show responsibility to clients. The proposition tested in the 
chapter is that altruistic, knowledgeable, and skilled leaders embedded in the communities in 
which NPOs work will prioritise responsiveness to communities. 
Non-profit performance and success are directly linked to the quality of a leader running the 
organisation (Ronquillo, Hein & Carpenter, 2012; Wallis & Dollery, 2005). Effective leaders can 
execute their tasks in a manner that gives the NPO the stability required to fulfil organisational 
objectives and to meet the needs of the recipients of their services (Ronquillo et al., 2012, p. 9). 
They can motivate and ease efforts to achieve those aims (Potluka, Kalman, Musialkowska & 
Idczak, 2017, p. 299). The quality of the leader is acknowledged as necessary for organisational 
success and performance, and in turn, performance is often defined as meeting the needs of and 
being responsive to the community.  
However, very few studies have examined the role of leaders in the relationship between NPOs 
and client-communities (Kilby, 2006; Jacob & Wilford, 2007; Geer, Maher & Cole, 2008; O’ 
Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Wellens & Jegers, 2014a). In these studies, the NPOs’ accountability 
to these principals is linked to the incentives faced by managers, which impact on their attitudes 
and motivations (Kilby, 2006; Jacobs & Wilford, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014a), as well as the 
knowledge and skills they possess (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). The studies provide evidence of 
the factors that may impact on leader’s decision making and practices. However, they do not help 
us understand whether there are individual-level differences in leader’s commitment to pursue 
greater responsiveness to client communities.  
The study, therefore, examines how NPO accountability to client-communities varies with the 
individual-level characteristics of leaders such as altruism, education, experience, and community 
embeddedness. The research uses a unique community-level data set of 195 NPOs in the Eastern 
and Western Cape provinces in South Africa to answer the question: are more altruistic and 
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educated NPO leaders with more experience, who are embedded in the communities in which they 
work more likely to reify participatory values and practice responsiveness to their client-
communities? 
South Africa is chosen as the location of the study because a large segment of the NPO sector is 
formed of small voluntary, grassroots and faith-based organisations (Habib & Kotze, 2003). These 
small NPOs make up over 90% of registered organisations in the country, and it is argued that they 
are at the forefront of community development, but are often large on “intent and passion, and 
very small on financial capacity and operational sophistication” (Peterson, 2010, p. 6). They are 
praised for meeting the needs of people and for being rooted in the communities which they serve 
while relying on volunteers and limited funding (Ranchod, 2007). In most instances, small NPOs 
struggle as they are not eligible for government funding, which is usually earmarked for 
established organisations (Knutsen & Brower, 2010, p. 589). 
Most NPOs in the country are therefore survivalist in character, run on limited resources, are more 
likely to be run by volunteers and to be embedded in the communities  (Habib & Kotze, 2003). 
The small and survivalist’s nature of the majority of the NPOs in the country offers an opportunity 
to investigate the preference of NPOs with regards to accountability to clients in organisations 
where leaders may have a powerful influence on decision making. The South African NPO sector 
also offers an opportunity to assess the extent to which smaller NPOs are embedded and responsive 
to their communities. 
In the following section, the concepts of leadership, client-community accountability and 
responsiveness as operationalised in this study are discussed. This is followed by a theorisation of 
the role of leadership in NPO-client-community principal-agent relations. The propositions 
formulated based on the principal-agent theory are presented in section 5.4. In section 5.5 the data 
and sample are shown with the results following in section 5.6. The chapter ends with a discussion 
and conclusion in sections 5.7 and 5.8. 
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5.2 Definitional matters 
 Leaders  
In the study, we use the term leader. However, the use of this term may pose challenges as it goes 
against accepted definitions, which differentiate between leaders and managers. According to 
Wallis and Dollery (2005) leaders are distinguished from managers because they are future-
oriented and care more about the strategy and direction of the organisations as opposed to having 
an eye on the day-to-day operations, managing the costs, and ensuring the performance of the 
organisation, which is the responsibility of the manager. Leadership and management are two 
distinct roles requiring different skills sets. But, in most NPOs, the manager fulfils both functions, 
especially in small organisations where authority is more centralised and when the board of 
directors do not execute their responsibilities of driving the NPO vision and mission and providing 
the necessary oversight.  
The term ‘leader’, in this study, therefore refers to those individuals responsible for the daily 
operations of the organisations and the making of strategic decisions that affect the implementation 
of the organisational mission and future sustainability. The term `leader`thus captures that these 
individuals handle more than just the operational efficiency of the organisations but also its 
strategic direction. The term is used without any normative connotations.  
 Client-community accountability and responsiveness 
Accountability to client-communities is usually termed ‘downward’ accountability and is often 
juxtaposed to upward accountability to trustees, donors, and governments (Edwards & Hulme, 
1996, pg. 8). The concept describes a relational process that involves interactions between clients 
and NPOs where there is mutual learning (Bawole & Langnel, 2016; Ebrahim, 2003a). In this 
study, client-community refers to individuals or groups to whom NPOs provide goods or services 
and those people in the “catchment of an NPO’s activities, indirect clients such and the community 
at large” (Najam, 1996, pg. 345).  
Additionally, client-community accountability is operationalised as the organisation’s 
responsiveness to community inputs and suggestion. Responsiveness is one of the raisons d'être 
for NPOs and goals of accountability (Barret, 2001; Koppel, 2005). It is an essential element in 
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the process of accountability to clients because it reflects how an NPO is sensitive to client needs 
and that it is a learning organisation that generates “knowledge by processing information or events 
and uses that knowledge to cause behavioural change” (Ebrahim, 2003a, pg. 818). NPO 
responsiveness also signals greater awareness, engagement with communities and contributes to 
organisational effectiveness in many ways including identifying organisational priorities and 
building legitimacy with other stakeholders (Balser & McClusky, 2005; Barret, 2001; Ospina, Diaz 
& O’Sullivan, 2002, p. 297). 
5.3 Theorising the Role of Leaders in NPO and Client-community Relations  
Principal-agent relationships involve the principal delegating some decision-making power to the 
agent (Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308). The theory assumes misaligned interests, which could 
give rise to opportunism on the part of the agent when the agent can hide his decisions and choices. 
To curb agent opportunism andto  minimise informational asymmetries best contracts and 
investment on formal information systems are proposed to reduce the agency cost that arises from 
the relationship (Miller, 2002, p. 433). 
However, the principal-agent relationship between NPOs and client-communities are more 
complex than the relations covered by the theory. Client-communities are not principals to NPOs 
in the traditional sense unless they are members and contribute to the running of the organisations 
(Burger & Seabe, 2014). Most often they receive NPO services paid for by third parties who are 
also not principals in the conventional sense because they have no residual claim on the NPO 
(Fama & Jensen, 1985). In NPO there are “no specific residual claimants with alienable property 
rights in net cash flows” (Fama & Jensen, 1983a, p. 342). This absence of residual claims has 
significant implications for governance in NPOs as we will discuss.  
Despite the complexity, communities as final users of NPO goods and services and as parties who 
legitimise NPO operations are also the principals of NPOs. Barret (2001, p. 39) argues that NPO 
clients are as important as shareholders of for-profit firms and therefore the organisations should 
be accountable to them as firms are accountable to their shareholders. In reaction to Fama and 
Jensen’s (1983a) omissions of other principals of NPOs except for donors, Williamson (1983) also 
states that clients are one of the principals of NPOs: because of their over-reliance on NPO service, 
they stand the most to lose if the organisations fail. Wellens and Jegers (2014b) also contend that 
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based on the Jensen and Meckling’s definition of principal, multiple principals can be identified 
in NPO principal-agent relationships, including clients. Client-communities, therefore, face the 
risk of loss in welfare due to agency problems that arise from unobservable behaviours such as 
moral hazard and adverse selection, though to a lesser extent. Their interests should, therefore, be 
protected as they have a stake in the organisation and are affected by what it does or does not do. 
Theoretically, an NPO’s board of directors should protect the rights of client-communities, which 
is why the study of agency relations in NPOs has focused on investigating principal-agent 
relationships between the NPO boards and leaders (Wellens & Jegers, 2014a; Jegers, 2002; Du 
Bois et al., 2009). Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that NPOs fit into a specific organisational form 
where the decision-making process entails the separation of the decision management, initiation, 
and implementation from decision control, ratification and monitoring, which is the responsibility 
of the non-profit board aimed at dealing with any agency problems that may arise. The role of the 
board thus forms part of the decision hierarchies, with the board at the apex, which prevents agents 
from making decisions that may have detrimental outcomes for principals (Fama & Jensen, 
1983b).In non-profits, the board, therefore, plays the role of protector of the NPO’s mission and 
objectives, and its responsibilities also include the hiring, compensating, monitoring and firing of 
executives (Miller, 2002). 
However, the theory of ineffective principals suggests that the NPO board may not effectively 
execute their duties (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Miller, 2002). Miller (2002) noticed that in the 40 
board meetings he attended during his research board members we never critical or suspicious of 
executive actions. Furthermore, NPOs boards face limited incentives to perform as they do not 
answer to shareholders, do not face the threat of a takeover as in the case of for-profit firms or own 
assets linked to the organisation's success (Glaeser, 2002). 
Additionally, board protection of the rights of client-communities would assume that they have 
homogenous preferences which include the welfare of the organisation’s clients. However, there 
is no reason to believe that this is the case as boards usually form a unique set of people with 
different perspectives and interests in the organisations. Even if their interest may align, they may 
be more interested in the preservation of the organisation than pursuing activities providing 
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maximum welfare benefits to the clients. The presence of the board as an oversight mechanism, 
therefore, does not guarantee the maximisation of client-community welfare.  
The non-distribution constraint also constrains donors from laying financial claims on the revenues 
of the organisations and ensures that they have no controlling rights over what the organisations 
do (Glaeser, 2002). They are one of the principals of NPOs, if not the ones considered the most 
‘legitimate’ considering their role as resource providers. They also have the credible ‘threat of 
withdrawal’, which they can use to control NPO behaviour. That said, they are ineffective as 
principals and in protecting the rights of client-communities as far as their focus is on the adherence 
of NPOs with financial management and reporting standards. A situation that worsens in North-
South donor NPO relations where geography and sometimes cultural differences vastly separate 
the two parties.  
The result of ineffective principals is that NPOs provide the environment for greater managerial 
discretion and less oversight (Caers, Du Bois, Jegers, De Gieter, Schepers & Pepermans, 2006). 
The consequence of which is the prominence of NPO leadership in driving the agenda and 
increased leeway in how stakeholder relations are managed (Geer et al., 2008). Hill and Jones 
(1992) argue that in this regard leaders are unique. They are the link between the organisations’ 
stakeholders: “the only group, who enter into contractual relationships with all other stakeholders 
and the only ones with direct control of decision-making in an organisation” (Hill & Jones, 1992).  
NPO executives, therefore, have a central role in the organisation. They influence decisions made 
including those around accountability to client-communities (Potlaka et al., 2017). Consequently, 
it can be expected that they will be at the centre of executing responsibility to communities, 
especially in public benefit service delivery NPOs where accountability to clients is noted to be at 
the discretion and grace of the NPO manager (Kilby, 2006; Geer et al., 2008; Gray et al., 2006). 
The manager could use this discretion and lack of oversight irresponsibly or use it to make 
decisions that are in the best interest of the community (Caers et al., 2006). The question this raises 
is what type of NPO leader will prioritise client-community’s inputs? 
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 NPO leaders as altruistic ideologues 
Caers et al. (2006) argue that the manager, who makes decisions on whether to include the welfare 
of the clients in their utility maximisation function will be more likely to be responsive to their 
needs. This situation, resembling a stewardship NPO-stakeholder relationship, would minimise 
goal misalignment and as consequence agency problems (Caers et al., 2006). These kinds of 
leaders are most likely to be found in NPOs because the non-distribution constraint assures them 
that their efforts will not be misappropriated. The non-distribution constraint also signals 
commitment not to act in a manner detrimental to the principal, which is why altruistic individuals 
who care about the public good will found non-profits (Bilodeau & Slivinski, 1998) 
Theories of NPO supply suggest that NPO leaders indeed care firstly about the welfare of clients 
before anything else and have little care for pecuniary benefits (Rose-Ackerman, 1996 & 1997). 
NPOs are founded and run by entrepreneurs and people with distinct preferences that may be 
grounded on professional experience or the values of the community from which the organisations 
appear (Badelt, 1997; Brown & Caughlin, 2009, p. 102). They care more about the output of the 
NPO and motivated by a concern for the social benefits and services provided by the organisation, 
reasons why they are also willing to accept lower pay (Francois, 2001).  
NPO leaders are, therefore, committed altruistic ideologues (Rose- Ackerman, 1996). An 
ideologue “is a person with strong beliefs about the proper way to provide a particular service. The 
individuals espouse an educational philosophy, hold religious beliefs that prefer certain forms of 
service delivery, or subscribes to a particular aesthetic or psychological theory” (Rose-Ackerman, 
1996, p. 719). Gassler (1998) confirms that NPO founders are altruist driven by Kantian ethics. 
They decide to take some of their pecuniary rewards as the satisfaction of meeting their 
philanthropic goals (Gassler, 1998). Altruism can be motivated by the “fundamental concern for 
the welfare of others or the desire to feel good by helping others” (Noreen, 1998, p. 360). In the 
latter instance, the leaders could derive a ‘warm-glow’ from providing a service through the 
organisations they have founded. A utilitarian ethic can also drive them: “voluntary compliance 
with rules of right behaviour because it is in your best interest to do so” (Noreen, 1998, p.360). 
However, the “willingness to sacrifice one’s own time, energy, and resources for the benefit of 
others by no means make you a perfect agent” (Jensen, 1994, p. 5). Although altruism may be 
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necessary for founding an NPO, it is not a given that it will translate to accountability to 
communities. Leaders of NPOs are not a homogenous group (Jegers, 2002). They differ in their 
preference for altruism, ability and effort, factors which are also necessary for effective 
management and organisational outcomes (Van Puyvelde & Jegers, 2016). Additionally, the 
incentives they face are not the same nor is the context in which they work. These differences will 
impact the performance of the NPO and the severity of agency problems in their relationship with 
stakeholders. More relevant for this study, how responsive the organisation will be to client-
communities. In this chapter, we examine the role of altruism and the heterogeneity in NPO leaders 
to ascertain which leaders’ characteristics are more likely to be associated with the responsiveness 
of NPOs to client-communities.  
5.4 Client Accountability and Leadership Characteristics  
In this section hypotheses of the relationship between certain leadership characteristics and NPO 
responsiveness are presented. 
 Altruism  
As supply theories of NPOs demonstrate, altruism plays an essential role in the founding of NPOs. 
The question is whether the preference for altruism also affects the decisions made by managers, 
especially those around sensitivity to clients. Fama and Jensen (1983a) note that the selflessness 
of NPO staff reduces the costs of managing agency problems and protects clients and donors from 
exploitation. Glaeser & Shleifer (1998) also argue that public spirit, a keen interest in their causes 
and altruism rather than profit maximisation motivates NPO entrepreneurs. If that is the case, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that more altruistic leaders may make decisions in favour of 
responsiveness to enhance organisational effectiveness. We would also expect them to drive 
responsiveness in their organisations because it is ethical to consider and act on the inputs of client-
communities when making decisions that will affect them.  
To test this theorisation, we include three proxies for altruism in our model: whether the manager 
of the organisations is one of the founders, are female and possess a religious title. Founder-
managers are different to non-founder managers; an essential part of their utility depends on the 
performance of the organisations (Gassler, 1998, Jegers, 2002). Jegers (2002) therefore shows that 
founder-managers would require a substantial increase in monetary benefits to compensate for the 
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loss of utility due to a decrease in organisational performance. The manager-founder has a vested 
interest to see the NPO succeed compared to a manager who is not a founder. The implication is 
that welfare loss is reduced due to the low probability that the manager-founder will act 
opportunistically. If indeed they are other-regarding and care about the welfare of the communities 
they serve, as NPO supply theories suggest, it would be strategically and ethically right for them 
to be responsive to their inputs. We, can, therefore, expect that: 
Proposition I: In NPOs where the manager is also the founder, there is a greater likelihood of 
NPO responsiveness to the client- community inputs. 
Female managers are perceived to embody altruism and to embrace a democratic culture (Burger 
et al., 2015; Le Roux, 2009). They are also described as more likely to adopt a ‘relational’ approach 
to leadership by leading with care for others, vision, collaboration, courage and inclusiveness, 
shared ownership, connectedness and cooperativeness (Regan & Brooks, 1995; Smit, 2013). 
Because of these attributes, there is a greater likelihood that female managers will be more likely 
to include communities in NPO activities but also to consider and respond to those inputs.  
Proposition II: Female NPO managers will have a higher likelihood of responsiveness to the client 
community  
When a manager has a religious title, it may signify an altruistic ideologue who cares about the 
people he serves and making an impact on their lives (Burger et al., 2015). They may be inclined 
to respond because their religious beliefs may exert moral pressure for them to make decisions that 
are sensitive to client-community inputs.  
Proposition III: Where the NPO manager has a religious title, there is a greater likelihood that an 
NPO will be responsive to client-community inputs. 
 Knowledge and skills 
Leader’s knowledge, skills, and competencies also facilitate network building and stakeholder 
management (King, 2004). To be able to understand the information provided by communities and 
incorporate it into the NPOs strategic decisions, while considering the financial and organisational 
implications, leaders need high levels of skills and knowledge. They should also know of the 
available options they can implement to coordinate inputs to be responsive to client-communities. 
Lack of knowledge on the alternatives is mentioned as one of the barriers to client accountability 
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in NPOs. For example, O’ Dwyer and Unerman (2008) found that even though the NPOs’ leaders 
recognise a need for accountability to clients, it was not considered in part because of the lack of 
knowledge about available client accountability mechanisms. Skills and knowledge, including but 
not exclusively consisting of formal education, are therefore important prerequisites for NPOs’ 
responsiveness to clients. Characteristics we include as proxies for skills and knowledge are 
tertiary education and prior NPO experience. 
The positive effects of education in the voluntary sector have been noted. More knowledge has 
been linked to greater participation and engagement both in public and voluntary organisations 
and civic responsibility (Dee, 2004). One of the pathways through which education is related to 
awareness and exposure to different realities and world views. Educated managers may, therefore, 
be more likely to be aware and to understand the philosophy behind client accountability and the 
mutual benefits involved.  
Proposition IV: When the leader has a tertiary education, NPOs will be more likely to be 
responsiveness to client inputs. 
Suarez (2010, p. 697) argues that in the NPO sector “substantive professional backgrounds and 
non-profit experience give leaders the necessary ‘street credentials’ for leadership”, that is 
credibility and legitimacy when it comes to the likelihood of leading an NPO. The benefit of 
experience is career advancement, but experience may also result in the manager understanding 
which strategies to pursue to achieve organisational outcomes including responsiveness to 
communities. Furthermore, leaders with prior NPO experience are more likely to be aware of 
managerial best practices, which they have gained from longer socialisation in the sector (Claeyé 
& Jackson, 2012),  
Proposition V: If the manager has prior NPO sector experience, the organisation is more likely to 
be responsive to client needs.  
 Embeddedness 
Sociological agency theory highlights the importance of embedding agency relations in ongoing 
networks (Shapiro, 2005). The idea is that personal familiarity between the agent and principal can 
lessen adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Shapiro, 2005). Personal familiarity can 
occur through repeated interactions in trusted and shared social networks (Shapiro, 2005). When 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
 
there is already familiarity between the two parties “it is likely that the principal will learn about 
the agent and so will be able to assess behaviour more readily” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 62).  
It is also easier to monitor the behaviour of the leader in continued interactions, and social networks 
have sanctioning power that can motivate the leader to act in an exemplary manner (Shapiro, 
2005). Leaders can choose to be accountable and therefore responsive because they fear being 
shamed, ostracised, or a loss of reputation (Shapiro, 2005). To assess the influence of 
embeddedness of the leaders we include their tenure at the NPO and whether they are from the 
community in which the NPO works. Length and intensity of the service relationship may have a 
bearing on a manager’s attitude towards accountability to clients (Wellens & Jegers, 2014a, p. 
947). The tenure duration of the manager could also signal deep and intense relationships with the 
client- community, which can facilitate responsiveness because of the goodwill already developed.  
Proposition VI: The longer the tenure duration of a leader the higher the likelihood that the 
organisations will be responsive to client-communities.  
An NPO manager who is also from the community can be expected to have deeper and broader 
social networks in the area. They may, therefore, be more likely to be embedded in the community 
and to feel a sense of obligation and responsibility towards them. The closeness to community 
members may increase their likelihood to be accountable to them. (Van Zyl et al., 2017).  
Proposition VII: When the founder is from the community an NPO is more likely to be responsive 
to client inputs  
 Organisational factors  
To control for possible endogeneity stemming from unobserved heterogeneity we also include 
NPO characteristics in our model. The attributes include revenue, location (whether the NPO is 
based in East Cape or Western Cape province), whether it is an early childhood development centre 
(ECD) and whether participation is a donor requirement. No propositions are formulated about 
these factors because they are included only as control variables. 
The amount of funding will determine the organisation’s ability to implement accountability 
mechanisms while complying with the demand of other stakeholders. Furthermore, larger, and 
more professional NPOs are more likely to provide opportunities for client participation as an 
institutionalised practice of professional management (Wellens & Jegers, 2014a). At the same 
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time, smaller organisations may also have more opportunities for client involvement because there 
are fewer layers of bureaucracy separating managerial staff from clients. These statements suggest 
that NPO size may correlate with NPO responsiveness, but the direction of the relationship cannot 
be determined a priori.  
Organisations in rural collective communities may display a positive attitude towards 
accountability to communities because of the stronger networks in the areas. These organisations 
are also more likely to depend on financial and in-kind donations from the community members 
for survival because of the distance between them and donor markets (Van Zyl et al., 2017). 
Therefore, organisations in closed collective rural communities can be expected to be more likely 
to adopt and practice responsiveness to client-communities.  
We also thought to investigate differences in responsiveness between different types of 
organisations, mainly those that are ECDs and the rest of the sample. The investigation was 
motivated by the idea that the structure of ECDs resembles that of a membership organisation, as 
parents of children usually pay for the services provided. Wellens and Jegers (2014a) conclude 
that participation being a legal requirement may have an educational effect on leaders in 
organisations where they are applied and Kilby (2006) argues that the more formal the client 
accountability mechanisms, the higher the likelihood for accountability. We therefore also include 
a variable that denotes whether participation is one of the requirements of the NPOs’ two most 
important donors.  
5.5 Sample and Variables  
The paper follows an exploratory research approach in trying to find the attributes of managers 
most aligned with responsiveness to client communities. The research uses the original 
community-level data set described in Chapter 4, which is based on information gathered from 
surveys conducted with NPOs in the Eastern and Western Cape provinces of South Africa.  
 Variables 
To measure the NPOs’ responsiveness, to client-communities we use a dummy variable based on 
a question, which asked the respondents to give an example where the NPO changed its programme 
or approach because of community or client inputs or feedback, see A1 in appendices at the end 
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of the dissertation. The enumerators were instructed to select yes when an illustration was given 
and no when the respondent could not provide one. The variable is coded 1 if the response was yes 
and 0 if no. Responses to the question could include how the organisations changed their 
operations, took on new activities or changed their strategic direction because of the feedback 
provided by communities of clients. For example, in one of the interviews one respondent 
mentioned: 
“Look our approach in the beginning was just to offer workshops, formal 
workshops and through the feedback from the community we have more informal 
workshops now, what do they call it, awareness sessions…these are shorter type of 
workshops and we also try to….like I said before, to utilise more community 
members as community speakers and facilitators where we always brought people 
in from outside; we have now realised  that we do have expertise in our community 
itself who can present programmes for us like for example; we had a heart skills 
bricklaying course and utilised a man who lives in the community who came and 
taught the youth, yes, the way the organisation works has changed in that it is more 
directed to the community. It interacts more with the community, in a better way, I 
would say” 
The independent variables included are the leadership characteristics and controls for other 
organisational factors that may impact on responsiveness. The leadership variables include Tenure, 
Tertiary, Prior NPO experience, Founder is the manager, From the community, Female and 
Religious. Tenure of the manager is measured as the number of years at the organisations. The rest 
of the leadership characteristics are included as dummy variables coded 1 or zero. For example, 
Tertiary is coded 1 if the leader has a tertiary qualification and zero if not. This coding system is 
applied to the rest of the leader characteristics variables. The control variables included are a 
continuous annual revenue variable entered as a proxy for NPO size and dummy variables to 
indicate whether the NPO is an ECD, it is based in the Eastern Cape and whether it has community 
participation as a donor requirement.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
101 
 
 Variable distribution characteristics 
In Table 5.1 we present the information on the distribution of the included variables. Of the 
sampled organisations 59% gave an example of responsiveness to the communities they serve. 
Three-quarters of the organisations have female managers, and all managers have on average been 
with the organisations for ten years. Additionally, 69% of the managers are the founder or one of 
the founders of the NPO and 70% are from the same location as the domicile of the organisation. 
It is important to note that a Polychoric correlation test showed a close to zero correlation between 
the two variables despite both sub-samples individually forming a significant part of the sample. 
Forty-seven percent of the leaders also have a tertiary qualification and 40% a religious title. In 
terms of organisational characteristics, Table 5.1 shows that over half of the NPOs are early 
childhood development organisations and 20% work in the Eastern Cape. Participation is also a 
donor requirement for 42% of the NPOs.  
Table 5.1: Variable distribution characteristics 
Variables  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Responsiveness (Dep Var) 195 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Leader characteristics  
Tenure  178 10.25 8.46 0 45 
Tertiary 195 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Prior NPO experience 176 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Founder  182 0.70 0.46 0 1 
From the community 192 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Female 180 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Religious title 164 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Control variables  
ECD 195 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Revenue 2012 118 1,926,595 6,387,871 0 50,100,000 
Eastern Cape 195 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Participation donor 
requirement 
195 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Note: Samples sizes vary due to missing observations for some of the variables.  The sample was much smaller 
for the revenue variable because only 118 organisations provided their financial information.  
5.6 Estimation Methods  
Descriptive statistics, logit regressions and margins are the statistical tools used for this analysis. 
The descriptive analysis methods include non-parametric methods such as a binomial test to verify 
the proportion of NPOs that are responsive to client- communities and chi-squared test to examine 
the relationship between NPO responsiveness with categorical variables included in our model. 
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They also include the Kruskal-Wallis (1952) equality-of-populations rank test to test whether there 
are differences in mean years worked by managers between responsive and non-responsive NPOs, 
as well as a t-test to examine the association between NPO responsiveness and revenue.  
For a more in-depth analysis, the research employed multivariate logit regressions followed by 
margins to predict the probability of NPO responsiveness based on the given data. Williams (2012) 
argues that margins make results more tangible and practical. Two models of NPO responsiveness 
are estimated. The base Model I included only the leadership characteristics, whereas Model II 
incorporates the leadership characteristics and control variables (ECD, Eastern Cape, Revenue and 
Participation donor requirement). The logit results are presented as marginal effects to facilitate 
interpretation. The marginal effect of the independent variable is “the partial derivative, which is 
the ratio of the change in y to the change in x, when the change in x is infinitely small” (Long, 
1997, p. 5): it is the slope of the logistic curve at a point, all else being equal. We also plot the 
predictive margins for certain variables of interest; mainly tertiary, manager tenure duration, 
manager prior NPO experience, founder manager, and revenue. 
5.7 Results  
Here we present the results of the descriptive and Logit regression analyses. The binomial test 
confirmed that 59% of respondents could give an example of how they changed a component of 
the organisation's operations because of inputs provided by community members.  
 Leadership characteristics 
In Table 5.2 the results of the chi-squared test show evidence of an association between NPO 
sensitivity to client-community inputs and various leadership characteristics. NPO responsiveness 
is marginally significant and positively correlated to the founder and prior NPO experience 
variables. The results of the tertiary education variable are insignificant. However, NPOs, where 
managers had tertiary education (63%), are more likely to be responsive than to those where the 
managers do not have a tertiary education (55%). The insignificance of the results may be a case 
where the small sample is impeding significance, despite there being a relatively large gap and 
thus evidence of a strong association.  
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These results suggest that some organisations are more likely to be sensitive to community 
demands if they are founded and run by an altruist with prior NPO sector experience. The founder 
being from the community, female and having a religious title are insignificant suggesting that the 
manager’s connection to the community and level of altruism as represented by gender and 
religious title may have a negligible effect on responsiveness.  
Table 5.2: Bivariate regressions of NPO responsiveness and leadership characteristics 
NPO Responsiveness (Dep Var) No Yes Pearson Chi2  P-value 
Altruism 
Founder manager  49.09 63.78 3.432 0.064 
Female  68.29 69.72 0.0287 0.865 
Manager is religious  57.14 60.61 0.1949 0.659 
Knowledge and skills 
Tertiary  55.88 63.44 1.1532 0.283 
Prior NPO experience  55.47 68.97 3.0774 0.079 
Embeddedness  
Founder is from the community  63.16 58.52 0.3591 0.549 
The bivariate regressions were followed by a descriptive analysis of the relationship between 
responsiveness and the manager’s tenure at an organisation. An examination of the tenure variable 
showed that it is non-normally distributed, (see A1 in appendices). The variable is skewed to the 
right showing that for a large part of the sample the managers have been in the organisations ten 
or fewer years. Because of the non-normal distribution of the variable a Kruskal-Wallis rank test 
and t-test, which is robust to the assumption of normality was applied to examine the relationship 
between NPO responsiveness and leader’s years at the NPO. The Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-
populations rank test shows a significant difference in the mean manager’s years at the NPO 
between responsive and non-responsive organisations, χ2 (1) = 5.891, p = 0.0152. The 
disadvantage of the Kruskal-Wallis test is that it does not provide much information with regards 
to the nature of the difference.  
We therefore also conducted a t-test, and the results show that NPOs that are responsive have 
leaders who have been with the organisations’ a longer time (11.2 years) compared to managers 
who are in organisations, which are not responsive (8.7 years). The results are significant with a 
p-value of 0.05 for the rejection of the null proposition and a p-value of 0.02 for the alternative 
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hypothesis that NPOs who are responsive to community inputs have managers who have been with 
the organisations for longer durations.  
Tenure was also interacted with the responsiveness and the founder variables to examine whether 
having a founder-manager impacted on the relationship between tenure and responsiveness. The 
results illustrated in Figure 5.1 show that the relationship holds even when the analysis accounts 
for founder-manager. However, the graph shows that the difference in manager’s years at the NPO 
between responsive (13.7 years) and non-responsive (9.7) NPOs is greatest in the sub-group where 
the manager is not the founder. 
 
Figure 5.1: The mean of manager’s years at NPO by responsiveness and founder-manager 
 Organisational characteristics  
The descriptive results also showed that a greater proportion of organisations are likely to be more 
responsive to community suggestions if they have more financial resources. This suggests that 
having the desire to be accountable is not enough. The results also illustrate that most of our sample 
run on less than R 200 000 a year (14 684.24 $), see appendix. Because of the non-normal 
distribution of revenue, the analysis included a t-test to investigate the association between revenue 
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and responsiveness. The results show a significant (p= 0.01) difference in the mean revenue 
between responsive (R 730 375, 00) and non-responsive NPOs (R 226 810, 06), with organisations 
enjoying more revenue being more likely to react to community inputs  
Revenue and responsiveness further interacted with tertiary education. Figure 5.2 shows that NPO 
sensitivity to communities is positively correlated with higher revenue. Additionally, Responsive 
NPOs who are run by managers with a tertiary education also enjoy on average more revenue 
compared to their counterparts with less educated managers.  
 
Figure 5.2: NPO revenue by NPO responsiveness and managers education 
A chi-square test was also used to examine the relationship between NPO responsiveness and the 
geographical location of NPOs, denoted by the province in which the organisation is located. The 
results show that there are no significant differences in responsiveness between organisations 
located in the Eastern Cape and those located in the Western Cape provinces and between ECDs 
and the rest of our sample. Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that donor participation 
requirements are associated with NPO responsiveness to community members.  
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 The role of leadership in community accountability  
Here we present the results of the two estimated models, which show evidence that specific 
leadership characteristics are correlated with NPO sensitivity to clients. The results below in Table 
5.3 suggest that having an altruistic leader has a significant association with NPO sensitivity to 
communities feedback and inputs. The relationship between the founder-manager and NPO 
responsiveness is consistently positive and significant. Responsiveness is 26%-points more likely 
in an NPO with a founder-manager than in one without. The difference in probability increases to 
36%-points in Model II. The result may be explained by people who initiate NPO projects care 
about the wellbeing of the community and are thus more likely to engage in activities and 
behaviour that reifies that value. Our data showed that when the organisations were founded, in 
67% of them the founder/s had a strong vision of what they wanted to do and where they wanted 
to locate their projects. 
The results also suggest that human capital plays an important role in the probability of NPOs 
changing behaviour and actions in response to client inputs. Both tertiary education and prior NPO 
experience have a positive relationship with NPO responsiveness. Managers with tertiary 
education were 19% more likely to be responsive compared to managers that did not have further 
education and training. This result stays robust after the inclusion of controls in Model II. The 
result of the tertiary variable was, however, insignificant in the bivariate regression table in Table 
5.2. The improved significance could be the result of a suppressor variable/s. The suppressor 
variable partials out extraneous variation, leading to a clarification of the relations between the 
dependent and relevant independent variable (Ludlow & Klein, 2014). The suppressor is usually 
uncorrelated with the dependent but with the independent variable of interest. In the case of 
tertiary, the founder-manager variable could be acting as the suppressor because it has a significant 
and negative correlation with tertiary. Similarly, where a manager had worked in another NPO 
before joining or starting the current organisation, the NPO was more likely to be responsive to 
community suggestions. 
Among the control variables, only revenue has a positive and marginally significant correlation 
with NPO responsiveness. The positive relation suggests that having the resources to implement 
changes matters for an NPO to be able to respond to communities. 
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Table 5.3: Table 5.4: Leadership and client accountability logistic regressions 
 Model I Model II 
NPO responsiveness (Dep Var) Coef.  Se.  Coef.  Se. 
Altruism Founder manager 0.26**  0.09 0.36*** 0.1 
Female 0.05 0.097 0.25* 0.11 
Manager religious  0.05 0.08 0.08 0.1 
Knowledge and skills Tertiary education  0.19* 0.08 0.19* 0.1 
Prior NPO experience  0.21** 0.08 0.26** 0.09 
Embeddedness Founder from the 
community 
-0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.1 
Tenure at NPO (years) 0.01* 0.004 0.01 0.01 
Control variables ECD   -0.04 0.1 
Eastern Cape     -0.06  0.13 
Participation a donor 
requirement 
    0.07 0.09 
Revenue      3.99*  1.89 
N   132 86 
R2  0.11 0.23 
*0.05 *0.01 ***0.001(Source: Own Data) 
Note: Sample sizes vary due to missing observations, especially in the revenue variable. Only 118 organisations 
provided their financial information.  
To have a better understanding of the relationship between NPO responsiveness and individual 
leadership characteristics we further estimated the predicted probabilities for sub-samples of the 
data and plotted them for better visualisation of the results. Figure 5.3 shows a positive relationship 
between the probability for an NPO to be responsive and the manager’s tenure at the NPO. 
However, this differs by whether the manager has prior NPO experience. For a manager with prior 
experience, the predicted probabilities increase from 75%-points to 0.93 %-points. Whereas when 
the manager has no prior NPO experience, the probability of being a responsive NPO only 
increases from 0.44%-points to 0.8. Though the probabilities start at a higher level for experienced 
managers, the change in probabilities over the managers' tenure is higher for leaders with no 
previous NPO experience.  
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Figure 5.3: Predictive margins: NPO responsiveness by managers and prior NPO experience 
The probability to be a responsive NPO also changes with revenue, whether the manager has 
tertiary education and is the founder of the organisation. Figure 5.4 illustrates that the likelihood 
to be responsive is greater when the founder is the manager, has tertiary education and the NPO 
has more revenue.  
 
Figure 5.4: Predictive margins: NPO responsiveness by founder manager and tertiary education 
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5.8 Discussion  
Using principal-agent theory and entrepreneurship theories of NPOs, the research hypothesised on 
the role of leaders in NPO client-community accountability relations. It identifies altruism as one 
of the leadership characteristics most likely to be associated with NPO responsiveness to client-
community inputs. In previous literature, we also identified knowledge and skills as well as 
community embeddedness as some of the factors that may correlate with the leader’s decisions to 
act on community’s views and inputs to improve organisational service delivery and performance. 
Based on the theoretical work we formulated propositions about the relationship between leader 
characteristics and NPO responsiveness to communities. These propositions were empirically 
tested using a unique community-level data set of NPOs collected in the Eastern and Western Cape 
provinces in South Africa.  
Of the propositions, we tested I, IV, V, are fully supported by the evidence. The results confirm 
Proposition I, which predicts a positive relationship between NPO responsiveness and the manager 
being a founder of the organisation. The result may be explained by the altruistic character of the 
founder-manager (cf. an individual who accepts a job at an NPO) as suggested by NPO 
entrepreneurship theories. Some people may also be driven by their ethical sensibilities (Noreen, 
1988). Burger et al., (2017), theorise that when the NPO founder is still the manager, it may signal 
an unbureaucratic organisation not yet tied to the aid chain and therefore one which has not adopted 
donor-focused accountability tendencies. 
The relationship could also be explained by the founder run NPOs still espousing the altruistic 
values held by the leaders. Additionally, it is more likely that founder-managers experience more 
organisational identification where the manager treats the organisation’s successes and failures as 
their own (Mael & Ashforth, 1992). When this is the case, the leader is more likely to adopt 
practices that facilitate success. These benefits of organisational identification could be lost once 
a new leader is employed and the organisation redirects its focus to reflect the values and priorities 
of the new leader, who could be less community focused.  
Similarly, the consistently positive and significant tertiary education variable coefficient confirms 
Proposition IV. This result suggests that educated leaders are more likely to care and be responsive. 
Education may increase awareness and sensitivity about community needs and how to address 
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them. Education, after all, has a positive and significant effect on the supply of NPOs (Puyvelde 
&Brown, 2016). These results are however different to what Burger et al., (2015) reported, about 
NPOs in Uganda where having a manager with a degree is negatively related to beneficiary welfare 
and community participation. A phenomenon that could be explained by the crowding out of 
community-focused practices by the bureaucratic tendencies that come with donor dependency 
(Burger et al., 2015).  
Experience obtained through earlier NPO employment in the NPO sector is also positive and 
significantly correlated to NPO responsiveness. This result is like what was reported on NPOs in 
Uganda where the manager’s experience was reported as positively associated to community 
involvement and welfare (Burger et al., 2015). Geer et al., (2008) also found a positive relationship 
between accountability and the leader’s experience.  
Propositions II and VII are partially supported by the findings. When organisational factors were 
controlled for, the results show that female managers are also more likely to adopt community 
focused practices. Manager’s tenure also began significant but attenuated when the control 
variables were added in Model II. Hypotheses III and VI are not supported by the findings.  
In terms of the control variables, only NPO revenue has a significant and positive relationship with 
NPO responsiveness. The results are like what was found previously. Geer et al., (2008) report a 
positive and significant relationship between the budget size of the organisations and 
accountability. However, the results differ in that Geer et al., (2008) looked at the relationship 
between the general accountability of NPOs. The results are also in line with the logic professed 
by Wellens and Jegers (2014a) that larger and more professional NPOs are more likely to provide 
opportunities for client participation as an institutionalized practice of professional management. 
5.9 Conclusion  
With this research, we aimed to investigate the leadership characteristics related to NPO 
responsiveness to client communities. The results firstly show that a large proportion of the NPOs 
in our sample report openness to community inputs. These organisations could provide an example 
of how they transformed the information, suggestions and feedback into practical action to 
improve the organisations and delivery of services. The regression analysis, therefore, offers 
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evidence that points to the significance of leadership characteristics in the discharge of client 
accountability in service organizations. 
This study has, therefore, provided evidence of the key role played by leadership characteristics in 
the probability of NPO responsiveness and thus accountability to clients, and the study is a first of 
its kind dealing with small community-based organizations, some of them located in remote areas. 
Additionally, it provides justification for why leadership should be considered in conversations 
about accountability to clients especially among small service organizations; leadership plays too 
important a role to be ignored in such conversations.  
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Appendices  
  
A1: Frequency of NPOs by manager's tenure duration 
 
A2: NPO distribution by revenue 
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A3: NPO distribution by revenue > or equal 1 million 
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CHAPTER 6: CLIENT-COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NON-
PROFIT PERFORMANCE: A SOUTH AFRICAN CASE-STUDY  
Abstract  
Efficiency and rights-based arguments support the call for NPOs to show accountability and 
evidence of their performance (Ebrahim, 2003; Gaventa, 2002; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). 
However, scholars have raised the concern that these arguments have been made with limited 
evidence to back them (Burger, Dasgupta & Owens, 2016; Dubnick; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). 
This study investigated the relationship between NPO accountability and community 
satisfaction. It tested the hypothesis that NPO accountability to client-communities is positively 
related to community satisfaction using survey and structured group-interviews data collected in 
2015 from NPOs and community members in the Eastern and Western Cape provinces in South 
Africa. The results of the structural equation analysis showed that accountability to communities 
has a direct positive effect on community satisfaction. Furthermore, NPO responsiveness, an 
essential element in accountability is the main driver of community satisfaction with the value 
created by the organisations in their communities.  
Keywords: accountability, principal agent, client-community accountability, participation, 
responsiveness, satisfaction, SEM  
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6.1 Introduction  
Demands have increased for NPOs to show their responsibility to clients and communities. The 
arguments have been based on the reasoning that since the existence of NPOs is to improve the 
inequitable distribution of public goods and services and to provide innovative solutions to social 
problems. It is only logical that they “should be able to demonstrate results in solving those 
problems, especially if they are publicly funded” (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014, p. 123).  
The rights-based proponents argue that communities have a right to be active participants in 
decisions that affect their lives (Gaventa, 2002; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). On the other hand, 
efficiency-based arguments claim that accountability to these groups will improve NPO 
efficiency through better access to information that can help them tailor their services to existing 
demand. The arguments also include that since accountability assumes an active role for clients 
in the organisations, participation will have a positive effect on the use of NPO services 
(Mlodovosky, 2014). Client accountability also improves community buy-in, increases support 
and volunteering and stimulates the exchange of information and ideas about service delivery 
(Smith, 2010).  
However, scholars have raised the concern that these claims about the benefits of client- 
accountability, especially participation, have been made with limited substantive evidence to 
back them (Burger, Dasgupta & Owens, 2016; Wellens & Jegers, 2014a). Dubnick (2005) argues 
that the idea that accountability increases performance has been accepted without scrutiny and 
warns of the ‘accountability paradox’ where more accountability may reduce NPO performance. 
This is because accountability mechanisms such as participation have an increasing marginal 
cost (Burger et al., 2016). The extent to which accountability to client-communities impacts on 
performance also depends on how the information is used in organisational decision making, 
which depends on the measures in place to guide the systematic integration of that information 
(Ebrahim, 2005). 
The positive link between community accountability and performance in terms of welfare to 
clients is not a given, and the question stays as to whether greater accountability to this group 
bears on the organisation’s ability to impact the welfare of the people for whom the services are 
intended.  
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Studies, which have tried to address this question have not been able to provide a definitive 
answer. Accountability to client-communities is often referred to as ‘downward accountability’ 
(Andrews, 2014; Ebrahim, 2003a) and defined as when organisations account to the stakeholders 
directly or indirectly impacted by the organisations’ operations (Najam, 1996).However, more 
than one definition of accountability exists, and this has caused ambiguousness, which has made 
the measurement of the concept a challenge (Ebrahim, 2005, p. 60). Consequently, studies have 
resorted to investigating the use of accountability mechanisms which are easier to identify and 
measure such as participation, information disclosures, the presence of feedback mechanisms 
and complaints procedures (Burger et al., 2016; Barr and Fafchamps, 2006; Jacobs & Wilford, 
2007; Kilby, 2006; Noor, 2016, Wellens & Jegers, 2014a; Van Zyl, Claeyé & Flambard, 2017).  
For example, Kilby (2006) proposed the depth and formality schema to categorise the 
accountability mechanisms used by NPOs and reported that ‘downward’ accountability is a 
significant factor in the empowerment of poor women in India (Kilby, 2006). Barr and 
Fafchamps (2006) in their evaluation of NPOs in Uganda also found positive community welfare 
and satisfaction effects from community involvement and the permanent presence of the 
organisations in the communities, which their surveyed. Noor’s (2015) research also showed that 
information disclosures and complaints producers have a positive effect on external effectiveness 
and participation mechanisms and complaints procedures a positive effect on internal 
effectiveness (Noor, 2015). 
On the other hand, Hsieh (2010) reported that customer orientation contributes very little to 
organisational performance. Burger et al., (2016) found no significant relationship between 
participation and beneficiary welfare. Wellens and Jegers (2014a) also reported that the quality 
of the mechanisms was not associated with the beneficiary, or representative impact, which 
suggested that mechanisms were being used symbolically in the organisations (Wellens & 
Jegers, 2014a). Due to these inconclusive results and the different measures of accountability 
used the impact of accountability on community welfare is still unclear. 
Trying to understand how the contribution of NPOs can or should be measured has also been 
another challenge (Moxham, 2009). It is sometimes not very clear whether NPOs are “at best, 
efficient welfare delivery systems…enjoying legitimacy from the community” or “at worst, 
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inefficient managers of resources trying to implement a diverse set of programs requiring a 
managerial competence… beyond their existing capacities” (Sen, 1987, p. 161). Sen’s 
sentiments still hold as the field of NPO performance measurement also suffers from its own 
limitations. Moxham (2009) notes that performance measurement in NPOs has received limited 
treatment unlike in the for-profit and public sector, where there is a well-established body of 
knowledge.  
The barriers and complexities to performance measurement include challenges with developing 
a useful criterion able to capture intangible outcomes, confusing terminology, and trying to 
capture long-term outcomes in the context of short-term contracts (Moxham, 2009). Walsh and 
Lenihan (2006, p. 413) add that measurement is especially a problem in development 
organisations, who “lack any clear metric of success”. Because of their broad and imprecise 
objectives of meeting some form of development need: “their bottom-line is unclear and 
performance measurement difficult” (Walsh & Lenihan, 2006, p. 413). The result of these 
challenges is the lack of clarity and consensus on the meaning and measurement of community 
accountability and the measurement of NPO performance. 
Since the “primary mission of NGOs relates to the desires and needs of their beneficiaries and 
communities, their performance should be assessed by their effectiveness to assist beneficiaries 
to achieve their mutual social goals” (Kareithi & Lund, 2012, p. 2012). But, the literature on 
NPO performance has paid little attention to beneficiary perspectives despite the rhetoric of 
participatory development (Kareithi & Lund, 2012). Accountability to communities is seldom 
mentioned in some performance measurement guides even though performance is ultimately 
about how organisations serve communities and target clients (Benjamin, 2012). Consequently, 
the performance measurement field suffers from a lack of empirical tests of the available and 
new measures (Ritchie & Kolodisky, 2003), and even studies examining the link between client-
community accountability on their welfare. 
This study, therefore, investigates the relationship between NPO accountability and performance 
operationalised as community satisfaction. It tries to measure NPO accountability to client-
communities and how it translates to better evaluations by community members. The research is 
in line with Gray and Schlesinger’s (2009) call to examine the relationship between NPOs and 
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client-communities when evaluating social value and impact. It thus shifts the focus back to 
communities and the NPO’s effect on their wellbeing as reported by them. In this respect, the 
research is like that of Burger and Owens (2013) who also investigated whether the output 
created by NPOs was valued and appreciated by the communities. Burger and Owen’s (2013) 
moved from the premise that community concerns should be key if development and poverty 
alleviation are acknowledged to be people-centred endeavours.  
The need to understand how NPOs impact on the welfare of communities is also backed by 
Bryson et al.,’s (2001, p. 273) assertion that “non-profit organisations are externally justified - 
morally, ethically, and legally-by what they do to address social needs” and that their success 
means satisfying the key interests of those stakeholders “whose satisfaction is crucial to the 
generation of support, legitimacy, and resources to ensure the organisations viability”. 
Furthermore, Wellens and Jegers (2016, p. 305) also warn that “a mechanism implemented under 
the pretext of allowing beneficiaries and/or their representatives to have an impact on policy 
without making an actual impact does not function well”. It is therefore important to understand 
whether there is an expectation gap between what we think client-community accountability and 
related mechanisms can achieve and what they really do achieve.  
The hypothesis tested in this chapter was whether NPO accountability to client-communities is 
positively related to client-community satisfaction. To test the hypothesis, the study applied a 
structural equation model (SEM) analysis to a mixed-methods data consisting of survey and 
structured group-interview data. Sowa et al., (2004) encourage the use of SEM because it helps 
with a more in-depth analysis of organisational effectiveness and its multiple layers and 
dimensions. Therefore, the aim of using SEM was to test the validity of our multidimensional 
constructs client-community accountability and community satisfaction and to examine whether 
the former has a direct impact on the latter. Additionally, the method was chosen because it 
provided the platform to examine the nature and direction of the relationship between 
accountability and community satisfaction.  
Accountability was operationalised within the principal-agent and right-based frameworks as the 
use of various accountability mechanisms aimed at community involvement, transparency, 
obtaining their feedback and being responsive to their inputs. Community satisfaction, on the 
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other hand, is captured using statements related to the communities’ beliefs about the motivations 
and competence of NPO staff and their self-reported satisfaction with the organisation and its 
activities. The statements covered the community members’ perception about the organisations’ 
responsiveness, professionalism, satisfaction and selfishness. Responsiveness is included as a 
variable in both the accountability and community satisfaction constructs for triangulating the 
information provided by NPOs with reports from communities. The variables were also included 
in both constructs because, as we argued in chapters 3 and 4, it is a different, but an important 
part of accountability.  
In the following section, we introduce our principal-agent framework linking client-community 
accountability and community wellbeing. The section is then followed by a presentation of the 
data and variables in Section 6.3 and the results of the bivariate regressions in section 6.4. In 
Section 6.5 the chapter presents and discusses the SEM models of accountability and satisfaction 
including the estimations methods and results. The findings are discussed in section 6.6 and the 
conclusion in section 6.7.  
6.2 Linking Accountability and Community Welfare 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in economics the relationship between NPOs and their client-
communities falls into what is referred to as agency relationships. Ross (1973, p. 134) defined 
an agency relationship as when two are more entities (individual, association or cooperation) 
come into agreement, and the agent “acts on behalf or as a representative” of the principal. These 
relationships exist because agents sometimes possess different (better or finer) information on a 
matter of interest than the principal (Ross, 1973, p. 135). In the case of the client-community and 
NPO agency relationship, the NPO has the expertise and/or capabilities that the community does 
not have, but which can aid in the fulfilment of their needs (Ross, 1973).  
Consequently, the community delegates some decision-making authority motivated by their 
inability to perform the task themselves (Laffont & Martimort, 2002, p. 28). NPOs have the 
knowledge and the capacity to mobilise resources from third parties and to provide goods and 
services, which the communities need. The NPOs role in this relationship is therefore to 
maximise the welfare / satisfaction of its clients-communities.  
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However, as the theory assumes misaligned interests, some degree of agency problems is a 
possibility, which may lead to welfare loss for the principal if left unaddressed. Agency problems 
may be less of a problem when the agent and principal’s utilities are aligned, which should be 
the case in NPOs given that they are ‘mission’ focused organisations. Most if not all NPOs’ 
objectives centre around service maximisation and care for the quality and the quantity of the 
goods provided driven by altruistic concerns (Newhouse, 1970; Feldstein, 1971). The mission is 
thus important in NPOs, it “services as a long-term objective, the achievement of which is the 
organisation’s raison d’êtres” (Mc Donald, 2007, p. 257). The mission also underpins the ethical 
and value base of accountability (Brown, Carlton & Yoshioka, 2003; Kilby, 2006) and provides 
a basis for judging organisational performance and progress (Ebrahim, 2003b). Being mission-
focused, however, does not preclude agency problems in the relationship of NPOs with client-
communities. 
They cannot be completely avoided because even in the most best-intentioned agents a 
divergence of interest is inevitable (Caers et al., 2006). Shapiro (2005) argues that “conflict of 
interest in agency theory does not necessarily mean “shirking or opportunism with guile; it is 
about wrenching choices among the legitimate interests of multiple principals by agents who 
cannot extricate themselves from acting for so many” (Shapiro, 2005, p. 278). Even if we would 
expect the utility functions of an NPO and its clients to be almost identical (Caers et al., 2006), 
they still exist. 
Steinberg (2010) notes that the complexity of agency problems encountered in the relationship 
between communities and NPOs relate to the type of goods and service provided. Most often 
NPOs provide Type-II goods and services that have public and quasi-public goods 
characteristics, which make them difficult to observe and to enforce in contracts (Steinberg, 
2010; Weisbrod & Schlesinger, 1986). Observability of the quality may be less of a problem for 
client-communities because they have proximity and experience the goods and services as the 
final users. As it was argued in Chapter 3, this reduces the transaction costs involved with 
monitoring the NPO. The issue that may be more a problem in observing whether the quantity 
and quality align with the resources made available by donors for their provision. There is also 
a hidden information problem that may arise related to financial conduct because clients have 
limited access to organisations’ finances.  
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For client-communities, behaviour-based contracts, which involve monitoring the organisation’s 
actions and tracking its performance may be the only viable option (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Accountability processes provide the framework through which this is done. They facilitate 
access to the information required to determine whether the organisation has acted in the client-
community`s best interest. The organisation gives an account about the responsibility it has 
towards the community because of their “right to be informed and receive an explanation or 
justification with regards to the NPOs’ actions and decisions taken (Lindberg, 2013). 
Accountability thus acts to manage information asymmetries between the two parties (Lindberg, 
2013) and as a result to reduce agency problems and the accompanying welfare loss.  
Lindberg argues that “when decision making power is transferred from a principal to an agent, 
there must be a mechanism[s] in place to hold the agent accountable for their decisions” 
(Lindberg, 2013, p. 2). Accountability mechanisms, therefore, provide the means through which 
client-communities can monitor the NPO’s behaviour, if observable and verifiable by a third 
party. Participatory accountability mechanisms also have a direct effect on the community’s 
utility because of their involvement in the organisation’s affairs. Such involvement impacts on 
allocative efficiency by ensuring a better match between NPO interventions and community 
needs (Barr & Fafchamps, 2006). These mechanisms can include participation such as in 
strategic decisions making, on the board and through informal and formal feedback mechanisms 
such as evaluations and assessments.  
Board representation is one element of accountability that helps enhance community welfare. 
Wellens and Jegers (2014b) reported that the quality of mechanisms among Belgian NPOs had 
a positive relationship with beneficiaries being full members of the organisation’s board 
(Wellens and Jegers, 2014b). The positive board impact could result from customers gaining 
control over organisational decisions about how to address their needs. Steinberg (2010), 
therefore, sees customer control as a guarantor of the satisfaction of consumer demand. Having 
an elected board could even amplify the benefits of board representation (Weidenbaum, 2009).  
Ebrahim (2003a) also argues that formal feedback mechanisms such as performance and impact 
assessments are some of the tools available to facilitate accountability. These mechanisms can 
facilitate strategic decision making and help the organisations evaluate their progress in terms of 
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fulfilling their mission and impact on their clients’ welfare (Ebrahim, 2003a; LeRoux & Wright, 
2010). They also provide a link between accountability and learning, if they feed back into 
organisational decision making, and, involve multiple constituencies. (Ebrahim, 2005).  
However, the use of accountability mechanisms is not an end. They only act to facilitate 
accountability, which also depends on how the organisation responds to information collected 
and feedback provided (Barret, 2001). NPO responsiveness within the principal-agent 
framework means responding to need and reflects how the organisation ‘bonds’ with client-
communities. The aim of bonding is to ensure that the NPO will not act in a manner that 
prejudices the principal’s welfare (Hill & Jones, 1992). Connecting to client-communities is also 
an interest alignment mechanism. NPOs cannot provide a warranty for their services. The 
alternative is to engage in actions that demonstrate that the interest of the client-communities 
will be met as they have specified: they will be provided what they need not what the NPOs 
thinks they need (Hill & Jones, 1992, p. 138). Furthermore, when client-communities are 
integrated into organisational decisions and planning, their needs are better served and will thus 
be more likely to give a positive review of the organisations (Hill & Jones, 1992). 
Meaningfully practised this process of accountability can lead to an increase in the communities’ 
satisfaction. Through accountability and the use of participatory mechanisms, the organisation 
can adjust its supply of goods and service by using the feedback given to respond to the 
preferences and demands of communities. Other paths through which accountability can impact 
community satisfaction include through ensuring that stakeholder needs are met and carefully 
considered in the organisation's policies and practices (Blagescu, De las Casas & Lloyd, 2005). 
The organisation could also manage expectations through its integration and involvement of 
communities in the organisation and its strategic decision making. Accountability also can act to 
increase trust, goodwill, credibility, social legitimacy, and be a relationship builder (Bagescu et 
al., 2005).  
We, therefore, expect accountability to be positively related to community satisfaction because 
client-community “involvement in decision-making processes may lead to greater satisfaction 
and greater trust over time, which in turn enhances stakeholder assessments and support of the 
organisations (Willems et al., 2016, p. 470) 
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Hypothesis: Increase in accountability practices will be correlated with an increase in 
principal’s (community) satisfaction with the NPOs performance.  
In Chapter 3 we also made the argument that accountability also depends on internal and external 
factors, which may also correlate with the organisation’s impact on community satisfaction. The 
factors include whether the organisation has members, the presence of donor conditions and 
where the organisation is located, which may account for socio-economic variation, as well as 
differences in NPO provision across geographical locations. For example, Ebrahim (2003) 
argues that clients who are not members have a different right to accountability than clients who 
are members. We would expect that membership or membership like organisations will have 
greater accountability and control over organisations, and better welfare outcomes for 
communities (Uphoff, 1996; Ebrahim 2003b). 
Non-profit organisations agency relations are special. Because of the non-distribution constraint, 
they have no residual claimants, everyone with a claim is a principal. One of those principals is 
the donor, who plays an important role in NPOs as their resource providers. However, when it 
comes to accountability, concerns have been raised that the prominence of donors’ demands 
crowds out accountability to other NPO principals. Schmitz and Mitchell (2009) report that 
NPOs have the desire to practice downward accountability, but because of resource dependency, 
the incentives they face favour ‘upward’ accountability to donors. Furthermore, the relationship 
between NPOs and donors could lead to distortions. For example, a strong association was found 
between increased international aid and the material aspirations of NPO leaders and lower 
organisational performance in Pakistan (Bano, 2008). It is also noted that donor practices of 
mandating reporting for compliance may result in superficial compliance involving ceremonial 
and symbolic practices (Mitchell, 2014: Prichett, 2015).  
However, through their conditions and requirements, donors could also facilitate greater 
accountability and performance. Through conditional payments, for example, donors could 
incentivise organisations to improve their performance towards their beneficiaries. In this respect 
NPO facing incentives to prioritize client-communities are more likely to show accountability 
and performance. Because the impact of donors could be negative or positive, we formulate no 
prior hypothesis with regards to its relationship on accountability and client-community 
satisfaction.  
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6.3 Data and Variables  
The analysis also uses the survey and structured group-interview data collected in 2015 from 
NPOs and community members at the Eastern and Western Cape provinces in South Africa, 
described in Chapter 4. For this research, we merged the survey (195 NPOs) and group-interview 
data and were able to merge 156 observations. In the sample, 21 of the observation were 
represented more than once because they were discussed in more than one focus group. These 
duplicates were dropped at random, and we remained with the 117 observations. Due to missing 
data, for some of the variables the sample is less than 117 observations, especially those from 
the structured group-interview data.  
 Variables 
The variables included are listed in Table 6.1 with their distribution’s characteristics. Community 
satisfaction’ is defined as the maximisation of the community’s utility as a function of NPO 
services and actions. It is measured using Likert scale variables based on the responses to 
questions related to the community’s subjective perceptions about the organisation, its staff, and 
the value it brings into the community. Group-interview participants had to decide among 
themselves whether they strongly agree (1), agree (2), neither agree nor disagree (3), disagree 
(4) or strongly disagree (5) with the given statements. 
The variables and accompanying statements are: Responsiveness (The NPO is always quick to 
respond when inhabitants of this community or the community as a whole ask for help); 
Satisfaction (The people who live in this community are satisfied with the performance of the 
NPO); Professional (NPO representatives are good at what they do); and Selfishness (The NPO 
exists to serve the purposes of its own staff rather than to help us). The responses were reverse 
coded (1=strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree), and 3 (neither agree nor disagree) was recoded 
to missing because it relayed no information about the community’s perception about the 
organisation. Some of the measures are the same as those used by Barr and Fafchamps (2006), 
Burger and Owens (2013) and Burger et al., (2015) in their studies of NPOs in Uganda, where 
community views of NPOs’ services were also solicited. The recoding resulted in 4 Likert scale 
variables measuring the perceptions of community about the organisations on a scale between 
1=strongly disagree and 4=strongly agree.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
130 
 
For the descriptive analysis an independent variable, community satisfaction constructed using 
Polychoric principal component analysis. One factor was retained with an eigenvalue of 1.84 
and which could explain 96% of the variation in the data. The Cronbach’s alpha statistic of .72 
confirms the reliability of the construct, see appendix for details. 
Table 6.1: Variables Distributions characteristics  
Variables  Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Community satisfaction 
Responsiveness (community) Focus group 64 3.75 1.6 1 5 
Satisfaction  Focus group 67 4.14 1.22 1 5 
Professional Focus group 64 4.56 0.79 1 5 
Selfish   Focus group 75 1.97 1.34 1 5 
NPO Accountability 
Strategic decision  Survey 108 0.33 0.45 0 0.99 
Community representative  Survey 117 0.57 0.49 0 1 
Formal feedback  Survey 117 0.68 0.46 0 1 
Informal feedback  Survey 117 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Reports  Survey 76 0.38 0.44 0 0.97 
Responsiveness (NPO) Survey 100 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Control 
Funders will withdraw funding Survey 79 40.51    
Funders are patient  Survey 79 37.97    
Funders will not withdraw funding  Survey 79 21.52    
ECD Early childhood development   Survey 117 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Eastern Cape Survey 113 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Source: Own data 
Note: Sample sizes vary due to missing observations in the data  
From the survey, we extracted variables to measure NPOs’ reports about their accountability 
practices, as well as other internal and external organisational factors that may be predictors of 
both NPO accountability and community satisfaction. The measure of accountability includes 
indicators of NPOs’ use of participation mechanisms (involvement in strategic decisions, board 
representation, use of input and feedback mechanisms, access to financial and annual reports) 
and responsiveness to community inputs and feedback. 
Polychoric principal component analysis was also used to construct some of the accountability 
indicators. Components with eigenvalues greater than 19 ,which made theoretical sense and 
explained a larger proportion of the variance were retained, see appendix for information on 
                                                          
9 This is in line with the eigenvalue greater than 1.0 rule (Thompson, 2004).  
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retained components (variables). For example, involvement in NPO strategic decisions is a 
composite measure based on the dummy variables where NPOs indicated whether they required 
authorization from communities to expand activities, or to a new area or buy a new building. The 
variables were based on responses to the question, does [NPO] need to obtain the authorization 
of an outside body before [NPO] can undertake the following, 1. expand into new activities; 
expand into another area and 3. purchase a building? The outside bodies included 1. board, 2. 
community, 3. The Department of Social Development, 4. funder and 5. Other. Polychoric 
component analysis was applied to the community responses and a component with an 
eigenvalue of 2,6, which could explain 75% of the variance was retained as the variable strategic 
decisions.  
The variable board representation is also a compound indicator measuring whether the 
community is represented on the non-profit board by a representative elected by the community. 
Formal and informal feedback mechanisms are also composite indicators measuring the use of 
participation mechanism such as surveys, needs assessments, evaluations, general meetings and 
other informal means, for example, ad hoc personal conversation to gain feedback from client-
communities. The formal and informal feedback variables were created from the dummy 
variables based on the question: In which of the following ways do you receive feedback from 
community members about the needs of the community? Respondents could make multiple 
choices from the list of mechanisms provided. See question 57 in the survey in the appendix A1. 
The list included 1. comments and feedback box ;2. programme evaluation, 3. survey; 4. 
community meetings; 5. annual general meeting; 6. invited discussions with community leaders; 
7. Invited discussions with; community members; 8. Social media and 9. Other. 
To create formal feedback the responses to 1. comments and feedback box ;2 programme 
evaluation, 3. survey and 5. annual general meeting were summed to create a single variable with 
a range between 0 and 5 indicating the number of mechanisms used by an organisation. Due to 
the small nature of the sample the variables were recoded 0 if no mechanism was chosen and 1 
if an organisation indicated it used one or more of the feedback mechanisms. A similar procedure 
was followed to create the informal feedback categorical variable, however, the responses to 4. 
community meetings; 6. invited discussions with community leaders; 7. invited discussions with; 
community members and 8. social media were used to create the variable.  
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The variable reports, on the other hand, indicates whether organisations provided communities 
with access to audited financial statements and the annual progress reports. The variables were 
created from responses to the questions, was this annual report shown/given to any of the 
following and were these accounts shown/given to any of the following? The variables were 
coded 1 if community was chosen and 0 if it was not chosen. The reports variable was created 
by also applying Polychoric component analysis to the responses to those two variables. A 
component with an eigen score of 1.71 that could explain 85% of the variance was retained.  
On the other hand, NPO responsiveness is based on the response to a question about the NPOs 
use of the information provided by communities. Non-profit representatives were asked the 
question, can you give an example of how your NPO has changed its programme or approach 
because of community or beneficiary inputs or feedback? When the representative was able to 
provide an example, the enumerators were instructed to tick yes(coded=1), and no(code=0) in 
the case of the opposite. The responses included examples such as, changing or expanding 
activities, changing the location of the organisation, improving fundraising among others. An 
example of the responses provided is included in the previous chapter.  
We also controlled for other predictors such as whether an organisation is an early childhood 
development centre (ECD) as a proxy for membership organisations, based in the Eastern as 
opposed to the Western Cape, and funder requirements, which conditioned repeated funding. 
Funder requirements is a dummy variable transformed from a categorical variable with three 
categories, funders will withdraw funding if performance is not measured (1), funders are patient 
(2), and funders will not withdraw funding (3). The responses were re-coded to funders will 
withdraw funding (1), and funder will not withdraw funding (0), the latter was derived from the 
responses 3 and 2.  
6.4 Bivariate Regressions Analysis  
As part of the exploration of the data, bivariate regressions were estimated to understand if any 
empirical relationship existed between community satisfaction, and the use of accountability 
mechanisms. As well as, whether any of the donor, organisational and community-related factors 
could predict community satisfaction with NPOs and its services.  
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The results for the 9 separate bivariate regressions are presented in Table 6.2. They show that 
community satisfaction has a positive large and significant relationship with the involvement of 
communities in strategic decisions and NPO responsiveness among the accountability variables. 
Donor conditions also have a positive and significant effect on community satisfaction. 
Organisations who noted that repeated funding was conditioned on performance measurement 
were 94 % points more likely to have communities satisfied with their work compared to those 
who noted the opposite. On the other hand, community satisfaction also had a large significant 
association with Eastern Cape, they are 70% points more likely to have satisfied community 
members than their counter parts in the Western Cape.  
Table 6.2: Bivariate community satisfaction regression results  
Community satisfaction (Dep Var) Coef. Std. Err.  N  R-squared  
Accountability  
Strategic decision 0.73* 0.46 75 0.03 
Community representative 0.19 0.45 69 0.06 
Formal feedback 0.09 0.17 63 0.01 
Informal feedback  0.12 0.15 63 0.00 
Reports 0.16 0.34 63 0.02 
responsiveness_npo 1.54*** 0.37 59 0.23 
Donor conditions 
Funders will withdraw funding(ref)   52 0.06 
Funders are patient  -0.24 0.46   
Funders will not withdraw funding (clarify 
results) -0.94* 0.50   
Organisational factors 
Early childhood development  0.34 0.32 69 0.02 
Eastern cape 0.70** 0.33 69 0.06 
Source: Own data 
Note: Sample sizes vary due to missing observations in the data  
The bivariate analysis illustrates the effects of different mechanisms on community satisfaction. 
The issue with the analysis is that it does not consider that together the mechanisms could be 
indicators of an underlying trait, accountability. The analysis proceeds with structural equation 
analysis because of the multidimensional nature of the concepts of accountability and 
satisfaction. The advantage of using SEM is that it allows for the evaluation of the entire model, 
which takes precedence over individual effects (Kline, 2005, p. 15). A full SEM model also 
allows for the unique variance of each indicator to be estimated and thus estimates the 
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relationships among latent variables without the bias of the errors in the indicators (McCallum 
& Austin, 2000). 
6.5  SEM of Accountability and Community Satisfaction  
Here we present the structural equation models used to test the hypothesis and validity of the 
constructs. Structural equation is a methodology encompassing a range of statistical tools that 
can be used to “evaluate the validity of substantive theories with empirical data” (Lei & Wu, 
2007, p.33), and it “allows researchers to test propositions regarding how constructs are 
theoretically linked and the directionality of that relationship” (Schreiber, Stage, King, Nora, 
Barlow, 2006, p. 326). The method is different to other general linear methods such as analysis 
of variance and multiple regression in that it allows latent traits that may be indicated by observed 
data to be examined (Lei & Wu 2007). It can be used for data reduction through using the 
covariation of observed variables to indicate a variable (Schreiber et al., 2006, p. 323). The 
method is thus ideal for evaluating the relationship between the constructs, non-profit client -
community accountability, and community satisfaction. 
In the models, the analysis first examines whether the indicators strategic decisions, community 
representative, formal feedback, informal feedback, reports and responsiveness (NPO) together 
measure a common construct, client-community accountability. Similarly, it investigates 
whether responsiveness(community), professional, satisfaction, and selfishness also measure the 
common latent construct community satisfaction. The models also test whether the latent client-
community accountability has a direct effect on community satisfaction construct. 
Two full structural equation models (SR model), which display the relationship among latent 
constructs and observables are estimated. Structural equation models synthesise the structural 
and measurement models and allow for the testing of the model hypothesis as well as the direct 
and indirect effects (Kline, 2015). The first SR model is presented in Figure 6.1. In the structural 
component, the relationship between the latent/unobservable constructs accountability and 
community satisfaction, are represented by the oval shapes. Because accountability is 
hypothesised as having a positive direct effect10 on community satisfaction it is represented by 
                                                          
10  SEM is a theory confirmatory tool, but it does not imply causality (Kline, 2015).  
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a straight path and arrow from the latent exogenous construct accountability to the latent 
endogenous community satisfaction construct (Schreiber et al., 2006) Community satisfaction is 
endogenous and thus accompanied by an error term.  
 
Figure 6.1: SEM model of client-community accountability and satisfaction Source: Own data 
Note: Satisfaction= responsiveness (community) (S1), professional (S2), satisfaction(S3), and selfishness (S4). 
Accountability = Reports (A1), strategic decisions (A2), community representative (A3), formal community 
feedback (A4), informal community feedback (A5) and responsiveness (NPO) (A6).  
Our model has two measurement components where the two hypothetical and unobservable 
constructs are linked to their respective indicators/observable variables. The observed variables, 
represented by rectangle boxes in Figure 6.1, are related to the hypothesised latent constructs 
and examined for how well they measure that construct using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
(Kline, 2005). They are theorised as being the result of the latent variable hence the direct arrow 
from the latent variables (MacCalllum & Austin, 2000).  
In the model the construct ‘accountability’ is represented by reports (A1), strategic decisions 
(A2), community representative (A3), formal community feedback (A4), informal community 
feedback (A5) and responsiveness (NPO) (A6). We expect all these factors to load positively on 
the accountability construct. The construct satisfaction is represented by the indicators 
responsiveness (community) (S1), professional (S2), satisfaction(S3), and selfishness (S4). We 
expect responsiveness(community), professional and satisfaction to load positively on 
community satisfaction but selfishness to have a negative effect. The indicators are accompanied 
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by their respective measurement errors depicted as circles in the diagram. The model estimation 
involves separating common variance from the measurement error, which helps with controlling 
for any unreliability in the coefficients (Lei & Wu, 2007 p. 34). 
In Model II, illustrated in Figure 6.2 included exogenous predictors Eastern Cape (C1), ECD 
(C2) and Funder conditions (C3). Due to the sample size limitations, only three controls were 
included. We opted for these covariates because they account for significant differences in NPOs 
that may affect their behaviour towards communities. We included Eastern Cape to account for 
socioeconomic differences in the communities and the level of NPO resources. The organisations 
in that province are more likely to run on smaller budgets and to rely on community contributions 
given their proximity to the people. As discussed in Chapter 3, organisations that have a 
membership like characteristics, such as ECDs, are more likely to differ on client-community 
accountability and satisfaction than those with no members (Steinberg, 2010). Exposure to 
funder conditions may also incentivise the organisations, serving to crowd out or encourage 
participatory behaviour. 
 
Figure 6.2: SEM model of client-community accountability and satisfaction with control 
(Source: Own data) 
Note : Satisfaction= responsiveness (community) (S1), professional (S2), satisfaction(S3), and selfishness 
(S4). Accountability = Reports (A1), strategic decisions (A2), community representative (A3), formal 
community feedback (A4), informal community feedback (A5) and responsiveness (NPO) (A6). Eastern Cape 
(C1), ECD (C2) and Funder conditions (C3). 
Accountabilityε1
A2
ε
2
A3
ε
3
A4
ε
4
A5
ε
5
A6
ε
6
Satisfactionε
7
S1
ε
8
S2
ε
9
S3
ε
10
S4
ε
11
A1
ε
12
C2
C3
C1
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
137 
 
 Estimation 
To estimate our models, we use the maximum likelihood estimator for missing values (MLMV) 
or Full information maximum likelihood. The estimator uses all the available information in the 
estimation and is thus not a listwise or pairwise deleter like the default SEM in Stata. It adjusts 
the likelihood function so that each case contributes information on the variables that are observe 
and as a result does not create or impute any missing values in the data (Cham, Reshetnyak, 
Rosenfeld & Breitbart, 2017). In full information maximum likelihood estimation, the 
population parameters are estimated that would most likely produce the estimates from the 
sample data that is analysed (Enders & Bandalos, 2001). We opted for this estimator due to the 
missing observations in our data. Two simple models were estimated for this research because 
of the smallness of the sample, which restricts the estimation of complex models (Kline, 2005).  
 Results  
6.5.2.1 Model identification  
One of the critical issues in SEM is model identification, whether there is enough variance and 
covariance information from the observed variables available to uniquely estimate the unknown 
coefficients (Mueller, 1999, p. 357). That means that there is a numerical solution for each of 
the parameters in the model. There are two requirements for model identification. The first is 
that the degrees of freedom are equal or greater than zero, 𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚 ≥ 0, meaning that the number of 
observations should equal or be greater than the number of free parameters (Kline, 2005). The 
number of free parameters equals the total number of variances and covariances of exogenous 
variables and direct effects on endogenous factors (Kline, 2005).  
The second requirement is that each latent variable must have an assigned unit of measurement 
(Mueller, 1999). Our models meet both requirements. The 𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚  for Model I and II are 34 and 78, 
respectively and each latent construct’s path to one of its indictors was fixed to 1 to ensure that 
they had a measurement scale. In both models, the path between accountability and strategic 
decisions as well as satisfaction and responsiveness (community) is constrained to 1 to fulfil the 
second requirement for model identification. 
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6.5.2.2 Model fit  
Table 6.3: Model fit indices 
Model fit indices  Model I Model II 
Model Chi2(34) p>chi2  0.23 0.06 
Comparative fit index (CFI) (≥ 0.95) 0.95 0.85 
Root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) (. ≥0.06) 0.03 0.05 
SRMR is not reported because of missing data NA NA 
Coefficient of determination 0.60 0.39 
Model fit indices are used to assess how well the model fits the data and include the overall, 
incremental and absolute goodness of fit measures (Lei & Wu, 2007). Incremental indices 
measure the relative improvement of the model over the base model with zero covariances, and 
the obsolete indices measure the proportion of the covariance in the sample data matrix explained 
by the model (Kline, 2015; Hu & Bentler, 1999). It is advised to estimate at least three of the fit 
measures (Hu & Bentler, 1999). We assessed the overall goodness of fit using the Chi-squared 
measure, among the incremental measures we assessed the TLI CFI, as well as the RMSEA 
among the absolute fit indices.  
The results in Table 6.3 show that Model I fit the data well and better than the Model II with 
exogenous factors. All the indices are within acceptable limits. For Model II the root mean 
squared error approximation (RMSEA) at 0.05 is just below the recommended level at the 0.06 
cut-off level. The other indices for Model II do not provide enough evidence to support a good 
fit between the model and the data. Lei and Wu (2007) advice that the interpretation of individual 
parameters and evaluation of their significance can start if the model fits the data well and the 
solution considered is adequate. This would mean that we retain only Model I, but Kline warns 
against the use of the indices as ‘golden rules’ and advises that researchers apply their judgement 
while considering the theoretical foundations of the model and other tests of significance. Since 
the formulation of Model II is based on theoretical and empirical evidence, we retain both models 
and provide the interpretation of the results in the section below.  
6.5.2.3 Estimate results  
The results for Model I are presented in Figure 6.3 as standardised coefficients as well as in 
Table 6.4, which includes the variables’ significance level and standardised standard errors. 
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Standardised coefficients are correlation coefficients with a range between 0 and 1. They are 
usually reported in SEM analysis because they ease interpretation relative to the un-standardised 
coefficients involving different measurement scales (Kline, 2015). The results of the structural 
component show that client-community accountability has a significant direct and positive effect 
on community satisfaction. The standardised coefficient value of 0.46 suggests that as client-
community accountability increases by one standard deviation from its mean community 
satisfaction increase by 0.46 standard deviation. This means that an increase in accountability is 
correlated with a higher likelihood that a community will have a positive view of an organisation.  
The measurement results in Figure 6.3 also show that accountability has a positive association 
with most its indicators. Informal feedback and reports are both insignificant and the size of the 
informal feedback loading not very different to zero. The other loadings- strategic decisions 
(0.35), community representative (0.32), formal community feedback (0.35), and responsiveness 
(NPO) (.068) - on the latent construct accountability are positive and significant. On the other 
hand, all the loadings of the indicators responsiveness (community) (0.68), professional (0.87), 
satisfaction (0.72), and selfishness (-0.80) on the satisfaction construct are significant. 
 
Figure 6.3: Basic Structural regression model 
Source: Own Data 
Note: Satisfaction= responsiveness (community) (S1), professional (S2), satisfaction(S3), and selfishness 
(S4). Accountability = Reports (A1), strategic decisions (A2), community representative (A3), formal 
community feedback (A4), informal community feedback (A5) and responsiveness (NPO) (A6).  
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We also decomposed the results into direct, indirect, and total effects. Table 6.4 shows that 
accountability has an indirect relationship with the satisfaction variables. The results show that 
the accountability construct has a non-negligible significant effect on 
responsiveness(community) (0.31), community satisfaction (0.33), professional (0.40) and 
selfish (-0.36) mediated by satisfaction.  
Table 6.4: SEM MLMV Model I: Client-community accountability and community satisfaction  
SEM MLMV MODEL I 
 Std. Coef. Std. Err. 
Structural 
Satisfaction(endogenous)   
Accountability 0.46*** 0.16 
Measurement 
Accountability -   
Strategic decision 0.35*** 0.16 
Community representative 0.32** 0.12 
Formal feedback 0.35** 0.14 
Informal feedback  0.01 0.13 
Responsiveness (NPO) 0.68*** 0. 16 
Reports 0.10 0.15 
Indirect effects    
Responsiveness (community) 0.31*  
Satisfaction  0.33*  
Professional 0.40*  
Selfish -0.36*  
Satisfaction- 
Responsiveness (community) 0.68*** 0.09 
Satisfaction  0.72*** 0.10 
Professional 0.87*** 0.06 
Selfish  -0.8*** 0.07 
Source: Own data. Significance level*10% *5% ***1% 
The results of Model II are illustrated in Figure 6.4 and Table 6.5 below. When we included the 
exogenous predictors in the structural part, the effect of accountability on community satisfaction 
becomes insignificant, but the standardised coefficient remains high at 0.45 standard deviations. 
Additionally, none of the predictors has a significant effect on community satisfaction. In terms 
of the coefficient sizes and signs, ECD (-0.06) has a small negative and Eastern Cape (0.10) a 
positive association with community satisfaction. The organisational and community factors, 
however, have a significant association with accountability a standard deviation increase in ECD 
is correlated with 0.27 standard deviation increase in accountability and a 0.25 increase in the 
case of the Eastern Cape. The effect of donor conditions is however negative suggesting that 
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organisations who have donor conditions that require performance measurement are -0.52 
standard deviations less likely to be accountable to communities.  
 
Figure 6.4: SEM of client-community accountability and satisfaction with controls 
Source: Own data 
Note: Satisfaction= responsiveness (community) (S1), professional (S2), satisfaction(S3), and selfishness 
(S4). Accountability = Reports (A1), strategic decisions (A2), community representative (A3), formal 
community feedback (A4), informal community feedback (A5) and responsiveness (NPO) (A6). Eastern Cape 
(C1), ECD (C2) and Funder conditions (C3). 
When we decomposed the results of Model II, the significance of the indirect effects of 
accountability on community satisfaction disappeared. In terms of the other mediated effects, 
ECD has positive and significant indirect effects on community representative and 
responsiveness (NPO). This could be because the community have more opportunities to be 
involved and to influence decisions when the organisation is membership like. On the other hand, 
funder conditions have an indirect negative effect on strategic decisions, community 
representative, formal feedback, responsiveness (NPO), responsiveness(community) and a 
positive significant indirect effect on NPO selfishness. 
Conversely, Eastern Cape has a positive significant indirect effect on both the responsiveness 
variables, satisfaction, professional and a significant negative effect on NPO selfishness. In terms 
of the measurement component, the indicators that had significant loadings on accountability in 
the first model remained significant, whereas only responsiveness(community) and professional 
remained significant among the community satisfaction indicators.  
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Table 6.5: SEM MLMV Model II: Client-community accountability and community 
satisfaction with control variables  
SEM MLMV MODEL II 
 Std. Coef. Std. Err. 
Structural 
Accountability (Endogenous) 
ECD 0.27* 0.13 
Funders conditions -0.52*** 0.16 
Eastern cape 0.25* 0.015 
Satisfaction (Endogenous) 
Accountability 0.45 0.28 
ECD -0.06 0.15 
Funder conditions 0.01 0.22 
Eastern cape 0.10 0.15 
Indirect effects    
Accountability   
Responsiveness (community) .30  
professional .33  
satisfaction .39  
selfish .34  
Measurement 
Accountability    
Strategic decision 0.38*** 0.11 
Community representative 0.43*** 0.12 
Formal feedback 0.38*** 0.13 
Informal feedback  -0.01 0.12 
Responsiveness (NPO) 0.51*** 0.14 
Reports 0.08 0.16 
Satisfaction 
Responsiveness(community) 0.67*** 0.09 
satisfaction  0.74*** 0.09 
Professional 0.88 0.05 
Selfish   -0.77 0.07 
Indirect effects  
ECD -   
Community representative .11*  
Responsiveness (NPO) .14*  
Funders conditions-   
Strategic decisions  -.21**  
Community representative -.20*  
Formal feedback  -.22**  
Responsiveness (NPO) -.28*  
Responsiveness(community) -.41*  
selfish .40*  
Eastern Cape-   
Responsiveness_(NPO) .12*  
Responsiveness(community) .36*  
professional .24*  
satisfaction .38*  
Selfish   -.35*  
Source: Own data. Significance level*10% *5% ***1%  
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6.6 Discussion 
In this chapter, a hypothesis based on a principal-agent framework linking client-community 
accountability to community satisfaction was formulated and tested using structural equation 
modelling. The hypothesis that greater accountability to client-communities has a positive 
association with community satisfaction is supported by the results in the structural part of Model 
I. The estimated coefficients in the measurement component also provide support for the 
hypothesis. All the accountability indicators except the reports and informal feedback loaded 
positively on the construct.  
The sizes of the standardised coefficients are below the 0.7 level advised for achieving ‘construct 
validity’, specifically convergent validity which concerns whether the chosen indicators’ 
intercorrelations are at least moderate in size (Kline, 2011). The results ranged from 0.32 to 0.68, 
with responsiveness (NPO) having the highest loading on accountability. However, the small 
size of the coefficients could have less to do with the indicators’ ability to measure the construct, 
than with the small nature of the sample. Additionally, the measures also have different scales, 
which may have added to the low intercorrelations. That said, the large responsiveness (NPO) 
coefficient suggest that NPO responsiveness to communities could be driving the effect of 
accountability on community satisfaction. The result also suggests that more formal involvement 
of communities in the organisations are driving accountability rather than transparency in the 
form of access to reports and informal feedback mechanisms. 
All the loadings on community satisfaction except selfishness are positive and significant and 
range from moderate to high providing evidence of convergent validity. The results are like those 
Barr and Fafchamps (2006) found among Ugandan NPOs. The only difference is that they did 
not include community satisfaction as reported by the community members.  
Though for Model II only the RMSEA absolute fit index is within the acceptable levels for 
adequate model fit we retained the model because there is enough theoretical justification for the 
included exogenous variables. Furthermore, as we previously noted, fit indices are 'rules of 
thumb' and not 'golden rules'. It is noteworthy that the significance of the effect of accountability 
on client-community satisfaction disappeared when we included these ECD, donors and Eastern 
Cape in Model II. The results showed that the variables are important in explaining 
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accountability, specifically that ECDs and Eastern Cape have a positive direct effect on 
accountability and funder conditions a negative effect. The positive ECD result is as expected 
given their organisational form. Early childhood development centres could provide more 
opportunities for the direct involvement of parents. The Eastern Cape results suggest that positive 
social capital effects may be responsible as communities in the Eastern Cape are more 
collectivistic and the organisations more integrated into the community than in the Western 
Cape. As we argued in Chapter 3, greater social capital will increase accountability because it 
reduces the bonding cost needed to enact accountability relative to in communities with less 
social capital.  
Further, the exogenous covariates had indirect effects on some of the accountability and all the 
satisfaction indicators. The indirect impact on the satisfaction indicators suggests that 
community satisfaction has more to do with where the organisations are located and the 
organisational form. Communities in the Eastern Cape may be satisfied due to the scarcity of 
services which makes them happy with any level of service provision. Barr and Fafchamps 
(2006) however argue that if NPOs aim to redress welfare imbalances among communities, they 
will allocate their efforts such that less endowed districts receive more, and consequently, these 
communities would be more satisfied with the NPOs relative to neighbourhoods who have less 
need for the organisations. Indeed, areas in the Eastern Cape have fewer resource endowments 
than their counterparts in the Western Cape.  
The adverse indirect effect of funder conditions suggests that Mitchell's (2004) observation that 
donor mandates for reporting and performance management for compliance may have the 
negative consequence of ceremonial and symbolic use of accountability mechanisms on the part 
of the organisations (Mitchell, 2014).  
6.7 Conclusion  
In the literature, there have been increased calls to investigate the relationship between 
accountability to NPOs constituents and their performance. The calls are motivated by the 
essential to understand whether there is an expectation gap between what we think accountability 
can achieve and what it does achieve. Consequently, in this chapter, structural equation 
modelling was applied to South African data to examine whether accountability to client-
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
145 
 
communities had a direct effect on client-communities' satisfaction with NPOs and how they 
conducted their activities in their areas. 
Our findings suggest a relationship between accountability and how communities value the work 
of NPOs in their areas. Client-community accountability had a direct positive effect on 
community satisfaction. Furthermore, responsiveness, an essential element in accountability, is 
an important driver in the overall satisfaction of communities. These results confirm that it is not 
enough for organisations to employ accountability mechanisms but how they respond and learn 
from the use of such mechanisms is important for how community members judge them.  
That said, the field could benefit from more research using innovative measures of accountability 
and satisfaction. Future studies could also examine how the NPOs’ multiple accountabilities to 
their numerous principals mediate the relationship between accountability and community 
satisfaction. The study also tried to go beyond the measurement of participation practices by 
including the responsiveness of NPOs in the measure of accountability. Responsiveness, though 
a good indicator may not fully capture the depth of what accountability is over and above the use 
of mechanisms and how the NPO responds to needs and what it has learned from community 
involvement.  Future studies could include the presence or absence of sanctions, or other 
incentives that aim to enlist compliance from NPOs on behalf of client-communities. Part of 
accountability is whether there are consequences for the failure of the agents to act or give 
sufficient justification for decisions taken (Lindberg, 2013). This study suggests that funding 
conditions that mandate client-community favouring mechanisms may have negative 
consequences for the organisations and community satisfaction. However, future studies may 
explicitly model the extent to which this is the case using various measures for consequences 
such as loss of funding from donors.  
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Appendix 
A1: Polychoric principal component analysis results for explanatory variables  
Variable   Indicators  Eigenvalue Proportion  Alpha reliability 
Community 
satisfaction  
• NPO quick to respond; 
• NPOs are good at what they do,  
• Community satisfied with NPO, and 
• NPO exists to serve its own purpose 
1.84 0.96 0.72 
Community 
authorisation 
is required  
NPO requires authorisation to:  
• Start new activities 
• Geographical expansion; and  
• Buy a new building  
2.26 0.75 0.68 
Board 
representation  
• Community represented on board; and  
• Community representative is elected by 
the community  
1.71 0.85 0.63 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examined the NPO client-community accountability dynamics by applying 
various economic theories and statistical methods. The main aim of the research was to understand 
the role played by client-communities as principals and claim-holders in NPOs and its effect on 
their evaluations of the organisations. The dissertation tried to answer the following questions. 
Firstly, to what extent do NPOs take into consideration the needs of communities in their location 
choices? The aim of the research was to understand how NPOs navigate the trade-off between 
being pragmatic and being mission focused in decisions about location. Additinally, the aim was 
to understand the impact of spatial development inequality on the distribution of NPOs. 
Secondly, under what leadership conditions are NPOs more accountable or likely to espouse and 
practice participatory values? Here the focus was to find the characteristics of leaders most 
associated with the likelihood to act on community inputs and feedback gathered through various 
participatory mechanisms. The study focused on leaders because they drive the agenda in how 
stakeholder relations are managed (Geer et al., 2008). Additionally, they are the link between the 
organisations’ stakeholders: “the only group, who enter into contractual relationships with all other 
stakeholders and the only ones with direct control over decision-making in an organisation” (Hill 
& Jones, 1992). 
Lastly, what effect does greater accountability to client-communities have on communities’ 
satisfaction and their evaluations of the organisations? The aim of this question was to examine 
whether there is an expectation gap between what we think accountability to communities can 
achieve and what it does. Additionally, to test whether NPO self-perceptions about their 
accountability practices were aligned to what the communities reported about their operations and 
services and staff.  
7.1 Main conclusions  
A few conclusions can be drawn about NPO accountability to community constituents based on 
this research and the answers to the questions stated above. Firstly, NPO accountability to client-
communities is important for the efficiency and efficacy of the organisations, and mostly for the 
empowerment and the fulfilment of the rights of communities as claim-holders to be active in their 
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own advancement. This was why we set about with the aim of assessing how NPOs were 
accountable to client-communities, with South Africa as a case study.  
Secondly, NPOs have main accountabilities that relate to their service and responsibility to client-
communities. These accountabilities include maximisation of the client-communities’ welfare, as 
well as, involving in them in the organisations’ decision making. They also include assisting 
communities in demanding their rights as claim-holders in relation to non-NPO duty bearers as 
well as recognising the community’s rights to hold organisations accountable for the nature of their 
activities.  
Thirdly, small CBOs in South African are accountable to their client-community constituents to 
the extent that they can act upon community needs and information gathered through participatory 
processors. For example, Chapter 2 showed that NPOs do consider the needs of communities when 
making location decisions. The spatial examination of NPO density showed that NPOs 
agglomerate in specific regions with poverty, education and private philanthropy acting as the 
centripetal forces. However, cross-subsidisation of NPO services between richer and poorer 
municipalities in South Africa was also evident. This leads us to conclude that NPOs are 
responsive; they have widespread reach meeting the needs present in their own municipalities and 
among their neighbours. 
The results also suggested that leadership plays an important role in understanding the extent to 
which organisations will be accountable to community and client constituents. Factors such as the 
leader’s education, preference for altruism and tenure affect whether an organisation adopts and 
practises participatory values.  
The SEM findings of Chapter 6 showed a positive and direct link between community satisfaction 
and client community accountability measured as participation and responsiveness. The results 
also showed that involvement of communities in the NPOs strategic decisions, having an elected 
board representative, formal feedback mechanisms and openness to community member inputs 
contributed more to the accountability construct than access to reports and informal feedback 
mechanisms. On the other hand, all the indicators of satisfaction loaded significantly on the 
construct and carried the expected sign. 
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However, external factors such as revenue, type of organisation, geographical location and 
community characteristics also impact accountability practices and mediate in the relationship 
between accountability and community satisfaction. Non-profit organisations with greater 
financial resources are more likely to respond to communities. Additionally, communities in the 
Eastern Cape were more likely to have NPOs who reported to be more responsive, and in turn, the 
communities reported positively about the individual components of NPOs’ behaviours except for 
selfishness. What the results also showed is that having funder requirements that conditioned 
payments on performance measurement had a negative direct and indirect effects on accountability 
and on the satisfaction except for selfishness 
7.2 Limitations of the Dissertation  
The research also identified several limitations. They included inadequate treatment of 
accountability to client-communities in economics. As a result, literature covering NPOs related 
to agency theory is very limited (Peterson, 2010), which meant a weak theoretical base on which 
to situate and strengthen the research. The research also focused on one principal with the limited 
treatment of the role of donors. A multiple-principal framework would be more beneficial in 
understanding the accountability dynamics in community and NPO relationships. Such a 
framework will assist in dealing with the competing objectives of NPO’s multiple principals 
(Herman and Renz, 2004). As noted in the chapters, the research also suffered from many data 
limitation related to the smallness of the original data and missing data.  
7.3 Contributions and Future Research  
Despite the limitations the dissertation makes some contributions to the study of non-profit 
accountability, however, the field could benefit from more research in the area. The main 
contributions include a framework, which can be used to guide the investigation of the 
accountability decisions made by non-profits. Even so, the framework could be further formalised 
through the formulation of a theoretical economic model. Additionally, although we incorporated 
factors, we deemed important covariates of NPO accountability to the client- communities. These 
are not exhaustive. Further research could assist in expanding this list of factors. The other 
contribution made by this research is the examination of the impact of spatial autocorrelation in 
the explanatory variables on NPO density using spatial econometric techniques. The research 
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examined this using aggregated data and did not account for the fact that these interactions could 
operate differently in different regions, in the case of this research, provinces. For example, other 
studies could investigate this spatial relationship at a more disaggregated level and focus on one 
province or control for differences between provinces. Furthermore, spatial dependence in other 
covariates can also be further investigated.
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APPENDICES 
A1: Survey of Non-Governmental Organizations in South Africa 
NAME OF NPO: 
 
 
ACTIVITY: 
PROVINCE: 
 
CODE: 
TOWN: 
 
Address: 
INTERVIEWER: 
 
CODE: 
SUPERVISOR: 
 
CODE: 
DATE OF VISIT: START TIME on recorder: 
END TIME on recorder: 
 
 Completed? 
Section A: Identification  
Section B: Leadership  
Section C: Mission and activities  
Section D: Funding and finance  
Section E: Funding sources and banking  
Section F: Networks  
Section G: Performance and effectiveness  
Section H: Reporting  
Section I: Internal accountability  
Section J: Government relations  
Section K: Employees  
Annual report collected  
Financial statement collected  
Signed institutional consent form  
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Signed individual consent form  
 
INTRODUCTION   
Good (morning, afternoon, evening), I am …………………………, conducting a survey on behalf of Stellenbosch and Vrije 
University Brussels. The purpose of this survey is to collect knowledge about the functioning of the NPO sector in South 
Africa. NPOs play an important role in the country’s development. However, there is a lack of knowledge and a lot of 
confusion regarding the NPO sector in South Africa.  The information collected will therefore help us to understand how 
an enabling environment can be created for them to fulfil their role.   
 
Today, we would like to ask you a few questions about how your organisation operates. This should not take much longer 
than an hour and a half to complete.  
 
We value your opinion and there is no right or wrong answer. We therefore request that you answer these questions to the 
best of your ability and as honestly as possible. You or your organisation’s name or address will never be named in any 
of the reports we plan to write. Please be therefore assured that the information collected will be treated as confidential 
and will be used anonymously for summary statistics compiled for our research reports.   
 
 The people of South Africa appreciate the work that NPOs do and the services they provide to the people of South Africa. To 
be successful we need your help. The ultimate objective of this study is to provide guidance on how better to assist NPOs 
operating in the country.   
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ENUMERATORS 
  
Statements in square brackets are instructions for enumerators.  
 
Replace everywhere [NPO] by the name of surveyed NPO.  
 
Replace [respondent] by the name of the respondent. 
 
As far as possible we will attempt to interview the manager/director of the organization. The manager/director may 
however refer us to other staff members for different subsections of the survey. 
 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO ENSURE THAT THE CONSENT FORMS HAVE BEEN SIGNED BEFORE BEGINNING WITH THE 
INTERVIEW 
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SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT 
 
The information above was described to the participant by ………………………………………………… The participant was also given 
the opportunity to ask questions and these questions were answered to their satisfaction.  
 
 
I hereby consent voluntarily to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.  
________________________________________ 
1. Name of Participant 
 
 
________________________________________    
2. Signature of Participant     Date 
 
 
 
I hereby consent voluntarily to be recorded during the completion of the survey.  
 
________________________________________ 
3. Name of Participant 
 
 
________________________________________    
4. Signature of Participant     Date 
5. SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR 
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I declare that I have explained the information given in this document to 
………………………………………………………………………………………..  They were encouraged and given ample time to ask questions. 
 
________________________________________  ______________ 
Signature of Investigator     Date 
 
A) IDENTIFICATION 
 [Separate sheet for respondents to fill out themselves: give first 3 pages] 
1. Name of NPO:_________________________________________________________ 
2. NPO Number: _________________________________________________________ 
3. Physical Address [road and directions]: _____________________________________ 
  ____________________________________________________________________________ 
4. Telephone_____________________________________________________________ 
5. Web address Yes/No.  If yes_______________________________________________    
6. Name of respondent _____________________________________________________ 
7. Email address of respondent (if doesn’t have, then NPO)______________________________________________ 
8. Job description/title_____________________________________________________ 
9. When did you join the NPO?  _______________________________________ 
10. Gender of respondent:  1. Male   2. Female   
11. Age of the respondent? ____________________years 
12. Total years of overall professional experience (including time with NPO)? ___________________________ 
13. In which year was the [NPO] founded? ___________ 
14. Is the [NPO]  a   [circle that which applies ]  
1. South African NPO       2.    An international NPO or branch of an international NPO    
15. If branch of an international NPO, what is name of parent NPO? _____________________________________ 
16. Is this office the head office of the [NPO]?        1. Yes     2. No 
17. If not the head office, how much control does this branch have on scale of 1-5 [circle that which applies]: 
a) Start new activities    (none)  0 1 2 3 4 5 (full control)   
b) Start working in another district  (none) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (full control) 
c) Buy a building     (none) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (full control) 
d) Hire new staff     (none) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (full control) 
18. Does [NPO] have a religious affiliation?   1. Yes 2. No      
19. Was [NPO] founded by: [tick one]  
1. single South African individual   
2. a group of South African individuals   
3. foreign individuals   
4. South African and foreign individuals   
5. an international NPO   
6. an existing South African NPO (i.e., is it a local branch?)  
7. a church/religious organisation   
8. a foreign government   
9. other:   
 
20. Is the current manager/director one of the founders?  1. Yes 2. No 3. Do not know 
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21. Is [NPO] registered with NPO Board/Department of Social Development?    (circle) 
1. Yes [skip to (C)] 2. No [go to (A)] 3. Deregistered [go to (B)] 
         
22. (A) If not, why are you not registered? ________________________________________________________ 
23. (B) If deregistered, why was the organisation deregistered? _______________________________________ 
24. (C) In what year was the organisation first registered? ________________year  
25. When did [NPO] last renew its registration?           ________________year  
26.  If you registered, have you submitted certified financial statements and reports to the DSD?    1. Yes   2. No                                   
27. On a scale of 1-10 how easy was the registration process [ 1 very hard; 10 easy]  (circle) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
28. On a scale of 1-10 how easy is it for your NPO to comply with DSD requirements regarding yearly audits  
[1 very hard; 10 easy] (circle)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
29. Does your organisation have a Public Benefit Organisation status (tax exempt)? 1.Yes   2.No   3.Do not know 
30. Have you registered a trust to manage your investment/savings?        1. Yes  2.No   3.Do not know 
B) LEADERSHIP 
31. What is the name of the director/head/manager of [NPO]: _____________________________ 
[Hereafter we want to know about the manager/director; if respondent is manager/director, ask about respondent]  
32.   Are you the manager/director? 1. Yes (if yes, no need to repeat from introduction, skip 33, 34, 35) 2. No  
33.      Gender  1. Male   2. Female 
34.      (Approximately) how old is manager/director? __________________ 
35.    How long has manager/director been with NPO? _____________________________________years 
36.   Is manager/director a South African national?   1. Yes 2. No 
37. What is the manager/director’s race? _______________________________________ 
38. What was the highest level of education achieved by the [manager/director]? [Tick which applies]  
 0: No formal education       1: Primary         2: Secondary          3: Tertiary/university  4. Do not know 
     
39. How many years did he/she complete at that level?     ________________________ years    A1. Do not know 
40. Does the manager/director hold a religious title? 1. Yes (if yes, circle) 2.No     3. Do not know 
1. Lay person    2. Priest/minister/mollah    3. Nun/monk/sister/brother    4. Other_________ 
 
41.  If married, what does the spouse do? ___________________________________________    2. Do not know 
42.  Did manager/director travel outside South Africa?    1. Yes 2. No   3. Do not know 
43.  Did manager/director work in another NPO prior to joining [NPO]?  1. Yes 2. No   3. Do not know 
44.  For how many years? _________________________   99. Do not know 
45.  Did [manager/dir] work in government/private for-profit sector prior to joining [NPO]? 1. Yes  2. No  3. Don’t know  
46.  What is/was the job of the father of [manager/director]? _______________________________   2. Do not know 
47.  What is/was the job of the mother of [manager/director]? ____________________________       2. Do not know 
48.  Is the [manager/director] involved in any other NPOs apart from [NPO]?       1. Yes    2. No  3. Do not know 
49.  Does [manager/director] have a job other than managing [NPO]?   1. Yes    2. No  3. Do not know 
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49.a What are the main activities of the [NPO]?  
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Activity   
Ti
ck
 if
 d
o 
th
is 
ac
tiv
ity
 
Ra
isi
ng
 a
w
ar
en
es
s 
Ad
vo
ca
cy
 
Se
rv
ice
 d
el
iv
er
y 
Are similar services 
provided in the 
community where 
you work? 
Yes/No, if no skip 
next column 
If other organisations are 
providing the same 
services, do you   
a)Work with them 
b)Work separately 
 
Did the NPO 
do this activity 
from the 
beginning? 
Yes/No 
Do 
beneficiaries 
pay for this 
service? 
Yes/No, if no 
skip next 2 
columns 
How much 
do they 
pay? 
Per what 
unit?  
(e.g per 
use, per 
month) 
     
Go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
NP
Os
 
 Go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
NP
Os
 
 
    
1. Entrepreneurial programmes                 
2. Adult education and literacy               
3. School learner support               
4. HIV support group               
5. HIV prevention               
6. Healthcare                
7. Skills development and 
training 
              
8. Unemployed support group 
and job placement 
              
9. Gender violence               
10. Child welfare services               
11. ECD and child day care               
12. Services to handicapped and 
elderly 
              
13. Other               
14. Other               
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C) MISSION AND ACTIVITIES 
1. Note the time on recording device: _______  
50. Why was [the NPO] started?  
[Please circle statements that reflect NPO’s discussion from list below. We need you to circle at least one statement 
per probe. If the respondent does not provide enough information to circle one of the statements, please ask about it 
using the question indicated under the probe/prompt heading.]  
PROBE 1. What were the reasons behind starting the NPO [or this branch if the NPO is a subsidiary]? (Do not read 
options aloud. Can circle more than one) 
1. The NPO was founded to serve a community that needed help 
2. The NPO was founded around a vision of the founder 
3. The NPO was founded around a specific funding opportunity 
 
PROBE 2.   Was there a need for such services or activities?  (Can circle more than one) 
4. There is no mention of knowledge of a need for such services 
5. There is mention of general need for such services and activities but location at this site was due to 
proximity/convenience 
6. Need did exist and founding members learnt about the needs because they are part of community 
7. Need did exist and founding members learnt about the needs of community through word of mouth 
8. Need did exist and founding members learnt about the needs through the news 
9. Need did exist and founding members learnt about the needs through peers 
10. General knowledge 
 
PROBE 3. [when launching the NPO]? (Can circle more than one) 
11. No money was available 
12. Yes money was given via international contacts 
13. Responded to a funding opportunity, funding application 
14. Money was raised locally to start NPO 
 
PROBE 4. What was the role of founder [or founding group of individuals] own ideas or vision [in launching the NPO]? 
(circle if individual or set of individuals) 
15. Not mentioned   
16. Founder(s) had strong vision of what he/she[they] wanted to do and where 
17. Founder(s) had strong vision of whom he/she[they] wanted to serve and then did needs assessment 
18. Founder(s) had strong vision of what he/she[they] wanted to do and then found community with these needs 
 
PROBE 5. Is the NPO still committed to these ideas? 
19. Ideas and focus have not changed much  
20. Ideas and focus have changed somewhat 
21. Ideas and focus have changed considerably 
PROBE 6. If these ideas have changed, why did they change? 
22. Changing circumstances on the ground 
23. Learning through experience 
24. Donor pressure   
25. Government pressure 
26. Pressure from the community 
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51. Which area do you serve? (mention geographical boundaries)____________________________________ 
 
2. Note time on recording device: __________ 
52. Who are the targeted beneficiaries that the [NPO] hopes to serve with its activities? 
Note to field workers: community refers to the area that the NPO operates within; targeted beneficiaries are the 
individuals the NPO aims to serve; beneficiaries are individuals who receive NPO services .Do not communicate these 
definitions to the respondent unless you need them for the probe question. These definitions could be “leading” and 
may distort response. 
 
PROBE 1. Who is seen as the NPOs targeted beneficiaries? 
1. No community is mentioned/denial or explanation of why there is no beneficiary community 
2. Mentions at least one target group 
3. Summary of target groups (e.g. old/young, race, geography, gender, need, education, widows, orphans, HIV?) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
PROBE 2. Have the targeted beneficiaries served changed since foundation/launch/start? 
4. NPO has always served its current beneficiaries  
5. NPO has shifted focus away from initial beneficiaries 
6. NPO is still serving initial beneficiaries, but has expanded to new beneficiaries 
 
3. Note time on recording device: _____ 
Now we are going to discuss the community that NPO works with. Get the NPO to discuss what they mean by 
community. Who are the community? (make summary note) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  
53. What role do community members play within the [NPO]?   
Field worker to explain that community refers to the area that the NPO operates within; targeted beneficiaries are 
the individuals the NPO aims to serve; beneficiaries are individuals who receive NPO services (visual aids) 
PROBE 1. How do you involve the community in the activities of the NPO? 
1. No interest in involving community in activities/ see no need or purpose for it 
2. No attempts to mobilise due to funding 
3. Speak to and invite community leaders 
4. Campaign to mobilise all members of community 
5. Mobilize donations including in kind 
PROBE 2. How do you communicate with the community? 
6. Through elites/community leaders    
7. Attempts to consult more broadly (more representative in terms of education) 
8. Formal (meetings)     
9. Informal  (as it happens)  
10. Regular and frequent workshops  and meetings ad hoc 
11. Through the press 
12. Social media (e.g. facebook, what’s app, twitter) 
 
PROBE 3. What do you do with the information you get from the community? 
13. Meeting notes typed up and filed                    Meeting notes but not typed up                 No meeting notes 
14. Can we have a copy?     1. Yes         2. No (if no, why not________________________________________) 
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54. If you have board meetings, do members of the community attend these meetings? 
  1. Yes                2. No.             3. Do not know  [if 2 or 3, skip to next question] 
 If yes:        a) How are the community representatives chosen?  
1. Self-appointed 
2. Identified and appointed by NPO decision makers (e.g. Mother NPO, funders) 
3. Nominated and elected by community 
4. Nominated and elected by board 
5. Other_____________________  
 b) What attributes do you look for in community representatives on the board? (circle all that apply, do not 
   options read aloud)  
1. Educated 
2. Networks 
3. Direct beneficiaries of NPO services (users) 
4. Indirect beneficiaries of NPO services 
 c) How many times per year are there board meetings? ___________________________ 
 d) How many board meetings do the beneficiaries attend per year? All or Number: _______________________ 
 e) Why do they attend? (circle which applies) :  
1. formal procedures and requirements of NPO (internal protocols and policies) 
2. beneficiaries are interested in NPO activities 
3. to represent the beneficiaries 
4. international funders/donors requirements 
5. it is open to everyone 
6. other__________________________ 
7. No idea/do not know 
 
 
 
55. Tell me about the interaction of staff with community members:  
1. How many times a year does the NPO interact with the community? 
(not including service delivery) 
 
2. Level of interaction (not including service delivery) (circle) 1 none      2       3        4        5  lot 
3. Meet at scheduled meetings (tick)  
4. Meet with to discuss individual issues/complaints as required (tick)  
5. Freely share sensitive information (e.g. problems in the project) (tick)  
6. Frequent misunderstandings and disagreements (tick)  
 
56. In which of the following ways do you get input from community members about the needs of the community? 
[Tick any relevant box] (Do not read aloud) 
1. Needs assessment: structured  
2. Suggestion box  
3. Survey  
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4. Community meetings  
5. Annual general meeting   
6. Invited discussions with community leaders  
7. Informal individual conversations with community members  
8. Community comes to NPO  
9. Other:  
 
 
57. In which of the following ways do you receive feedback about your activities? [Tick any relevant box] (Do not read 
aloud) 
1. Comments and feedback box   
2. Programme evaluation   
3. Survey  
4. Community meetings  
5. Annual general meeting   
6. Invited discussions with community leaders  
7. Invited discussions with community members  
8. Social media  
9. Other:  
 
4. Note time on recording device: _______ 
 
58. What are the benefits of community participation for your NPO? 
1. Cannot mention any 
2. Mention few after much through 
3. Immediately mentions many with enthusiasm 
 
PROBE 1.   Does having the community participate in the NPO include any benefits? (let discussion flow)     
[Categories: 1. mentioned without probe, 2. mentioned with probe, 3. after probe not indicated as important] 1 2 3 
1. An understanding of community members lives    
2. A stronger relationship with community members (trust)    
3. Community members support decisions    
4. Community members report more satisfaction    
5. Awareness/marketing    
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6.    Other:    
 
59. Do you think that participation benefits community members?  
 
PROBE 1. In which way could participating in decisions be good for community members?  
 
[Categories: 1. mentioned without probe, 2. mentioned with probe, 3. after probe not indicated as important] 1 2 3 
1. Self-esteem by NPO showing interest in their opinion    
2. Help shape expectations and understanding of NPO services    
3. Promote social capital/community cohesiveness    
4. Other:    
 
PROBE 2.  Can you give an example of how your NPO has changed its programme or approach because of 
community or beneficiary inputs or feedback? 
 
1. Yes – example provided 
2. No – example not provided 
 
60. What are the frustrations of dealing with community members? 
[Categories: 1. mentioned without probe, 2. mentioned with probe, 3. after probe not indicated as 
important] 
1 2 3 
1. They do not see the bigger picture – do not understand complexities of NPO world    
2. They are not available when needed    
3. They do not attend if invited to the board meetings    
4. Voices of a few community members dominate    
5. Low level of participation and talking by community members    
6. They do not have educational background or exposure needed to make useful contributions    
7. Low volunteering    
8.    Other:    
 
D) FUNDING AND FINANCES 
61. When the [NPO] started did you receive a donation?   
1. Yes   2. No   3. Founder used own resources  4.  Do not know 
62.                 If yes, is this donor still funding the NPO?  1. Yes 2. No     3. Do not know 
63. Does [NPO] have a bank account with a chequebook?         1. Yes 2. No     3. Do not know 
64. Does [NPO] have a savings account?        1. Yes 2. No     3. Do not know 
65. Does [NPO] have an overdraft facility?   1. Yes 2. No     3. Do not know 
66. Does [NPO] have an investment fund/trust?  1. Yes 2. No     3. Do not know 
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67. Has the organisation ever applied for a grant?  1. Yes 2. No 3. Do not know 
68.               If no, why not? [choose one] 
1. No need for money    
2. Grant application process too complicated/time-consuming    
3. Would be turned down anyway   
4. Other reason:  
 
69. When was the last grant application filed?     _______________ year   99.Do not know 
70. To whom was this application made? __________________________   99.Do not know 
 
71. Regarding this application (circle appropriate answer) 
1. Donor approached you 
2. Responded to an advertised funding opportunity 
3. Municipality made them aware of opportunity 
4. Approaching a donor/funder with recommendation by someone you know (unsolicited) 
5. Approaching a donor/funder (without recommendation by someone you know) (unsolicited) 
6. Other: ______________________________________________________ 
 
72. For how much was this last grant application? __________________________ SA rands 99. Do not know 
 
73. To whom did [NPO] apply for this grant? [tick one] (Do not read out load) 
1. Black economic empowerment  
2. Mother NPO   
3. International NPO (e.g., Action Aid, World Vision, Oxfam, etc.)   
4. South African NPO    
5. National Government   
6. Local Government   
7. United Nations agency (e.g., UNICEF, UNDP, World Bank)    
8. Bilateral donor (e.g., DfID, DANIDA, USAID, Noraid)   
9. Church/religious organization   
10. National Development Agency  
11. Lottery fund  
12. Other: ______________________________   
 
74. Was the grant application accepted, turned down or are you still waiting to hear? [tick one]  
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1. Accepted  
2. It was turned down    
3. Still waiting to hear    
4. Never heard back  
 
75. If applied for a grant and was turned down, why was [NPO]’s application turned down? [tick one]  
1. project deemed insufficiently promising by grant agency    
2. [NPO] has insufficient experience    
3. work plan opposed by local government authorities   
4. budget too high/project too expensive   
5. no reason given   
6. other:   
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76. Who are [NPOs] most important funders/donors currently? [ Largest 2]  
 Name of funder/Donors 
(add donor type if donor not well 
known) 
Purpose of grant Grant 
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E. FUNDING SOURCES 
[If the respondent is unable to completely fill this section during the interview, fill in the name and code of 
[NPO] on it, leave this page with the respondent, and continue with the interview. Make sure to collect the 
page the next day and staple it to the rest of the NPO’s questionnaire.] If not available/don’t have revenue 
make a note of why: ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
77. Please indicate what amount of the NPO’s revenue that each of the funding sources represented last 
financial year and this financial year? 
All amounts in SA rands Name of funder 2013 or last 
completed fiscal 
year (if not 2013, 
specify which 
year?) 
______ 
2012 or preceding 
fiscal year (if not 
2012 specify, 
which year?) 
_______ 
1. Black economic empowerment    
2. Mother NPO     
3. International NPO (e.g., Action Aid, World 
Vision, Oxfam)  
   
4. South African NPO      
5. National Government     
6. Local Government     
7. United Nations agency (e.g., UNICEF, UNDP, 
World Bank)   
   
8. Bilateral donor (e.g., DfID, DANIDA, USAID, 
Noraid)  
   
9. Church/religious organization     
10. National Development Agency    
11. Lottery fund    
12. Other:    
13. Membership fees    
14. User fees paid by recipients of services 
rendered by [NPO] 
   
15. Income from sub-contracting    
16. Income from selling goods and services 
(shop, canteen, etc) 
   
17. Private donations by individuals    
18. TOTAL: in SA rands    
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E) NETWORKS 
78. Is NPO a member of a NPO Network/Forum?  1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know  [if 2 or 3, skip to section G ] 
79. Is [NPO] member of a South African NPO network or umbrella organization?  1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know   
If yes, which? ________________________________________ 
80. Is [NPO] member of an international or regional NPO network?            1. Yes 2. No  3. Do not know   
If yes, which? _______________________________________________ 
81. Do you receive any form of support from these networks/forums?  1. Yes 2. No 3. Do not know  
 If yes, what kind of support?    
1. Training 
2. Financial 
3. Administrative 
4. Other ___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
82. Do the networks have a code of conduct?   1. Yes 2. No   3. Do not know   
 
5. Note time on recording device: _______________________ 
83. What role does the code of conduct play in the organisation? 
PROBE 1. What does the code of conduct say?   
1. Respondent can summarise content without hesitation 
2. Respondent attempts summary but not convincing 
3. Respondent does not know at all 
 
PROBE 2. Do you abide by this code of conduct?    1. Yes   2. No 
 1.If no, why not? __________________________________________________________ 
PROBE 3.  Can you provide the code of conduct?   1. Yes 2. No  
 1.If no, why not? __________________________________________________________ 
 
F) PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
6. Note time on recording device: __________ 
84. How do you know whether or not your organisation is performing well?   
PROBE 1.How do you measure how well you are doing? 
1. Making a difference in the lives of beneficiaries mentioned early and prominently 
2. Do not mention making a difference in the lives of beneficiaries 
 
3. Clear and well thought through answer, coherent and convincing 
4. Appears confused by question, incoherent, hesitant 
 
5. They measure impact 
6. They do not measure impact, but want to 
7. They do not mention impact assessment at all 
PROBE 2. How? Does your organization set numerical targets or goals for any of your programs?  
  (i.e. “train 100 teachers in 2011”)?  1. Yes 2. No, if no why not:______________________________________ 
 
PROBE 3. Do the funders/donors insist on measuring performance? 
1. My funders/donors will withdraw money if they know that we have made no impact 
2. My funders/donors are patient and understanding and allow for learning  
3. They will not take my money away if we cannot show impact  
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PROBE 4.  Do you think the NPO is run the way it was intended? (circle all that applies) 
1. Indications of growth plan and future strategy 
2. Without any vision of future or long-term plan 
3. Self-critical, admit and learn from mistakes 
4. Self-congratulatory – no change is needed – denial 
 
85. If you measure performance of your organisation how do you do it? [do not read options aloud]  
1. Attendance logs (to capture numbers flowing through NPO)  
2. Questionnaires or focus groups with beneficiaries/participants by NPO  
3. Questionnaires or focus groups with beneficiaries/participants by third party 
(e.g. not the NPO, a hired consultant) 
 
4. Anonymous questionnaires  
5. Other:  
 
86. If you do not measure performance, why not? [do not read options aloud]  
1. Not familiar with term/Don’t know what it means  
2. Not applicable to organization   
3. Not possible to measure progress or impact of work   
4. Financial constraints, not enough resources   
5. Nobody has requested this   
6. Inexperience, lack of technical capacity  
7. Other:  
 
87. Does your organization face any challenges with measuring performance?  
[Do not read aloud, just circle what applies according to answer given by respondent] 
1. Not enough trained staff   
2. Not enough resources   
3. Not enough time given demands for other activities   
4. Unclear reporting requirements from donors/funders/donors  
5. Contradictory reporting requirements of donors/funders/donors  
6. Performance is difficult to measure  
7. Other:   
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Now, pertaining to a specific activity or programme (see front page for specific activity selected for this NPO):  
88. What is the name of this programme (If NPO has only one activity answers questions up to ****** for 
whole NPO and skip rest of section, otherwise answer all question in relation to the programme): 
___________________________________________________________ 
89. What are the aims of the programme? ___________________________________________________________ 
90. Who are your targeted beneficiaries with this programme? ______________________________________________ 
91. How did you identify targeted beneficiaries and offer you services to them? (e.g. unemployed with need for skills 
development) 
a) They find us (offices) 
b) We advertise (e.g. radio, newspaper) 
c) Other community members told them about the NPO (word of mouth) 
d) Direct relationships with community and conversations 
e) Told by NPO partners, government offices, churches (referrals) 
f) Going from house to house 
g) Other: _________________________________________________________ 
92. How many individuals are served by this programme? ____________________________________________ 
93. Are you satisfied with the proportion of needy from this community that you reach with this project? 
a) Satisfied with coverage 
b) Dissatisfied with coverage 
c) Have never thought about coverage 
d) Difficult to estimate need 
94. What are the expected outcomes of the programme? __________________________________________________ 
95. How satisfied are you with meeting expected outcomes? (on a scale from: 1 not satisfied to 10 very satisfied)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
********* 
96. What were the reasons behind launching this activity or programme? (Can circle more than one) 
a) The project was founded to serve the community that needed help 
b) The project was founded around a vision of the founder 
c) The project was founded around a specific funding opportunity 
d) NPO already operated in community and saw a need for this service 
97. Was there a need for such services or activities?  (Can circle more than one) 
a) There is no mention of knowledge of a need for such services 
b) There is mention of general need for such services and activities but location at this site was due to 
proximity/convenience 
c) Need did exist  
d) Other: _____________________________ 
98.  Was money available from the start [when launching the project]?  1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know   
99. How is this activity/programme funded now? ________________________________________________ 
100. Since this project started is the NPO still committed to the same ideas around the focus and the purpose of the 
programme/activity? 
a) Ideas and focus have not changed much  
b) Ideas and focus have changed somewhat 
c) Ideas and focus have changed considerably 
 
 
101. If these ideas around the focus and the purpose of the programme/activity have changed, why did they change? 
a) Changing circumstances on the ground 
b) Learning through experience 
c) Donor pressure   
102. How do you measure performance? _____________________________________________________________ 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
175 
 
103. Does your organization set numerical targets or goals for this programme? (i.e. “train 100 teachers in 2011”)?  
        1. Yes     2. No        3. Do not know   
G) REPORTING 
104. Does [NPO] produce an annual report (a report not written for a specific funder)?   
       1. Yes   2. No   3. Do not know (if 2 or 3, go to 108)  
105. When was the last annual report produced?    ___________ month _____ year        2. Do not know 
106. Was this annual report shown/given to any of the following: [tick all that apply]    
1. Community  
2. Beneficiaries   
3. Funder   
4. NPO board/Department of Social Development  
5. Municipality  
6. Other:  
 
107. Is [NPO]’s annual report available to the public if they ask for it? 1. Yes 2. No    3. Do not know  
  If Yes, ask the respondent for a copy 
  If not then provided write explanation as to why: ______________________________________________________ 
108. Does [NPO] prepare a balance sheet and income statement?  1. Yes 2. No  3. Do not know  [2 or 3 go to 114]   
109. When were the last balance sheet and income statement prepared? _________ month ___________year  
110. Were these accounts externally audited?       1. Yes     2. No     3. Do not know   
111. If yes, by who are the balance and income statement audited? __________________________________ 
112. Were these accounts shown/given to any of the following: [Circle all that apply]   
1. Community  
2. Beneficiaries   
3. Funder   
4. NPO board/Department of Social Development  
5. Municipality  
6. SARS  
7. Other:  
113. Are [NPO]’s annual accounts available to the public if they ask for it?   1. Yes 2. No    3. Do not know   
If Yes, ask the respondent for a copy (circle):  Provided Not provided 
If then not provided write explanation as to why: ______________________________________________________ 
 
114. Do you pay tax on your income (tax exempt)?      1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know 
115. Do you pay tax on what you buy?    1. Yes  2. No 3. Do not know 
116. Do you claim back your tax?    1. Yes 2. No 3. Do not know 
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H) INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
117. Do you have a constitution for the NPO?                         1. Yes  2. No     3. Do not know   
118. Does organisation hold an annual general meeting?      1. Yes  2. No     3. Do not know  (If 2 or 3, skip to 121)  
119. When was the last annual general meeting held?     ___________________ month _________ year  
120. How many people came to the last general meeting?     ______________________  
121. Does the organisation have a board of directors?   1. Yes 2. No      3. Do not know  (If 2 or 3, skip to 128)  
122. How many people currently serve on the board? ____________________________ 2. Do not know   
123. Are board members paid?     1. Yes     2. No   3. Do not know 
124. If yes, how much per year? (write amount, or if cannot answer ask which category best estimate - circle) 
Amount: _________________________________________or:________________________________________ 
Rand: 0;  less than 5,000;  5,000 – 20,000;  20,000 – 100,000;  more than 100,000 
125. How often does the board meet? _________________per __________________   99. Do not know 
126. How were they appointed? (tick all that apply) 
1. Self-appointed or founding member 
2. Identified and appointed by NPO decision makers (e.g. Mother NPO, funders) 
3. Nominated and elected by community 
4. Nominated and elected by board 
5. Applied for a vacancy 
6. Other_____________________  7. Don’t know 
127. If elected, do the board members have a fixed term, where after they have to be re-elected?  1.Yes  2.No  
128. How was the manager/director appointed? (tick one that applies) 
1. Self-appointed or founding member 
2. Identified and appointed by NPO decision makers (e.g. Mother NPO, funders) 
3. Responded to an advert, applied and interviewed 
4. Nominated and elected by community 
5. Nominated and elected by board 
6. Other_____________________     7. Don’t know 
129.  Please indicate the degree of influence of each of the mentioned stakeholders: 
 
130. Does [NPO] need to obtain the authorization of an outside body before [NPO] can undertake the following: 
[tick all cases that require such a meeting]  
 1. Board    2.Community    3. DSD 4. Funders 5. Other: ___________________: 
1) Stakeholders 2) No influence 3) Negligible 
influence 
4) Some 
influence 
5) Important  
influence 
6) Not 
applica
ble 
1. Board       
2. Manager/director      
3. Employees      
4. Non-executive volunteers      
5. Beneficiaries themselves      
6. DSD/NPO directorate      
7. Funders/donors      
8. Other stakeholders       
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Expand into new activities       
Expand into another area        
Purchase a building        
 
 
131. Is performance measurement a part of the boards duty?  1. Yes  2. No    3. Do not know 
132. If yes, how does it know if objectives have been met? _______________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
I) GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 
133. Since its creation, has organisation ever been visited by 1. Yes  2.No  3. Do not know [tick one]   
1. NPO directorate/Department of Social Development  
2. Municipality  
3. Other public body:     
 
134. In general, do you find the staff with whom you interact in the national government help you with what you do 
or do they cause problems? (this does NOT refer to help with funding) 
 1. Help 2. Problem 3. Both 4. Neither   Why? 
1. National DSD      
2. Provincial DSD      
3. Municipality      
4. Other      
 
135. What kind of support does government departments and agencies give to your NPO?  
[this does NOT refer to help with funding,  tick that which applies for each] 
 1. Training 2. Help with accounts 3. Help with preparing reports 4. Other   5. None 
1. National DSD      
2. Provincial DSD      
3. Municipality      
 
136. What other type of government support would you find helpful? _____________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
J) EMPLOYEES AND VOLUNTEERS 
137. How many staff  (salaried and volunteers) do you have? ___________________________________ 
138. How many staff members do you have in the following categories?  
 [If more than 100 employees, ask respondent to estimate proportions] 
 Full-time 
salaried 
Part-time 
salaried 
Full-time 
volunteers 
Part-time 
volunteers 
Total Foreign 
 
Support staff (e.g 
clerks/administrative staff/HR) 
      
Financial staff       
Frontline staff (e.g. project 
managers) 
      
Manager/directors       
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139. Over the last 12 months how many paid staff have left, joined the NPO, how many vacancies: 
 Left the NPO Joined the NPO Vacancies 
Total    
Support staff (e.g clerks/administrative staff/HR)    
Financial staff    
Frontline staff (e.g. project managers)    
Manager/directors    
 
140. Do you have contracts with staff?             1. Yes       2. No       3. Do not know 
  
141. Do you have job descriptions for staff?    1. Yes       2. No       3. Do not know   
142. Do you have written rules and procedures for firing employees?   1. Yes    2. No   3. Do not 
know 
  
143. Do you have a policy or plan for assessing and rewarding performance of staff?  
        1. Yes    2. No    3. Do not know 
 
144. Does your organisation have sufficient skills in these areas? 
  
 Yes No 
 
if no, why? 
L=due to lack of finance to recruit 
S=skill scarcity 
Not necessary 
1. Fund-raising     
2. Writing proposals     
3. Writing reports to funders/donors     
4. Compiling financial statements     
5. Project management     
 
145. How much time do your staff devote to the following tasks (ask to approximate if they don’t’ know): 
 List staff type involved in each task (e.g. 
support staff, finances, frontline staff 
or management; can list more than 1) 
How many 
people of 
each type 
Time spent on task 
as % of working 
hours in year  
1. Fund-raising    
2. Writing proposals    
3. Writing reports to 
funders/donors 
   
4. Compiling financial statements    
5. Running projects    
 
146. If you get an additional R4,000 per year of funds what would you do with it? _______________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
THANK YOU 
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Enumerator comments: Allow respondent to ask you questions, allow respondent to talk freely, make notes on 
discussion (with or without recorder depending on the respondent, circle which) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Did you see (circle): computers; piped water; electricity; vehicles; 
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A2: Semi-structured group interview  
 
Preparation: Fill in this table prior to SSGI; Add NPO names to sheets before starting; Need: 50 beans (section I & VII); ~5 slips of paper per 
NPO(section VI). 
 
Name of NPO to be assessed Main focus 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
Categories: 1. Health; 2. Education; 3. Labour; 4. Community development 
 
 
1. Community name 2. Local Municipality: 3. District: 4. Province 
5. Arranged date of meeting: 
6. Arranged time of meeting: 7. Time meeting 
started: 
8. Time meeting ended: 
9. Name of convenor: 
10. Enumerator (capturing answers): 
11. Facilitator: 
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1. I. ABOUT THE COMMUNITY 
 
Work with 50 beans throughout the semi-structured group interview (SSGI). This will make it easier to quickly estimate the percentages that you are 
required to write below. 
 
1. We would like to know a bit about your community. Imagine that this pile of beans represents all the households in this community. Working together, 
please would you divide the pile up in such a way that it reflects the division of households into those that have for instance shack dwellings and 
those in brick houses. So, if one half has shacks and the rest do not, you would divide the beans like this {divide the beans into two even piles} and 
then you would tell me which pile represents those who live in shacks.  
 
Ownership Percentage 
1. Percentage of households who live in shacks  
2. Percentage of households with televisions  
3. Percentage of households with access to car  
4. Percentage of households with members in paid employment  
5. Percentage of households with no access to a cellphone  
 
 
2. Over the past 5 years has this community become 
             Richer? 
      Poorer? 
    Stayed the same 
 
  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
182 
 
II. Community needs 
With the participants, work through the table below using the following notes: 
 
Question 1 
Ask the question and circle the needs that they mention in column 1. If an activity is mentioned that does not come under the 12 headings specify in 
category other. 
 
Question 2 
Then, ask question 2 for each activity noted. Ask if the service addresses the needs of the community on a scale of 0 (does not meet needs) to 10 (meets 
needs). Place an asterisk if there is in fact no need. 
 
Question 3 
Here either tick or place a number of each service provider for each activity listed.  
 
Question 4 
Finally ask the participants to name all the NPOs in the area providing the services listed. Do not prompt them to list those we are assessing. 
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Activity: are any of these 
services provided in the 
community (circle all that 
are provided) 
Between 
government, private 
business, church 
and NPOs are these 
community needs 
being addressed 
Who provides (tick or try to 
get particpants to provide a 
number of progammes 
operating by each category) 
List NPO providers: write names of all NPOs in community that provide service 
 Scale 0 needs not  
met – 10 –met (or *) 
Govt. Private 
business 
NPOs 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Entrepreneurial 
programmes   
 
          
2. Adult education and 
literacy 
 
          
3. School leaner support 
 
 
          
4. HIV support group 
 
 
          
5. HIV prevention 
 
 
          
6. Healthcare  
 
 
          
7. Skills development and 
training 
 
          
8. Unemployed support 
group and job placement 
 
          
9. Gender violence 
 
 
          
10. Child welfare services 
 
 
          
11. ECD and child day care 
 
 
          
12. Services to handicapped 
and elderly 
 
          
13. Other            
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14. If you had to nominate three NPOs for a prize that would be annouced in a local newspaper which three would you choose: 
15. First:                                                                     Second:                                                                               Third: 
In preparation for the SSGI, the name of the NPO to which this SSGI is linked in the study should be written in the first row of the table. Ask participants 
how well they know the NPO, ask if they can name the manger/director and NPO address. If unknown, write unknown. Ask how often they interact with 
NPO. Finally ask participants to list the NPO’s activities in the numbered rows. This is to ascertain level of knowledge by participants of the NPO.  
At this point the session leader should ask if there are any employees or board members of the NPO present in the room. If they are, kindly ask 
them if they would be willing to leave the room for the remainder of the session. 
 
IIi. Knowledge of NPO:  
Name of NPO (add prior to SSGI) 
 
1  
 
 
2 3 4  5  
How well do you know the following NPOs on 
a scale of 0-5 (0 do not know; 5 know very 
well)?  
0    1   2    3   4   
5 
0    1   2    3   4   
5 
0    1   2    3   4   
5 
0    1   2    3   4   5 0    1   2    3   4   
5 
Do you know name of manager/director (write 
name): 
 
     
Do you know address of NPO (write address): 
 
 
 
 
     
How often are you in contact with one of the 
organization’s staff? (0 never – 5 often) 
0    1   2    3   4   5 0    1   2    3   4   
5 
0    1   2    3   4   
5 
0    1   2    3   4   5 0    1   2    3   4   
5 
List of activities of the NPO as known by participants (do 
not prompt) 
     
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
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Are you regularly informed about changes in the 
activities of the organization? (0 never – 5 often) 
0    1   2    3   4   5 0    1   2    3   4   
5 
0    1   2    3   4   
5 
0    1   2    3   4   5 0    1   2    3   4   
5 
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III. Relationship with NPO 
 Name of NPO (add prior to SSGI) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. For how long has the NPO worked in 
this community? (years) 
     
2. How often is office/clinic open and a 
representative of [NPO] present?  
Note number of days per period:  2: week; 
3: month; 4: year; 5: never; 6: don’t know 
 
............. days per 
 
……………….. 
 
 
............. days per 
 
……………….. 
 
 
............. days per 
 
……………….. 
 
 
............. days per 
 
……………….. 
 
 
............. days per 
 
……………….. 
 
3. How often does a representative of 
[NPO] visit this community?  
Note number of days per period:  2: week; 
3: month; 4: year; 5: never; 6: don’t know 
 
............. days per 
 
……………….. 
 
 
............. days per 
 
……………….. 
 
 
............. days per 
 
……………….. 
 
 
............. days per 
 
……………….. 
 
 
............. days per 
 
……………….. 
 
4. Do members of this community travel to 
[NPO] in order to benefit from the 
services it offers?      
1. Yes   2. No 1. Yes   2. No  1. Yes   2. No  1. Yes   2. No  1. Yes   2. No  
5. Do you feel the NGO listens to the 
community? (0 never – 5 often) 
0    1   2    3   4   5 0    1   2    3   4   5 0    1   2    3   4   5 0    1   2    3   4   5 0    1   2    3  4  5 
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IV. Feedback 
Name of NPO (add prior to SSGI) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Has NPO ever asked your community what activities it should 
undertake? 
1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 
1.1 If yes, how did it go about asking?  
a. Needs assessment 
b. Suggestion box 
c. Survey 
d. Community meetings 
e. Annual general meeting 
f. Invited discussions with community leaders 
g. Informal individual conversations with community members 
h. Other, specify 
     
2. Has NPO ever given your community an opportunity to provide 
feedback? 
1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 
2.1 How did it go about this?  
a. Comments and feedback box  
b. Programme evaluation   
c. Survey 
d. Community meetings  
e. Annual general meeting 
f. Invited discussions with community leaders  
g. Invited discussions with community members 
h. Other, specify   
     
3. Has anyone else ever asked members of your community for feedback? 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 
3.1 Who asked? (Include as many as applicable)  
a. NPO directorate/DSD 
b. Municpiality 
c. Other public body (specify):  
d. Outside funders (specify): 
e. Other (specify): 
     
4. Is the community represented on the Board of the NGO? 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 
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4.1 If yes, how is the community representative elected/appointed?      
4.2 Is community invited to AGM? 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 1.Yes 2.No 
V. Statements 
 
I am now going to read you several statements. For each statement, you as a group then 
decide whether you     
 
  1= strongly agree with the statement 
  2= agree with the statement somewhat 
  3= neither agree nor disagree with the statement 
  4= disagree with the statement somewhat 
  5= strongly disagree with the statement 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. [NPO] is always quick to respond when inhabitants of this community or the community 
as a whole ask for help 
 
     
2. [NPO] representatives are hardly ever available when they say they are going to be 
 
     
3. [NPO] representatives are good at what they do 
 
     
4. The people who live in this community are satisfied with the performance of [NPO]  
 
     
5. [NPO] is an important part of our lives  
 
     
6. If [NPO] disappeared we would hardly notice  
 
     
7. [NPO] exists to serve the purposes of its own staff rather than to help us  
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VI. Relative Performance of Specific NGO  
Now turn your attention to the table on the following page.  
 
Preparation 
Write the name and main focus of each NPO written during preparation for SSGI in column 2, first row. In first column write the main focus of NGO 
from: 1 Health; 2 Education; 3 Labour; 4 Community Development (avoid community development if possible). 
 
Do this for each of the NPOs in turn.  
In the SSGI 
In the SSGI focus on the main area of activity in first table. In column 2 put the names of each of the agents who also engage in that activity in the 
community. You can put the agent type codes in the column marked ‘cd’ after the SSGI is over but remember to check any that you are not sure about.  
Now you are ready to work across the table. Work on one NPO at a time. Start with the first NPO. Take the required number of slips of paper and write 
the name of one of the actors listed in column 1 on each. Remember to write the name of [NPO] on one. Give the slips to the FG and ask them to 
arrange them in the rank order that they prefer for each of the questions. Record the rankings in the relevant columns.  
Do the same for the second, third, fourth, etc. NPOs listed in first table. 
 
Other agents: 
1. Government 
2. Private Business 
3. Other NPO 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In addition to [NGO], do any other organizations 
do this acivity in your parish?
Which of these 
organizations do you 
have to pay to get 
them to do this 
activity?
Please rank these 
organizations in terms 
of how much they 
charge for this activity
Please rank these 
organizations in terms 
of how accessible or 
near they are to your 
parish
Please rank these organizations in 
terms of value for money, i.e., in terms 
of how good they are at doing this 
activity which taking account of how 
much they charge.
Now imagine that all 
these organizations do 
this activity for free, then 
how would you rank 
them 
Now imagine that all these 
organizations do this activity 
for free and are all located in 
your village, then how would 
you rank them? 
Name cd tick 1=most expensive 1=nearest 1=best value for money 1=best 1=best
[NGO]
[NGO]
[NGO]
A
ct
iv
ity
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In addition to [NGO], do any other organizations 
do this acivity in your parish?
Which of these 
organizations do you 
have to pay to get 
them to do this 
activity?
Please rank these 
organizations in terms 
of how much they 
charge for this activity
Please rank these 
organizations in terms 
of how accessible or 
near they are to your 
parish
Please rank these organizations in 
terms of value for money, i.e., in terms 
of how good they are at doing this 
activity which taking account of how 
much they charge.
Now imagine that all 
these organizations do 
this activity for free, then 
how would you rank 
them 
Now imagine that all these 
organizations do this activity 
for free and are all located in 
your village, then how would 
you rank them? 
Name cd tick 1=most expensive 1=nearest 1=best value for money 1=best 1=best
[NGO]
[NGO]
[NGO]
A
ct
iv
ity
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
192 
 
VII.Evaluation of each NPO 
Imagine that you find out that [NPO] is going to stop doing its work in South Africa. Imagine that a large sum of money is needed to make it possible 
for [NPO] to carry on doing its work and that your community is asked to help find this money. Now, imagine that the government gives your community 
a grant. You are the committee who has to decide what to do with the grant. The government tells you that you can share all, some, or none of the grant 
equally among the households in the community and you can contribute all, some, or none of the grant to the [NPO] to help keep it working. This pile 
of beans represents the grant. Please separate it into two piles, one representing the money that you would wish to be shared among the households and 
one representing the money that you would wish to help keep the [NGO] working (NB:  one pile could be empty).  
**If the FG is very large and it is proving difficult for them to decide how to split the beans, give them one bean each and let them vote. This is not ideal 
and should only be used as an approach if the other preferred method fails. Indicate which method was used by ticking the appropriate box below. 
VII.i Individual Bean Counts 
Name of NPO Beans allocated to 
NPO 
Beans allocated to 
households 
**The group split the 
pile of beans 
**Each member of the group 
took a ban and they voted 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
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Now we want you to do a similar exercise but this time divide the beans amongst the NPOs discussed and households: 
VIIii. Comparative Bean Counts 
Name of NPO Beans allocated to each NPO 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
Beans allocated to households  
 
 
FINALLY 
If there is no NPO addressing the needs of the community, how does the community address the needs raised? Probe: why would you do it this 
way?  
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Comments from the community: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enumerator’s comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: When have collected consent forms please indicate with an asterisk any group members who were vocal and tended to dominate the 
conversation. Conversely, please indicate with a hash those who were particlarly quiet. 
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